Supreme Court, U. S.
FILED
JUL 21 1977
MICHAEL RODAK, JR., CLERK

In the Supreme Court of the United States

No. 77-118

PACIFIC ENGINEERING & PRODUCTION CO. OF NEVADA,
Petitioner,

vs.

KERR-McGEE CORPORATION AND
KERR-McGEE CHEMICAL CORPORATION,
Respondents.

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals For the Tenth Circuit

C. KEITH ROOKER
1800 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

RICHARD W. GIAUQUE
Suite 500
Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Petitioner

Of Counsel:

REX E. LEE
2840 Iroquois Drive
Provo, Utah 84601

WILLIAM D. HALL
P.O. Box 34436
Washington, D.C. 20034

SORG PRINTING COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA, 346 FIRST STREET, SAN FRANCISCO 94105

In the Supreme Court of the United States

No. .....

PACIFIC ENGINEERING & PRODUCTION CO. OF NEVADA,
Petitioner,

vs.

KERR-McGEE CORPORATION AND
KERR-McGEE CHEMICAL CORPORATION,
Respondents.

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals For the Tenth Circuit and Appendices A, B, and C Thereto

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
Table of Authorities	iii
Opinions Below	1
Jurisdiction	2
Questions Presented	2
Statutes Involved	3
Statement of the Case	4
A. Introductory Statement	4
B. Description of the Industry, the Parties, and the General Economic Facts	6
C. The Decisions Below	8
1. The Trial Court's Findings	8
2. The Court of Appeals' Conclusions	12
Reasons for Granting the Writ	13
1. The Writ Should Be Granted to Correct the Erroneous Rulings That Even Where Actual Monopolization Has Been Established, the Same Intent or Conduct Must Be Proven As in Attempted Monopoly Cases, and That Respondent Could Lawfully Plan and Execute Its Scheme to Price Petitioner Out of Existence	14
A. The Court of Appeals Has Incorrectly Applied the Same Standard of Intent in a Monopolization Case as in an Attempted Monopoly Case	15

Page

B. The Court of Appeals Has Incorrectly Authorized the Possessor of Admitted Monopoly Power to Engage in Business Practices That Were Exclusionary, as if Respondent Did Not Possess Monopoly Power 18

2. The Writ Should Be Granted to Correct the Erroneous Ruling That In Attempted Monopolization Cases Something in Addition to Specific Intent to Destroy Competition or Create a Monopoly Must Be Shown Such as Predatory or Sinister Conduct 22

3. The Writ Should Be Granted to Review the Court of Appeals' Holding That Even Over the Long Run, the Legality of Below Cost Sales Is to Be Measured by Marginal Cost Rather Than Fully Allocated Cost 32

Conclusion 39

Certificate of Service 41

Appendix A (Court of Appeals Opinion)

Appendix B (District Court Liability Opinion)

Appendix C (District Court Damage Opinion)

A. Cases Cited

Pages

Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962) 27, 29, 30

F.T.C. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536 (1960) 26

Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968) 38

Illinois Brick Co. v. State of Illinois, 145 U.S.L.W. 4611 (June 7, 1977) 38

Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co., 348 U.S. 115 (1954) 33, 36

Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973) 19

Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905) 16

Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953) 17, 26

United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948) 17
United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948) 17, 20
United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131 (1948) .. 17
United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927) 19, 21
United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 338 U.S. 338 (1949) 30
Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967), *rehearing denied*, 387 U.S. 949 ..... 3, 26, 27, 33, 34, 36, 37, 38

Pages

Arthur Murray, Inc. v. Reserve Plan, Inc., 406 F.2d 1138 (8th Cir. 1969) 18

Balian Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms Co., 231 F.2d 356 (9th Cir. 1955) 26
Ben Hur Coal Co. v. Wells, 242 F.2d 481 (10th Cir. 1957) 26, 37

Chisholm Brothers Farm Equipment Co. v. International Harvester Co., 498 F.2d 1137 (9th Cir. 1974) 30
Coleman Motor Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 525 F.2d 1338 (3rd Cir. 1975) 30

Denison Mines, Ltd. v. Michigan Chemical Corp., 469 F.2d 1301 (7th Cir. 1972) 30

E. B. Muller & Co. v. FTC, 142 F.2d 511 (6th Cir. 1944).... 34

Forster Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 335 F.2d 47 (1st Cir. 1964), *cert. denied,* 380 U.S. 906 34

Hanson v. Shell Oil Co., 1976-2 Trade Cases ¶ 61,052 (9th Cir. 1976), *cert. denied,* January 24, 1977 (CCH Trade Reg. Rptr. ¶ 60,021 at p. 65,093) 34

International Air Indus., Inc. v. American Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1975), *cert. denied,* 424 U.S. 943.....34, 36
Intern. Railways of Cent. America v. United Brands, 532 F.2d 231 (2nd Cir. 1976) 17

Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., 327 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1964).. 31
Lewis v. Pennington, 400 F.2d 806 (6th Cir. 1968) 17, 18

Maryland Baking Co. v. FTC, 243 F.2d 716 (4th Cir. 1957) 34

Pages

Moore v. Jas. H. Matthews and Co., 1977-1 Trade Cases ¶ 61,376 (9th Cir. 1977) 30-31

Morning Pioneer, Inc. v. Bismarck Tribune Co., 1974-1 Trade Cases ¶ 74,956 (8th Cir. 1974) 31

National Dairy Products Corp. v. United States, 350 F.2d 321 (8th Cir. 1965), *vacated and remanded on other grounds,* 384 U.S. 883 34

Porto Rican American Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 30 F.2d 234 (2nd Cir. 1929), *cert. denied,* 279 U.S. 858 ..... 34, 36

Sanitary Milk v. Bergjans Farm Dairy, Inc., 368 F.2d 679 (8th Cir. 1966) 27

Telex Corp. v. International Business Mach. Corp., 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir. 1975), *cert. dismissed* (petition withdrawn), 423 U.S. 802 ..... 2, 13, 17, 19, 21, 22, 23, 25, 31, 39

Treasure Val. Potato Bar. Ass'n. v. Ore-Ida Foods, Inc., 497 F.2d 203 (9th Cir. 1974) 18

Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Nisley, 300 F.2d 561 (10th Cir. 1961) 31

United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. [certified to the Second Circuit by the Supreme Court pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 29] 1945) 2, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 30

United States v. Empire Gas Corp., 537 F.2d 296 (8th Cir. 1976) 17, 18

Yoder Brothers, Inc. v. California-Florida Plant Corp., 537 F.2d 1347 (5th Cir. 1976) 31

Pages

Lektro-Vend Corp. v. Vendo Co. 403 F.Supp. 527 (N.D. Ill. 1975) 31

United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 91 F.Supp. 333 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) 20

United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F.Supp. 295 (D.Mass. 1953), *aff'd per curiam,* 347 U.S. 521 20

V. & L. Cicione, Inc. v. C. Schmidt & Sons, Inc., 403 F.Supp. 643 (E.D. Pa. 1975) 31

B. STATUTES CITED

Clayton Act, Section 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 ..... 2, 4, 8

Robinson-Patman Act (Clayton Act, Section 2(a), as amended by), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) 3

Sherman Act, Section 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 ..... 17, 20

Sherman Act, Section 2, 15 U.S.C. § 2 3

28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) 2

Rule 52, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 25

C. OTHER AUTHORITIES CITED

Areeda and Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 697 (1975) 32–36

Areeda and Turner, Scherer on Predatory Pricing, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 891 (1976) 33–36

Pages

Cooper, Attempts in Monopolization, a Mildly Expansive Answer to the Prophylactic Riddle of Section 2, 72 Mich. L. Rev. 373 (1974) 28

Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Telex Corp. v. International Business Mach. Corp., certiorari dismissed (petition withdrawn), 423 U.S. 802 (1975) 13–14

Rowe, Price Discrimination Under the Robinson-Patman Act (1962) 26

Scherer, Predatory Pricing and the Sherman Act: A Comment, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 869 (1976) 33–36

Scherer, Some Last Words on Predatory Pricing, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 901 (1976) 33–36

Sullivan, Antitrust (West Pub. Co., 1976) 28

Turner, Antitrust Policy and the Cellophane Case, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 281 (1956) 20

In the Supreme Court of the United States

No. .....

PACIFIC ENGINEERING & PRODUCTION CO. OF NEVADA,
Petitioner,

vs.

KERR-McGEE CORPORATION AND
KERR-McGEE CHEMICAL CORPORATION,
Respondents.

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals For the Tenth Circuit

Petitioner Pacific Engineering & Production Co. of Nevada prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment entered on February 16, 1977, by the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Court of Appeals appears in Appendix A to this Petition. It has not yet been officially reported (No. 76-1238). The liability and damage opinions of the District Court (the Honorable Walter E. Hoffman, Eastern District of Virginia, sitting by special designation) appear in Appendices B and C to this Petition. They are reported in 1974-1 Trade Cases ¶ 75,054, pp. 96,721-51, and 1976-1 Trade Cases ¶ 60,724, pp. 68,102-16, and ¶ 60,737, pp. 68,166-68.

JURISDICTION

The opinion of the Court of Appeals was filed on February 16, 1977. The Court of Appeals' Order denying Petitioner's timely Petition for Rehearing was entered April 25, 1977. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1). The District Court had original jurisdiction under 15 U.S.C. § 15.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. It is uncontroverted that Respondent in this case possessed actual monopoly power—annual shares of the market that ranged between 67 and 88 percent, plus power to control price and to exclude competition. Under these circumstances:

(a) Must the plaintiff also prove the same specific predatory intent required by the Court of Appeals for attempted monopolization cases in order to establish a violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act? Is not the requisite intent, as clearly held by Judge Learned Hand in the *Alcoa* case[1] inferrable from the existence of such uncontroverted monopoly power, coupled simply with the intent to maintain such power and position, however "innocently" Respondent may have proceeded so to do?

(b) Does Section 2 of the Sherman Act allow, as permitted by the Court of Appeals both in this case and in the *Telex* case[2] the holder of undisputed monopoly power to engage in the same range of activity actually or potentially harmful to its only competitor as is permitted a firm that does not have such power? Specifically, is not an actual monopolist prohibited from engaging over a seven-year period in below-cost pricing and other overt acts for the specific purpose, as admitted by the Court of Appeals, of driving its sole competitor out of business?

---

1. *United States v. Aluminum Co. of America*, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. [certified to the Second Circuit by the Supreme Court pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 29] 1945).

2. *Telex Corp. v. International Business Mach. Corp.*, 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir. 1975), *cert. dismissed* (petition withdrawn), 423 U.S. 802.

2. The District Court in this case found that Respondent had the specific intent to destroy competition or create a monopoly. The Court of Appeals did not reject this finding as clearly erroneous, but found that Respondent's overt acts were not in themselves "predatory" or "sinister." The second question presented, therefore, is whether, in proving the intent component of an attempt to monopolize, the plaintiff must show something in addition to specific intent to destroy competition or create a monopoly, such as "predatory" or "sinister" conduct.

3. The District Court found that Respondent's sales over a seven-year period were far below cost, and were fixed with the specific intent of driving Petitioner out of existence. The Court of Appeals accepted the finding of sustained below-cost sales and the finding of Respondent's specific intent, but held that Respondent's prices were nevertheless lawful because they were above its marginal or average variable cost. The third question presented is whether "cost" for purposes of below-cost sales—in both attempted monopoly and price discrimination cases—is limited to marginal cost, even where the relevant time period is a long-run period, in this case seven years, or whether "cost" is actual fully-allocated cost, as suggested by this Court in the *Utah Pie* case.[3]

STATUTES INVOLVED

Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2, provides, in relevant part:

> Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize . . . shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor . . . .

Section 2(a) of the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a), provides, in relevant part:

> It shall be unlawful for any person . . . to discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities of like

---

3. *Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co.*, 386 U.S. 685 (1967), *rehearing denied*, 387 U.S. 949.

> grade and quality, . . . where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce . . . .

Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15, provides:

> Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the United States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover three-fold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Introductory Statement.

Cases arising under Section 2 of the Sherman Act are not numerous, but are essential to the implementation of federal antitrust policy. The holding of the Court of Appeals in this case is of rare significance because it imposes an enormous and unprecedented magnification of the plaintiff's burden in monopoly and attempted monopoly cases. That holding, moreover, adds serious conflicts among the Circuits to the existing confusion surrounding standards of intent in attempted monopoly cases.

The learned and long-experienced trial judge dealt with a case that was pending for six years between filing and judgment, with a record aggregating in excess of 2,700 exhibits, trial testimony aggregating over 3,000 pages, and the deposition testimony of some 32 witnesses. In 1974, almost a full year after the close of the record on the liability trial, the trial judge issued a 76-page opinion, containing his findings of fact and conclusions of law, and certified the case for interlocutory appeal. The Court of Appeals declined the interlocutory appeal. In 1976, again almost a full year following the damage trial, the trial judge issued a 36-page opinion, containing his findings of fact and conclusions of law.

The trial judge found that Respondent had unlawfully monopolized and attempted to monopolize the ammonium perchlorate market, and had sold ammonium perchlorate in violation of the Robinson-Patman Act. Damages awarded, after trebling, were $4,590,594, together with attorneys' fees of $528,500 and taxable costs.

The Court of Appeals correctly appraised Judge Hoffman's meticulous and extensive opinions as "commendably thorough and exact as to the basic facts." (Appendix A, p. 2.)

The District Court's holdings that Respondent was guilty of both actual monopolization and attempted monopoly were based on the District Court's findings that:

> (1) During the years 1967 through 1970, the annual shares of the relevant market in the possession of Respondent ranged between 67 percent and 88 percent. (Appendix B, p. 38). The District Court also found that Respondent had the power to control the price; that in light of the finding of power to control the price there was no need to ascertain power to exclude competition; but that "if we were to decide this issue . . . we would rule that the defendant [Respondent] had this power." (Appendix B, p. 65.)
>
> (2) Respondent had "the specific intent to destroy competition or create a monopoly, [and] took overt acts pursuant to this intent, and that a dangerous probability of monopoly existed." (Appendix B, p. 59.)

None of these findings was rejected by the Court of Appeals as clearly erroneous. Indeed, the Court of Appeals characterized Judge Hoffman's findings as "commendably thorough and exact as to the basic facts." (Appendix A, p. 2.) Thus, the necessary effect of the Court of Appeals' holding is to expand the plaintiff's burden in Section 2 cases far beyond the holdings of any previous case. The effect of that holding is that:

> (1) In actual monopolization cases, the plaintiff must prove not only actual monopoly power but also the same

intent and conduct required by the Court of Appeals in attempted monopoly cases;

(2) In cases of attempted monopolization (and, it follows actual monopolization), the plaintiff must establish facts beyond proof of specific intent to destroy competition or create a monopoly—the plaintiff must prove "predatory" or "sinister" conduct.

The District Court also found that Respondent violated the Robinson-Patman Act by contemporaneous sales of ammonium perchlorate of like grade and quality to different purchasers at discriminatory prices. The Court of Appeals did not reject any part of this finding. It reversed the Robinson-Patman adjudication on the ground that predatory conduct had not been proven. It rejected without comment the District Court's finding that Respondent's discriminatory pricing had itself directly lessened competition and tended to monopoly. The District Court had based this finding on its adjudication of actual monopolization, a result the District Court found to have been achieved, in part, by Respondent's discriminatory pricing.

The effect of the Court of Appeals' Robinson-Patman holding therefore is to add a new element to the plaintiff's burden in a Robinson-Patman case, the requirement of proof of predatory conduct *in addition* to an actual finding of tendency to monopoly, notwithstanding the total absence in the Robinson-Patman Act of any such requirement.

B. Description of the Industry, the Parties, and the General Economic Facts.

The District Court found (and the Court of Appeals did not disagree) that the relevant product market in this Section 2 case is all ammonium perchlorate ("A/P") and the relevant geographic market, the entire United States.

A/P is one of the three major ingredients, and by weight and volume the principal ingredient, of solid rocket propellants. Its use as a rocket fuel oxidizer constitutes virtually the entire national market for A/P. Prior to 1958, Respondent[4] was the sole manufacturer of A/P in the United States. It had a complete monopoly. In 1958, two large firms (Hooker Chemical Company and Pennsalt Chemical Corporation) and one small firm (Petitioner) entered the market in competition with Respondent. In the period 1954-1957, when Respondent was the only producer, the price of A/P was above $.40 a pound. As competition eroded this monopoly price, Pennsalt by 1965 (the name later changed to Pennwalt) and Hooker by 1966 shut down their plants and left the market. In 1965, and during the following seven-year period, Respondent—faced with competition only from a small, one-product company—first reduced its A/P price to $.15 per pound, and then maintained the price in the $.15-$.20 range, with almost all competitive sales being below $.185 per pound, substantially below its cost. (Appendix B, p. 35.)

In 1965, when Respondent fixed the $.15 per pound price, it had net sales of over $55,000,000, and net income before taxes of nearly $9,000,000. (J A 2559.[5]) In the same year, Petitioner had net sales of $1,307,296 and a net operating loss of $535,613. (J A 2562.) In 1970, the final year of the damage period, Respondent enjoyed net sales of over $527,000,000 and net income before taxes of over $47,000,000. (P X 1086.[6]) In that year

---

4. Both Respondents are referred to collectively as "Respondent." Prior to 1958, American Potash & Chemical Corporation was the sole supplier of A/P. In 1967, it was merged into and with Respondent Kerr-McGee Corporation, which has since conducted the business through a wholly-owned subsidiary, at first named "Ampot, Inc.," later named "American Potash & Chemical Corporation," and now named "Kerr-McGee Chemical Corporation."

5. "J A" refers to the Joint Appendix comprising the record before the Court of Appeals. The Joint Appendix consists of 26 printed volumes, comprising 5,059 pages.

6. "P X" refers to Plaintiff's Exhibits received in evidence.

Petitioner had net sales of $1,005,071 and a net operating loss of $526,815. (J A 2562.) At the time of the liability trial, Respondent was one of the 250 to 300 largest business enterprises in the entire nation, with book assets exceeding $800,000,000. (J A 1219.)

Respondent itself suffered large losses in its A/P operations ($458,092 in 1965; $362,131 in 1966; $210,676 in 1967; $328,625 in 1968; and $247,560 in 1969)—a total of $1,607,084 in five years. Nevertheless, because of its unique ability as a multi-product supplier to the Government of products subject to the Renegotiation Act, Respondent in fact lost nothing. Unlike Petitioner, Respondent was able to subsidize its A/P losses from its below-cost sales directly from other profitable Government business. This ability resulted from the regulations of the Renegotiation Board then in effect that based allowable (renegotiable) profits on the aggregate results of operations relative to all Government business. (*E.g.*, PX 1076-1082, J A 3194-3291 [Respondent's Renegotiation Reports for 1965-1971].) This special capacity to subsidize A/P losses directly from other profitable Government business emphasizes dramatically the differences in size and financial muscle between Petitioner and Respondent. Small wonder that Judge Hoffman found that Respondent's below-cost pricing was aimed directly at Petitioner's very existence. Even in reversing Judge Hoffman's result, *the Court of Appeals itself concluded that Respondent possessed "an intent that its pricing succeed in excluding [Petitioner] from the market . . . ."* (Appendix A, p. 11; emphasis added.)

C. The Decisions Below.

The District Court had jurisdiction in this private antitrust case by reason of Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15.

1. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS.

Judge Hoffman found that Respondent's variable cost was $.12 to $.14 per pound. (Appendix C, p. 105.) If other usual and

actual costs such as taxes, insurance, management expense, sales costs, interest, overhead, depreciation, and general and administrative costs were included, however, the cost was between $.1932 and $.2937 per pound. (Appendix B, p. 35.) The District Court held that throughout the "damage period," Respondent had the power to control the price of A/P and that it could have raised the price. (Appendix B, p. 64.) Instead of raising the price, which would have maximized its profits even though it would have lost some of its volume (Appendix C, pp. 102, 106), Respondent, as held by the District Court, with "predatory intent," and "specific intent" to drive Petitioner out of business (Appendix B, p. 60) adopted and for over seven years maintained a price barely above the cost of materials and labor alone. (Appendix B, pp. 33-34.)

There is no doubt that Respondent's principal executives—its president and its four operating vice presidents—knew full well and calculated their pricing policy on the expectation of forcing Petitioner out of business, and precluding market entry or reentry by other potential competitors. In one of those remarkable documents that occasionally surfaces in aggravated antitrust cases, a June 1965 memorandum from D. C. Cable, Respondent's special financial analyst, to Respondent's executives, the writer recommended raising the A/P price from $.165 per pound to a level at which both Petitioner and Respondent could make a reasonable profit. Cable specifically advised his superiors that they ought to reconcile themselves to sharing the market with Petitioner, and cease pricing A/P on "the expectation of forcing [Petitioner] to shut down." (PX 44, J A 2411; Appendix B, pp. 35-37; Appendix A, pp. 5-6.) Cable added, however, that the higher price should not be so high as to encourage market entry by others. Cable's superiors disregarded his sound advice, and cut the price to $.15 per pound, which resulted in a net loss of $.134 per pound on the major sale then

under consideration. (Appendix B, p. 36.) As Judge Hoffman observed, the Cable memo is "Perhaps the clearest evidence that [Respondent] set its pricing policies with full knowledge that its price was below cost * * * [and] that officials of [Respondent] were aware that [Petitioner] was facing bankruptcy if the price of A/P remained below cost." (Appendix B, pp. 35-37.)

Judge Hoffman squarely held that Respondent monopolized the A/P market. (Appendix B, p. 65.) Although Petitioner and Respondent had approximately equal shares of the market in 1964, Respondent's pricing increased its market share to as high as 88 percent in 1968. Indeed, the Court of Appeals made essentially the same finding:

> "In the face of this knowledge, [Respondent] continued its low prices. In 1968, [Respondent] was bidding two to three cents a pound below [Petitioner]. [Respondent's] market share is indicative of the degree of its success in foreclosing [Petitioner] from the market.

Year	Percentage
1966	53.5
1967	80.0
1968	88.0
1969	67.0
1970	78.0

Appendix A, p. 6.

Both Judge Hoffman and the Court of Appeals agreed that Respondent selected and priced A/P at these levels knowing *and intending* that Petitioner, a small one-product company, could not survive at those prices. (Appendix A, pp. 5, 11.) Stated plainly, Respondent, an extremely large, diversified corporation, could and did directly make up its A/P losses from profits on other products—indeed directly on other renegotiable Government business—as well as from the profits of A/P sold at discriminatory prices to customers for whose business Peti-

tioner had only nominal penetration. Thus, to customers for whose business there was intense direct competition between Petitioner and Respondent, Respondent's price was in the range of $.15 per pound. To customers where such competition was lacking, it charged contemporaneously as high as $.325 per pound. (Appendix B, p. 74.)

The District Court further found, and the Court of Appeals did not disagree, that Respondent undertook "unreasonable" surveillance of Petitioner (Appendix B, pp. 38-40), and used the results to select pricing policies which would destroy Petitioner. Indeed, Respondent even made computations, based on information available to it from its surveillance, as to how long Petitioner could survive at Respondent's below-cost prices, and selected its pricing policy accordingly. When Respondent computed that Petitioner would expire, Respondent's quotations to customers for sales thereafter were much higher. When Petitioner did not bankrupt on schedule, or its circumstances changed favorably, Respondent lowered its forward prices. (Appendix B, pp. 42-45, 61.)

After Petitioner had not won a single bid for almost two years, it finally secured a major contract at $.1794 per pound from United Technology Corporation. This contract alone was expected to keep Petitioner in business for a substantial period of time. Defendant thereupon sent its Vice President J.C. Shumacher and its A/P Product Manager to see the President of UTC. Shumacher told UTC's President that Respondent had a large "surplus" of A/P that it was willing to sell at $.09 to $.10 per pound (far below the cost of materials and labor alone). The amount to be offered at this price was in excess of one year's supply to UTC. The obvious reason for this remarkable proposition was to take away what little business Petitioner would have. At the time of this attempted "dumping" Respondent had 88 percent of the market. Had the dumping been successful, Respondent would

have had 98 percent of the market. UTC, however, investigated and found that no surplus existed as was asserted, and rejected Respondent's unsavory offer. (Appendix B, pp. 40-42, 62.)

The District Court also found, and the Court of Appeals did not disagree, that Respondent made sales forecasts predicting it would obtain *all* A/P business (Appendix B, pp. 31-33, 62), and that Respondent acted to impair Petitioner's status as a small business, entitling it to "set-asides" on some procurements and to favorable financing (Appendix B, pp. 42, 61), a behavior found by Judge Hoffman to be "symbolic of [Respondent's] efforts to drive [Petitioner] from the market." (Appendix B, p. 61.)

Judge Hoffman, based on the above facts and numerous others outlined in his opinions, and not contested by the Court of Appeals, found that Respondent priced A/P at the foregoing prices for the purpose of driving Petitioner out of business so that Respondent would regain its 100 percent monopoly and be able to sell A/P at monopoly prices. (Appendix C, p. 99.) The District Court found that Respondent's market percentages of 80, 88, 67 and 78 percent during the years 1967 to 1970 were monopolistic. The Court of Appeals did not contest any of the findings related in this paragraph.

2. THE COURT OF APPEALS' CONCLUSIONS.

The following summarizes the conclusions reached by the Court of Appeals in reversing Judge Hoffman's judgments of liability and damages.

1. Respondent's pricing practices were lawful, even though for a long-run period of seven years far below full cost and at or just above marginal cost, and even though set, without any computation of marginal cost at the time, with knowledge and intent that those prices would drive Petitioner out of business.

2. "The other practices employed by [Respondent] inflicted no independent harm," and *"indicate nothing more than an*

intent that [Respondent's] pricing succeed in excluding [Petitioner] from the market." (Appendix A, p. 11; emphasis added.)

3. The Court of Appeals reversed Judge Hoffman's adjudication of actual monopolization. This was done without reference to the District Court's findings of Respondent's monopoly power to control price and to exclude competition, and without reference to Respondent's monopolistic market shares. The Court of Appeals thus explicitly held that the same standards of intent or conduct must be satisfied to establish a case of actual monopolization as to establish a case of attempted monopoly.

4. The Court of Appeals reversed Judge Hoffman's adjudication of attempted monopoly. It did so because of the absence of sales below marginal cost, which the Court of Appeals evidently would have considered predatory conduct. It did so without reference to the "clearly erroneous" standard governing appellate review of trial court factual findings, and without regard for the particular appropriateness of this standard on such issues as intent.

5. The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court's determination that Respondent violated the Robinson-Patman Act, holding that its admittedly discriminatory pricing caused no competitive injury, because, again, the Court of Appeals found no predatory conduct.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

The Petitioner in *Telex Corp v. International Business Mach. Corp.*, 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir. 1975), *cert. dismissed* (petition withdrawn), 423 U.S. 802, stated accurately the gravity of the novel direction taken by the Tenth Circuit both in *Telex* and in this case:

> Supremely at stake are the whole meaning and future of the national effort to control monopolization and attempts

> to monopolize, with the heretofore unbroken course of the law not only blocked but rolled back by the decision below. (Petition for Writ of Certiorari, p.26.)

The opinion of the Court of Appeals should be reviewed, and the three questions presented considered by this Court, for reasons that are distinct as to each question.

1. The Writ Should Be Granted to Correct the Erroneous Rulings That Even Where Actual Monopolization Has Been Established, the Same Intent or Conduct Must Be Proven as in Attempted Monopoly Cases, and That Respondent Could Lawfully Plan and Execute Its Scheme to Price Petitioner Out of Existence.

This case is first and foremost a monopolization case. The attempt claim is obviously unnecessary if the monopolization adjudications of the trial court are sustained.

The Court of Appeals correctly notes at the outset of its opinion that the elements of a monopolization case are (1) the possession of monopoly power in a relevant market, and (2) willful acquisition or maintenance of that monopoly power. (Appendix A, p. 2.) The Court of Appeals accepts the District Court's findings as to relevant market and Respondent's monopoly market shares of up to 88 percent. (Appendix A, p. 6.) Read in its entirety, the Court of Appeals' opinion implicitly approves the District Court's additional specific findings that Respondent possessed monopoly power to control prices and to exclude competition.

The Court of Appeals therefore acknowledges that this is a case in which Respondent possessed monopoly power in a properly-defined market. Only one ingredient remains to establish the offense of monopolization, the requisite intent to monopolize—whether Respondent's monopoly power was willfully acquired or maintained.

A. THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS INCORRECTLY APPLIED THE SAME STANDARD OF INTENT IN A MONOPOLIZATION AS IN AN ATTEMPTED MONOPOLY CASE.

The Court of Appeals does not separately address the intent issues as to the monopolization claims and the attempt claims, but from the outset *incorrectly* states Petitioner's claims and the District Court's finding. To the reader's amazement, the Court of Appeals flatly declares the issue of intent on both claims to be the same:

> The distinctions between the two offenses are not relevant to our decision, because the same conduct was relied upon to establish both the attempt and the willful maintenance of the monopoly. The fundamental issue is whether [Respondent] engaged in predatory price cutting. (Appendix A, pp. 2-3.)

The Court of Appeals thereafter proceeds with an analysis of intent that never distinguishes between the monopolization and attempt claims, and concludes that mixed discussion by holding:

> There is nothing in the record to warrant a finding that [Respondent] engaged in predatory pricing. (Appendix A, p. 15.)

Thus, the Court of Appeals squarely holds that the intent requirement for a monopolization offense and an attempt offense are identical, and that both require *predatory conduct,* elsewhere in its opinion characterized as *"sinister."* (Appendix A, p. 11.) It is notable, however, that the Court of Appeals, while it disagreed with the trial court's characterization of Respondent's acts as predatory, did not disagree with its findings as to what the acts were, their effects on competition, or the purpose or intent with which they were performed.

For purposes of the first Question presented, the distinction between specific intent and "predatory" or "sinister"[7] conduct is

---

7. The words "predatory" and "sinister" ought not in any event to be of any significance. They are only labels expressing a judgment that the behavior is to be condemned.

not important. The controlling fact is that for the first time in history a Court of Appeals in a monopoly case has imposed an intent requirement beyond general intent even where the defendant has preemptive market shares that are indisputably in the range of monopoly, and even where there are unrejected findings of fact that the defendant had at the same time power to control price and to exclude competition.

Thus, what the Court of Appeals has done is to combine the most burdensome elements of two separate Section 2 offenses: (1) proof of actual monopoly power, and (2) proof of specific intent, or, for reasons discussed below, something more than specific intent.

Every prior decision of which we are aware, of this Court and of the Circuits, recognizes the well-established difference between the specific intent required to establish an unlawful attempt to monopolize and the very different and lower level of proof of intent required in a case of monopolization.

The leading case is Judge Learned Hand's decision in *United States v. Aluminum Co. of America,* 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. [certified to the Second Circuit by this Court pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 29] 1945).[8] Judge Hand's heretofore-accepted analysis regarding the requisite intent in a monopolization case follows:

> In order to fall within § 2, the monopolist must have both the power to monopolize, and the intent to monopolize. To read the passage as demanding any "specific" intent, makes nonsense of it, for no monopolist monopolizes unconscious of what he is doing. So here, "Alcoa" meant to keep, and did keep, that complete and exclusive hold upon the ingot market with which it started. That was to "monopolize" that market, *however innocently it otherwise proceeded.* 148 F.2d at 432; emphasis added.

---

8. In the threshold decision, *Swift & Co. v. United States,* 196 U.S. 375, 396 (1905), Mr. Justice Holmes distinguished between the proof of specific intent required in an attempt case and the presumed intent to monopolize that should follow from the finding of monopoly power.

In *United States v. Griffith*, 334 U.S. 100, 105 (1948), this Court approved Judge Hand's analysis in a declaration that, on the facts of the case, is short of a square holding:

> As stated in [Alcoa], "no monopolist monopolizes unconscious of what he is doing." Specific intent in the sense in which the common law used the term is necessary only where the acts fall short of the results condemned by the Act.

The Court reaffirmed this principle in *dicta* in *Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States*, 345 U.S. 594, 626 (1953):

> While the completed offense of monopolization under § 2 demands only a general intent to do the act, "for no monopolist monopolizes unconscious of what he is doing", a specific intent to destroy competition or build monopoly is essential to guilt for the mere attempt now charged.

This Court has never retreated from or weakened the declarations of these cases, which make clear that there is a great difference between the specific intent required in an attempt case and the general intent that is presumed from the possession of unlawful monopoly power in a monopolization case. See also, applications of the equivalent rule in Section 1 cases, as in *United States v. Paramount Pictures*, 334 U.S. 131, 172-3 (1948), and *United States v. Columbia Steel Co.*, 334 U.S. 495, 524-5 (1948). This Court evidently has not, however, adopted the rule of the *Alcoa* case by a square holding, thus leaving latitude for the division among the Circuits that is created by the decision of the Court of Appeals in *Telex* and in this case.

The Circuits other than the Tenth that have considered the content of the requisite intent to monopolize in an actual monopolization case have, prior to the decision of the Court of Appeals in this case, followed the *Alcoa* case. *Intern. Railways of Cent. America v. United Brands*, 532 F.2d 231, 239 (2d Cir. 1976); *Lewis v. Pennington*, 400 F.2d 806, 811 (6th Cir. 1968); *United States v. Empire Gas Corp.*, 537 F.2d 296, 298-9 (8th Cir. 1976);

Arthur Murray, Inc. v. Reserve Plan, Inc., 406 F.2d 1138, 1145 (8th Cir. 1969); *Treasure Val. Potato Bar. Ass'n. v. Ore-Ida Foods, Inc.*, 497 F.2d 203, 209-10 (9th Cir. 1974).

In *Lewis v. Pennington,* the Sixth Circuit held:

> Unlike the substantive offense of monopolization, where it need be established that a company has monopoly power . . . coupled with a general or deliberate intent to exercise that power . . . , a specific intent to accomplish an unlawful result is necessary where monopoly power has not been obtained and the charge is an attempt or conspiracy to monopolize. 400 F.2d at 811.

In *Empire Gas,* the Eighth Circuit held:

> Specific intent need not be proved when it is alleged and proved that monopolization has been accomplished. 537 F.2d at 299.

In this case, as in *Alcoa,* Respondent "meant to keep, and did keep," that hold upon the market, that share of the market, that power over price, and that power to exclude competition, that it had: "That was to 'monopolize' that market, however innocently [Respondent] otherwise proceeded." 148 F.2d at 432.

B. THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS INCORRECTLY AUTHORIZED THE POSSESSOR OF ADMITTED MONOPOLY POWER TO ENGAGE IN BUSINESS PRACTICES THAT WERE EXCLUSIONARY BOTH IN PURPOSE AND EFFECT, AS IF RESPONDENT DID NOT POSSESS MONOPOLY POWER.

A major reason why the writ should be granted is that the decision below is in clear conflict with Judge Hand's opinion in *Alcoa.* The decision reverses the direction of the law on the subject. Thus there is a *direct conflict* between the Tenth and Second Circuits. But the conflict is more than that. Because there was not a quorum of this Court eligible to sit in *Alcoa,* the Second Circuit decided it under a special grant of jurisdiction and was acting in the capacity of a court of last resort—of this Court itself. A disagreement by any other court of appeals with a decision of that stature commands review by this Court.

Alcoa, and all subsequent decisions until *Telex* and this case have recognized that *monopoly is a condition, a state of affairs,* not limited to a condition produced by acts thought to be "unfair" or "reprehensible." The basic definition of monopoly power is "the power to control prices or exclude competition."

Whether the affirmative acts of the monopolist are neutral or reprehensible, lawful or unlawful if committed by one lacking monopoly power, is totally extraneous. No doubt theoretical arguments can be mustered why it would be better to permit the monopolist to sell at one price or another, perhaps even as here at a price far below his costs, regardless of the effect on competition or even regardless of his purposes, on the theory that thereby the public gains the benefit of low prices. But those are arguments of statecraft, to be addressed to Congress. They are not the philosophy of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. In adopting that Act Congress had no "idea of imposing an economist's model of competition on American Industry" or of enacting standards that change their meaning with every seasonal crop of economic theory. *United States v. Trenton Potteries Co.,* 273 U.S. 392, 397 (1927).

By the time of *Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States,* 410 U.S. 366 (1973), the law, as we submit it to be, was recognized, even by the dissenting justices, as the "familiar Sherman Act formula" under which the unilateral possessor of monopoly power acting to preserve that power is guilty of an antitrust violation. 410 U.S. at 383. What was before the Court in *Otter Tail* was as lawfully acquired a monopoly as can be imagined, a regulated natural monopoly. Yet Otter Tail was held to have violated Section 2 because it refused to sell power to a municipal corporation or to transmit power for it; it "used its monopoly power in the towns in its service area to foreclose competition or gain a competitive advantage, or to destroy a competitor . . . ." 410 U.S. at 377.

Judge Wyzanski in *United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.*, 110 F.Supp. 295 (D.Mass. 1953), *aff'd per curiam*, 347 U.S. 521, understood both *Alcoa* and *United States v. Griffith*, 334 U.S. 100 (1948):

> Since Judge Learned Hand's opinion in 1945 . . . and . . . United States v. Griffith . . . that provision of § 2 . . . has been so interpreted as to reach any enterprise that has exercised power to *control* a defined market, if that power is to any substantial extent the result of barriers erected by its own business methods (*even though not predatory, immoral, or restraining trade* in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1), unless the enterprise shows that the barriers are *exclusively* [emphasis is the court's] the result of superior skill, superior products, natural advantages, technological or economic efficiency, scientific research, *low margins of profit maintained permanently and without discrimination,* legal licenses, or the like. 110 F.Supp. at 297; emphasis added.

So also, on remand of *Alcoa* to the district court, Judge Knox understood its teaching, *United States v. Aluminum Co. of America*, 91 F.Supp. 333 (S.D.N.Y. 1950): ". . . Judge Learned Hand demonstrated that [there was no] requirement of abusive practices in addition to that of monopoly power . . ." (91 F.Supp. at 341), and no requirement that conduct be "predatory." The law had changed "in substantive emphasis from 'abuse' to 'power' . . . ." (91 F.Supp. at 342.) So, later, Professor Turner summed it up: "Alcoa clearly consigned the abuse theory of monopolization to limbo."[9]

Plainly Judge Hand's decision was that under Section 2 it is not necessary to convict the defendant of "practices unlawful in themselves." He added:

> So here, "Alcoa" meant to keep, and did keep, that complete and exclusive hold upon the ingot market with which it

---

9. Turner, Antitrust Policy and the Cellophane Case, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 281, 292 (1956).

started. *That was to "monopolize" that market, however innocently it otherwise proceeded.* 148 F.2d at 432; emphasis added.

Contrary to the reasoning of the Court of Appeals in *Telex* and in this case, *Alcoa* clearly held that conduct need not be "predatory" or "sinister" in tone in order to bring the possessor of monopoly power over the line from permissible conduct into illegality under Section 2, and that it is no defense to have done no more than use maneuvers honestly industrial or to have endeavored only to preserve the monopolist's share of the market. It is enough either (1) that the monopolist meant to preserve its dominating hold, or (2) that among other reasons, whatever they were, he acted with intent to prevent competition or destroy a competitor.

In *Alcoa* Judge Hand further demonstrated the irrelevance of the fact that Alcoa had not made exorbitant profits. (148 F.2d at 426, 427.) It is no defense to a price-fixing conspiracy that the prices fixed are "reasonable" or indeed that the conspirators end up, because of industry over-capacity, bad judgment, or other factors, operating at a loss; the offense under Section 1 lies in the concert, and it is said that courts have no competence to determine the reasonableness of prices. *United States v. Trenton Potteries Co.*, 273 U.S. 392, 397 (1927). Similarly, courts have no more competence to determine reasonableness of prices of a single firm monopolizer, and the offense under Section 2 lies in the monopolization. The fact that Respondent incurred huge losses in order to drive out Petitioner and ward off new venture capital faces Judge Hand's statement:

> Indeed, it may be thought a paradox to say that anyone has the monopoly of a market in which at all times he must meet a competition that limits his price. *We shall show that it is not.* 148 F.2d at 425; emphasis added.

In a famous passage Judge Hand also said:

> Many people believe that possession of unchallenged economic power deadens initiative, discourages thrift and depresses energy; that immunity from competition is a narcotic, and rivalry is a stimulant to industrial progress; that the spur of constant stress is necessary to counteract an inevitable disposition to let well enough alone. 148 F.2d at 427.

We submit that the meaning of *Alcoa* is clear. Intent in the case of actual monopoly consists in the purposeful maintenance of market power and position. The possessor of monopoly power cannot be permitted the same range of business practices available to those facing competition on the merits from rivals representing a real challenge.

That, we submit is not only the meaning of *Alcoa.* It is the meaning of Section 2. If, as we believe, it is the law already stated beyond question, this Court should grant the Writ to remove the stultifying and dangerous precedents represented by this case, and by *Telex* as well.

The Writ should be granted to resolve the division among the Circuits created by the decision of the Court of Appeals in this case, and to authoritatively adopt the rule of the *Alcoa* case. The Court should declare authoritatively for the courts of the United States an intent requirement that recognizes, as did Judge Hand in the *Alcoa* case, that the actual monopolist presents a significantly greater threat to competition than does the firm that has not demonstrated actual power of monopolization.

2. The Writ Should Be Granted to Correct the Erroneous Ruling That in Attempted Monopolization Cases Something in Addition to Specific Intent to Destroy Competition or Create a Monopoly Must Be Shown Such as Predatory or Sinister Conduct.

If the monopolization claim were not established in this case, one would then be obliged to examine the trial court's *alternative* finding that Respondent unlawfully attempted to monopolize. As is uniformly recognized, a charge of attempted monopoly under

Section 2 of the Sherman Act requires proof that Respondent's conduct was motivated by a specific intent to monopolize. The Court of Appeals in this case, however, has imposed a standard of proof regarding such intent that is patently erroneous. Among the previously decided cases, only the Tenth Circuit Court's opinion in the *Telex* case, which was settled before this Court ruled on the Petition for Writ of Certiorari, has held that a plaintiff in a Section 2 attempt case must meet the requirement of proving specific intent to monopolize by evidence that the conduct of the defendant injurious to competition was "sinister." As will be demonstrated, however, the decided cases are, at best, confused and chaotic in their attempts to go beyond the formulation "specific intent to monopolize" and further define the applicable standard of intent. The Court of Appeals in this case has imposed by its holding a criminal standard of intent never contemplated by Congress in enacting the Sherman Act and never countenanced by this Court.

Judge Hoffman's finding of specific intent was not rejected by the Court of Appeals, and controls this aspect of the case. The District Court observed:

> In order to establish such an attempt [to monopolize], the plaintiff must show that the defendant had the specific intent to destroy competition or create a monopoly . . . . (Appendix B, p. 59.)
>
> * * *
>
> As is claimed by [Petitioner] there is ample evidence of predatory intent. (Appendix B, p. 60.)

The District Court then made this finding:

> Respondent's extended below cost selling combined with its other acts provide the specific intent in the case at bar.
> We find this intent notwithstanding the fact that a company which reduces prices in defense of its economic life is not guilty of eliminating competition. (Appendix B, p. 60.)

The Court of Appeals did not reject as clearly erroneous Judge Hoffman's finding that there was "specific intent to destroy com-

petition or create a monopoly, that [Respondent] took overt acts pursuant to this intent, and that a dangerous probability of monopoly existed." (Appendix B. p. 59.) Necessarily, therefore, the Court of Appeals has established as part of the plaintiff's burden in attempted monopoly cases a requirement that goes beyond the specific intent declared by the District Court.

The Court of Appeals first correctly observed:

> A case of attempted monopolization requires proof that [Respondent's] conduct was motivated by specific intent to monopolize . . . . (Appendix A, p. 2.)

Its next step removed its analysis from the conception of "specific intent to monopolize":

> The fundamental issue is whether [Respondent] engaged in *predatory* price cutting. (Appendix A, p. 3; emphasis added.)

The third step taken in the Court of Appeals' sequence of logic is so far removed from the conception of "specific intent to monopolize" as to be unrelated to it. After reviewing some of the District Court's factual findings, and seriously misconstruing a key finding,[10] and after reviewing Respondent's *contested* evidence,

---

10. At Appendix A, page 6, the Court of Appeals erroneously stated:

> In the circumstances of the industry, the trial court found [Respondent's] prices alone were not a sufficient basis for an inference of predatory intent.

At Appendix A, page 11, the Court of Appeals based its ultimate ruling on this error:

> If the trial court correctly found [Respondent's] pricing was not predatory in itself, we do not believe [Respondent] can be found guilty of violating the Sherman Act.

Respondent asserted the foregoing interpretation of Judge Hoffman's liability opinion in its brief in the Court of Appeals (pp. 28-29), citing pages 42-43 of that opinion (Appendix B, pp. 60-61). Nothing on those pages, or anywhere else in Judge Hoffman's opinion, states that Respondent's below-cost pricing was insufficient alone to sustain his specific intent finding. Indeed, Judge Hoffman implies the contrary:

> It is not *just* the sales below cost, however, which convince us that [Respondent] possessed the requisite predatory intent. Kerr-McGee's other activities are equally persuasive. (Appendix B, p. 61; emphasis added.)

the Court of Appeals reasoned:

> The trial court rejected [Respondent's] contention that this evidence showed an absence of *predatory intent.*
>
> * * *
>
> The [District] [C]ourt's holding that [Respondent's] conduct was *predatory* is based on its effect as a competitor rather than its effect on competition.
>
> * * *
>
> *Predatory* pricing is the essential unfair means alleged in this case. The other practices employed by [Respondent] inflicted no independent harm. They were merely auxiliaries to its general pricing policies and *indicate nothing more than an intent that its pricing succeed in excluding Petitioner from the market.* . . .
>
> The term [predatory] "does not have a well-defined meaning in the context it was used, but it certainly bears a sinister connotation." [Citing *Telex,* 510 F.2d at 927.]
>
> * * *
>
> We conclude that in the circumstances of this case prices below total cost would be more consistent with the competitive goals of the antitrust laws.
>
> * * *
>
> The evidence shows that this is not a case of short-run price cutting designed to secure monopoly profits in the long run. . . . There is nothing in the record to warrant a finding that [Respondent] engaged in predatory pricing. (Appendix A, pp. 9, 10, 11, 13, 15; emphasis added.)

Thus, the Court of Appeals' opinion began, as it should have done, as an inquiry into the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain Judge Hoffman's finding that Respondent's "extended below-cost selling combined with its other acts provide the specific intent [to monopolize] in the case at bar." (Appendix B, p. 60.) Without reference to the "clearly erroneous" standard of Rule 52, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and without reference to the

District Court's finding of "specific intent," but after conversion of the legal standard by main strength from "specific intent" to *predatory conduct,* the Court of Appeals simply obliterated without direct engagement or review the careful findings of the District Court.

Notions of "predatory intent," "predatory conduct," and "sinister" conduct do not and should not provide the standard for determining "specific intent to destroy competition or build monopoly" (*Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. U.S.,* 345 U.S. 594, 626 (1953)) in an attempted monopoly case. The concept of "predatory intent" or "predatory pricing" has its principal origins not in cases arising under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, but in Robinson-Patman cases, as a mechanism for assessing the probability that discriminatory pricing will have the prohibited adverse effect on competition. *E.g., Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co.,* 386 U.S. at 696, n. 12.

It is of course true that predatory pricing or conduct may serve as evidence of specific intent to monopolize. As this Court observed in the *Utah Pie* case:

> [A] jury would be free to ascertain a seller's intent from surrounding economic circumstances, which would include persistent unprofitable sales below cost and drastic price cuts themselves discriminatory. See Rowe, Price Discrimination Under the Robinson-Patman Act 141-150 (1962), commenting on the Court's statement in F.T.C. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., supra, that "a price reduction below cost tends to establish [predatory] intent." 363 U.S., at 552, 80 S.Ct., at 1276. See also Ben Hur Coal Co. v. Wells, 10 Cir., 242 F.2d 481, 486, and Balian Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms Co., supra, 231 F.2d at 368, in which the courts recognized the inferential value of sales below cost on the issue of intent. 386 U.S. 685 at 696-7, n.12.

In *Utah Pie,* the Tenth Circuit had reversed a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff on the theory, as in this case, that the trial court

had acted on an *injury to a competitor* rather than *injury to competition.* Here the Court of Appeals criticized Judge Hoffman's analysis and result as "based on [Respondent's] effect on a competitor rather than its *effect on competition.*" (Appendix A, p. 10; emphasis added.) The Court rejected the very reasoning employed by the Court of Appeals in this case in the following terms:

> It might be argued that the respondents' conduct displayed only fierce competitive instincts. *Actual intent to injure another competitor does not, however, fall into that category,* and neither, when viewed in context of the Robinson-Patman Act, do persistent sales below cost and radical price cuts themselves discriminatory. 386 U.S. at 702-3, n. 14; emphasis added.[11]

The concept of "specific intent to monopolize" is a broad and elastic one. In this sense, it is no different from questions of intent that must be resolved by triers of fact in many other set-

---

11. A case remarkably similar in many respects, though in a different industry and not involving actual monopoly power, is *Sanitary Milk v. Bergjans Farm Dairy, Inc.,* 368 F.2d 679 (8th Cir. 1966). In that case the Eighth Circuit approved an instruction that permitted the jury to find an attempt to monopolize if

> the defendants, or any one of them, entered into a conspiracy to fix prices, "gave unlawful price discriminations to favored chain stores in order to get large volume of sales", sold below cost or at unreasonably low prices in order to destroy competition . . . "started a price war" in order to increase sales of raw milk . . ., "if done with the intent to acquire the power to fix the price, exclude competitors, or control the production of milk [in the relevant market]. 368 F.2d at 690.

In approving that instruction, then Circuit Judge Blackmun made the following pertinent observation:

> Sanitary's dominant position in raw milk production was necessarily an element of influence in anything it might choose to do and demanded caution on its part when it embarked on processing. . . . We must consider the evidence as a whole. "In cases such as this, plaintiffs should be given the full benefit of their proof without tightly compartmentalizing the various factual components and wiping the slate clean after scrutiny of each". [Quoting the opinion of Mr. Justice White for the Court in *Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp.,* 370 U.S. 690, 698 (1962).] 368 F.2d at 691.

tings. Nor is it different from other elastic legal concepts widely applied in the law, such as reasonableness, fair competition, fair comment, and the like. Specific intent, like the other concepts, is an ultimate factual question. It requires, indeed it permits, no particularized definition. The necessary concomitant of its breadth, its elasticity, and its basic factual nature is that it is an issue as to which it is for the trier of fact, from all the evidence, to determine whether a defendant was motivated by specific intent to monopolize.

This Judge Hoffman did. Because of the realities in this area, "conduct becomes a proxy for intent." (Sullivan, ANTITRUST, p. 135 (West Pub. Co., 1976).) Alternatively stated, "proof of the intent that outlaws any given conduct as an attempt to monopolize is most often derived from proof of the conduct itself." (Cooper, *Attempts in Monopolization, a Mildly Expansionary Answer to the Prophylactic Riddle of Section 2*, 72 Mich. L. Rev., 373, 397 (1974).) Judge Hoffman had before him massive evidence of conduct, and other indicia of intent as well. It necessarily follows that much deference must be given to the trier of fact, who has heard the witnesses, observed their demeanor, and considered all of the evidence.

Judge Hoffman found that Respondent was motivated by specific intent to monopolize in setting its below-cost prices, in forecasting procurement of all A/P business, in engaging in unreasonable surveillance of Petitioner, in projecting future prices that were high when its surveillance indicated Petitioner's imminent demise and low when Petitioner unexpectedly weathered the storm, in impairing Petitioner's small business classification, in attempting to impair Petitioner's existing contract with United Technology Corporation by offering a non-existent surplus of A/P at $.09 to $.10 per pound, two-thirds of the already below-cost price of A/P, and in incurring losses of $1,607,084 in its

A/P operations during the damage period (Appendix B, p. 37) in order "to recoup the losses of a price war by monopoly pricing . . . ." (Appendix C, p. 99.)

The Court of Appeals accepted all of these events as facts, but rejected them as irrelevant. It did so *not* because they were not found to be evidence of specific intent to monopolize, but because it thought the pricing conduct alone not "predatory" or "sinister," and because the other acts "inflicted no independent harm." (Appendix A, p. 11.) The analysis of the Court of Appeals is backwards. The question is not whether those other acts inflicted independent harm; the question is whether those acts constitute evidence from which a fact-finder may conclude that Respondent was motivated by specific intent to monopolize. The Court of Appeals neither asked nor answered that question. As to pricing, the question is not, as the Court of Appeals saw it, whether Respondent engaged in predatory pricing; the question is whether Respondent's pricing practices constituted evidence from which a fact-finder might conclude that Respondent was motivated by specific intent to monopolize. The Court of Appeals neither asked nor answered that question.

The proper inquiry for the Court of Appeals was whether the evidence, taken in its entirety, was such that Judge Hoffman's finding that Respondent "consciously chose and implemented" a decision to "actively pursue the acquisition of a monopoly" (Appendix C, p. 99) was "clearly erroneous." The Court of Appeals did not ask or answer that question. Rather than considering the evidence in its entirety, the Court of Appeals took the approach of "tightly compartmentalizing the various factual components and wiping the slate clean after scrutiny of each."[12] The Court of

12. A method of appellate review found by this Court to have been employed by the Tenth Circuit and vigorously rejected in the quoted language. *Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp.*, 370 U.S. 690, 698 (1962).

Appeals then dismissed Respondent's predatory acts other than pricing because "they inflicted no independent harm," and its below-cost pricing practices because they were thought to be not "predatory" or "sinister" even though intended to destroy Petitioner.

The Court of Appeals failed not only to follow the directive of the *Union Carbide* case, quoted above, it also failed to heed the admonition of this Court in *United States v. Yellow Cab Co.*, 338 U.S. 338, 341-2 (1949):

> Findings as to the design, motive and intent with which men act depend peculiarly upon the credit given to witnesses by those who see and hear them.

Judge Learned Hand in *Alcoa* made substantially the same observation:

> [U]pon an issue like the witness's own intent, as to which he alone can testify, the finding [of the trial court] is indeed "unassailable," except in the most exceptional cases. 148 F.2d at 433.

See also, Denison Mines Ltd. v. Michigan Chemical Corp., 469 F.2d 1301, 1309-1310 (7th Cir. 1972).

Although this Court has never done so, other Circuits have discussed the concept of predatory intent in attempted monopoly cases, thereby creating the confusion that has led to the Court of Appeals' ultimate error in this case.[13] Although the Circuit

---

13. Indicative of the confusion and inconsistency concerning whether predatory conduct is a required element for a finding of an attempt to monopolize are *Coleman Motor Co. v. Chrysler Corp.*, 525 F.2d 1338, 1349 (3d Cir. 1975) ["From the evidence of predatory practices . . . the jury could infer the intent and probability of success necessary to establish a section two violation"]; *Chisholm Brothers Farm Equipment Co. v. International Harvester Co.*, 498 F.2d 1137, 1144-1145 (9th Cir. 1974) ["[T]his specific intent 'must be accompanied by predatory conduct directed to accomplishing the unlawful purpose' "]; *Moore v. Jas. H. Matthews and Co.*, 1977-1 Trade Cases ¶ 61,376 at p. 71,364 (9th Cir. 1977) ["The rule in this circuit is that dangerous probability can be

cases are confused, and even the same circuit, the Ninth, may have rendered inconsistent opinions, no other Circuit appears to have done as the Court of Appeals has done in this case and in the *Telex* case in literally substituting a legal standard of predatory acts, each of which must inflict independent harm, for the fact finder's conclusion on the ultimate factual issue of specific intent to monopolize. The confusion, or potential for confusion, that the cited Circuit court cases created, in borrowing the concept of predatory intent from Robinson-Patman cases for application in attempted monopoly cases has come to full blossom in this major error of the Tenth Circuit, committed both in this case and in *Telex.*

The issue thus presented urgently requires the corrective and clarifying attention of this Court. Only rarely does a case arise that affords the Court an opportunity to clarify the standard of

---

inferred from: either specific intent coupled with monopoly power *or* from 'proof of specific intent to set prices or exclude competition . . . accompanied by predatory conduct directed to accomplishing the unlawful purpose' " (emphasis by the court)]; *Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co.*, 327 F.2d 459, 474 (9th Cir. 1964) ["[T]he specific intent itself is the only evidence of dangerous probability the statute requires . . ."]; *Morning Pioneer, Inc. v. Bismarck Tribune Co.*, 1974-1 Trade Cases ¶ 74,956 at p.96,260 (8th Cir. 1974) ["To establish an 'attempt to monopolize' in violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act, it is necessary to prove: (1) a specific intent to monopolize; (2) an overt act or acts; and (3) a dangerous probability of monopolization of a specific product market in a particular geographic market"]; *Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Nisley*, 300 F.2d 561, 586 (10th Cir. 1961) [Where the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury that the specific intent must be accompanied by conduct sufficient to create "a dangerous probability of monopolization" was upheld]; and *Yoder Brothers, Inc. v. California-Florida Plant Corp.*, 537 F.2d 1347, 1368 (5th Cir. 1976) ["In order to prove attempted monopolization, the plaintiff must show an intent on the defendant's part to bring about a monopoly and a dangerous probability of success."]. *See also, Lektro-Vend Corp. v. Vendo Co.* 403 F.Supp. 527,533 (N.D.Ill. 1975) ["To prove violation of section 2, plaintiffs must establish three elements of proof: (1) a dangerous probability of actual monopolization in a relevant market; (2) specific intent to establish a monopoly power; and (3) overt acts"]; and *V. & L. Cicione, Inc. v. C. Schmidt & Sons, Inc.*, 403 F.Supp. 643, 652 (E.D. Pa. 1975) ["[T]wo requisites (for attempt to monopolize claims are) specific intent to monopolize and dangerous probability of success . . ."].

intent in actual monopolization cases (see Question 1 above) *and* the standard of intent in attempted monopoly cases, on the same record and facts, and to pronounce those standards authoritatively in a context in which they may be compared and contrasted. The unique opportunity afforded by this case for the Court to clarify important principles and resolve conflicts and confusion among the Circuits is heightened by the presence of the Robinson-Patman claims, which afford convenient occasion for examination of the origins of the concept of predatory intent and the relationship of that concept as it has developed in the Robinson-Patman cases to the standard of specific intent in attempted monopoly cases.

3. The Writ Should Be Granted to Review the Court of Appeals' Holding That Even Over the Long Run, the Legality of Below Cost Sales Is to Be Measured by Marginal Cost Rather Than Fully Allocated Cost.

The Court of Appeals has not only held that a finding of specific exclusionary intent on the part of a dominant, diversified, wealthy and entrenched competitor fails to establish a specific intent to monopolize. It has compounded that error by its ill-advised endorsement of that competitor's sales over a seven-year period at prices greatly below cost because those prices were above "marginal cost." Reliance on the supposed fact that Respondent did not price-cut below its marginal costs is misplaced. *To allow one having monopoly power to undercut competitors to the point of their destruction because it remains above its own marginal cost is to say that the monopolist may use the advantages bestowed on it by monopoly to legalize that monopoly!* Secure in the knowledge that from its past and current dominance its costs are not less than its only competitor, and that it can bear a price destructive to that competitor because of its unique renegotiation position[14] and its overwhelming financial power, Respondent was plainly and simply exercising its monopoly power.

---

14. See discussion at p. 8, supra.

Marginal cost was not defined by the Court of Appeals (just as it was never defined by Respondent in the conduct of its business), but it was defined by the District Court. It is "the cost of producing an additional unit of production." (Appendix C, p. 97, n. 1.)

In *Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act,* 88 Harv. L. Rev. 697 (1975), Professors Areeda and Turner presented a sophisticated econometric analysis of a proposed, evidently separate offense under Section 2 of the Sherman Act called a " 'predatory pricing' antitrust offense." (88 Harv. L. Rev. at 697.) Among many other arguments, Areeda and Turner suggest that prices at or above marginal cost but below full cost *in the short run* "should not be considered predatory." (88 Harv. L. Rev. at 711.) Other related articles are a reply by F. M. Scherer, former Director of the Bureau of Economics of the Federal Trade Commission, *Predatory Pricing and the Sherman Act: A Comment,* 89 Harv. L. Rev. 869 (1976), a reply by Areeda and Turner, *Scherer on Predatory Pricing,* 89 HARV. L. REV. 891 (1976), and a rejoinder by Scherer, *Some Last Words on Predatory Pricing,* 89 Harv. L. Rev. 901 (1976).

The initial article is seriously oversimplified by the Court of Appeals:

> Professors Areeda and Turner argue that any price above a firm's marginal cost . . . should be conclusively presumed lawful. (Appendix A, p. 14.)

The Court of Appeals fails to note the concession by Areeda and Turner that this simplistic rule is utterly inconsistent with *Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co.,* 348 U.S. 115, 118 (1954) [discussed at 88 Harv. L. Rev. at 699, n. 10], and *Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co.,* 386 U.S. at 698, 690 (1967) [discussed at 88 Harv. L. Rev. at 726-27], which Areeda and Turner criticize severely. Both are Robinson-Patman cases, and condemn sales below full cost as predatory and therefore potentially injurious to competi-

tion. Areeda and Turner also acknowledge their rejection of, and criticize, the relevant Circuit court cases, including *Porto Rican American Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co.*, 30 F.2d 234, 236 (2d Cir. 1929), *cert. denied*, 279 U.S. 858; *National Dairy Products Corp. v. United States*, 350 F.2d 321, 327 (8th Cir. 1965), *vacated and remanded on other grounds*, 384 U.S. 883; *Forster Mfg. Co. v. FTC*, 335 F.2d 47, 53 (1st Cir. 1964), *cert. denied*, 380 U.S. 906; *Maryland Baking Co. v. FTC*, 243 F.2d 716, 718 (4th Cir. 1957); and *E. B. Muller & Co. v. FTC*, 142 F.2d 511, 517 (6th Cir. 1944). [88 Harv. L. Rev. at 699.]

The Areeda and Turner suggestions have been favorably received by the Fifth Circuit in *International Air Indus., Inc. v. American Excelsior Co.*, 517 F.2d 714, 723 (5th Cir. 1975), *cert. denied*, 424 U.S. 943, the Ninth Circuit in *Hanson v. Shell Oil Co.*, 1976-2 Trade Cases ¶ 61,052 (9th Cir. 1976), *cert. denied*, January 24, 1977 (CCH Trade Reg. Rptr. ¶ 60,021 at p. 65,093) and the Court of Appeals in this case.

The favorable reception accorded Areeda and Turner by the Fifth and Ninth Circuits, and the Court of Appeals' flat adoption of conclusively legal marginal cost pricing in this case, have created a serious conflict among the Circuits. Given the infrequency with which cases squarely presenting the marginal cost pricing issue are likely to come before the Court, particularly under the Sherman Act (*no* Sherman Act decisions of this Court are cited by Areeda and Turner as actually involving supposed marginal cost pricing), consideration and resolution of that conflict is imperative, unless the Court is to endorse by silence the emasculation of *Utah Pie*.

The Court of Appeals reaches the following wholly inconsistent conclusions:

> (1) Respondent had "an intent that its pricing succeed in excluding [Petitioner] from the market." (Appendix A, p. 11.)

(2) "[I]n the circumstances of this case prices below total cost would be more consistent with the competitive goals of the antitrust laws." (Appendix A, p. 13.)

(3) "The low prices for A/P persisted into the long run *(a period of nearly seven years)*. . . . The evidence shows that this is not a case of short-run price-cutting designed to secure monopoly profits in the long run." (Appendix A, p. 15; emphasis added.)

(4) "There is nothing in the record to warrant a finding that Respondent engaged in predatory pricing." (Appendix A, p. 15.)

Whatever else might be said for or against the "marginal cost" pricing hypotheses advocated by Areeda and Turner, it was clearly erroneous for the Court of Appeals to apply that concept in evaluating the legality of Respondent's prices in this case. In the first place, neither Areeda and Turner nor any judge or commentator other than the Court of Appeals in this case has suggested that the "marginal cost" view of below-cost pricing might in any way immunize from the antitrust laws a defendant found to have the specific intent "that its pricing succeed in excluding [a competitor] from the market." (Appendix A, p. 11.)

Further, and even more significant, the Court of Appeals has applied the "marginal cost" test of Respondent's pricing to a period found by the Court of Appeals to be long-run, involving nearly seven years of sustained below-cost selling. The entire thrust of Areeda and Turner exploration is addressed to the propriety of a company's prices under appropriate *short-run* circumstances. Aside from the Court of Appeals in this case, no authority has suggested that the dominant seller in a two seller industry could act lawfully in knowingly and intentionally selling its product below cost for a sustained period of seven years for the express purpose, as both the District Court and the Court of Appeals found, of excluding its rival.

On the contrary, in his reply to Areeda and Turner, F. M. Scherer observes:

> (1) That the Areeda and Turner marginal cost test for predation must in any event be rejected if the pricing practices involved were sustained over a long period.
>
> (2) That marginal cost pricing can only be considered rational and nonpredatory in the short run and that the appropriate goal for antitrust enforcement should, in contrast, be long-run maximization of profits. 89 Harv. L. Rev. at 869.

A fair reading of Areeda and Turner, Scherer's initial reply, and the respective final articles cited above, compels a conclusion wholly contrary to that adopted by the Court of Appeals, to wit: where the dominant firm has sold far below its full cost, but above its marginal costs, for a period far beyond the short run, and where there is substantial additional evidence of its intent to monopolize and its determination to exclude a rival, such conduct should be *conclusively presumed unlawful.* That conclusion finds substantial support in *Utah Pie.* (386 U.S. at 699.)

The application of the "marginal cost" concept by the Court of Appeals in determining whether Respondent's prices were illegal disregards the lesson of *Utah Pie* that prolonged sales below full cost constitute evidence of predatory intent, particularly where such below-cost sales are used as a "medium of eliminating weaker competitors." *Porto Rican American Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., supra; see also, Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co., supra.* In *International Air Indus., Inc. v. American Excelsior Co., supra,* the Fifth Circuit acknowledged that the decision of this Court in the *Utah Pie* case "may hold that it is not necessary to show a price below marginal cost in order to make out a prima facie case" of violation of the Robinson-Patman Act. (517 F.2d at 724, n.30.)

The Court's definition of "cost" in *Utah Pie* is plainly inconsistent with the Court of Appeals' adoption of conclusively-lawful marginal cost pricing. In *Utah Pie* the Court condemned as a "discriminatory below-cost price" (386 U.S. at 699) a price which was "less than [defendant's] direct cost plus an allocation for overhead." (386 U.S. at 698.) Marginal cost is, of course, far below direct cost, let alone "direct cost plus an allocation for overhead." The definition of "cost" as such was not central to the Court's opinion in *Utah Pie*. The case thus probably cannot be fairly read as finally dispositive of the definition of cost, particularly for purposes of determining specific intent to monopolize in violation of Section 2. *Utah Pie*, however, gives no comfort to Respondent, which argues for the conclusive legality in both Section 2 and Robinson-Patman contexts of sales far below the cost levels there condemned.

The Court was not seduced by fancy and transient econometric hypotheses in *Utah Pie*. Similarly, the Tenth Circuit also has formerly shown an appreciation for reality as distinguished from theory.

For example, in *Ben Hur Coal Co. v. Wells*, 242 F.2d 481, 486 (10th Cir. 1957), the Tenth Circuit said:

> In the final analysis, the question resolves itself into one of intent and purpose, *not a choice of accounting methods.* Emphasis added.

Yet in its decision in this case the Court of Appeals completely disregarded the hard facts of intent and purpose. It embraced an economic theory of cost-pricing relationships and ignored an overwhelming record of anticompetitive intent and purpose on the part of Respondent.

To so blindfold itself to the plain facts of the case and decide the critical issue of intent on an "economist's hypothetical model" (which is all that "marginal cost" pricing amounts to, particularly in light of the fact that the record contains no evidence

whatsoever that Respondent set its prices based upon its marginal cost), flies in the face of this Court's rulings in *Illinois Brick Co. v. State of Illinois*, 145 U.S. L.W. 4611, 4617 (June 7, 1977), and *Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.*, 392 U.S. 481, 493 (1968).

The Court of Appeals' adoption of the conclusive legality of marginal cost pricing, even in the admitted long run, foreclosed consideration and meaningful review of the District Court's exhaustive analysis and findings that, *based on all the evidence,* Respondent was motivated by the specific intent to monopolize. Indeed, *the Court of Appeals acknowledged that Respondent intended "that its pricing succeed in excluding [Petitioner] from the market."* (Appendix A, p. 11; emphasis added.) In holding such pricing practices conclusively lawful, the Court of Appeals violated the principle stated by the Court in *Utah Pie*:

> It might be argued that the respondents' conduct displayed only fierce competitive instincts. Actual intent to injure a competitor does not, however, fall into that category . . . . 386 U.S. 685 at 702-703, n. 14.

The holding of the Court of Appeals not only conflicts with this sound principle, but is in conflict with the decisions of other Circuits in adopting a standard of conclusively-lawful marginal cost pricing.

Equally or even more efficient competitors facing adversaries with long purses, as in this case, have been certified by the Court of Appeals as fair game for extermination by price cutting without limit as to time, so long as the prices of the dominant firm are not cut below marginal cost. The ruling puts at risk every small business, and many large ones, that compete with adversaries whose only advantage is overwhelming financial muscle or, as in this case, both overwhelming financial muscle and a special renegotiation capacity. Judge Hoffman laid his hand on this key point early in the trial. He interposed a comment during

the examination of D. C. Cable, Respondent's financial analyst and government contracts administrator.

In 1965, Cable had advised his superiors to cease "pricing on the expectation of forcing [Petitioner] to shut down" (Appendix A, p. 6):

> Q. For how long a period of time do you believe [Respondent] having other plants and operations and other products could have been able to sustain losses in the magnitude of those indicated here [on Respondent's renegotiation reports] on its A/P?
>
> A. From the standpoint purely of financial muscle, there's no reason why that couldn't continue.
>
> Q. Forever, right?
>
> A. From that specific standpoint, yes.
>
> THE COURT: Until the 800 million is gone. (JA 1433.)

CONCLUSION

On each isue, the Court of Appeals' holding is unprecedented. Each holding, moreover, represents a significant compounding of the plaintiff's burden in monopolization cases. Given the weight of that burden under the best of circumstances, and the importance of the private action to the implementation of national antitrust policy, the decision of the Court of Appeals in this case should not be the last word on these three important issues.

Moreover, the District Court's careful and detailed findings control the first two issues in this case. Though controlling, and not rejected, the Court of Appeals has failed to accord these findings the effect to which they are entitled. The federal antitrust laws are entitled to more. So also is a distinguished trial judge who invested the better part of five years in the creation of an enormous record and in an exhaustive analysis of that record.

The issues in this case are of nerve center importance to Section 2 of the Sherman Act, just as they were in the *Telex* case, which this Court did not have the opportunity to review. This case represents an opportunity that probably will not arise

again in this generation, and perhaps may never arise again, for the Court to consider and declare clearly in a single case on a common record the governing law on these core issues:

(1) The appropriate standard of intent and the permissible range of competitive conduct in a case of clear monopoly power and monopoly market shares.

(2) The appropriate standard of intent in a case of attempted monopoly where the Court of Appeals has substituted a predatory conduct standard for specific intent to monopolize, and where a Robinson-Patman claim is present to provide a useful reference to the doctrinal source of "predatory intent."

(3) The legality of marginal cost pricing intended by a competitor (with, as a practical matter, limitless resources) not only to injure, but to obliterate an equally or more efficient rival with lesser financial muscle.

These issues warrant the attention of this Court on the merits. The Writ of Certiorari should issue.

Respectfully submitted this 22d day of July, 1977.

C. KEITH ROOKER
1800 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

RICHARD W. GIAUQUE
Suite 500
Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Petitioner

Of Counsel:

REX E. LEE
2840 Iroquois Drive
Provo, Utah 84601

WILLIAM D. HALL
P.O. Box 34436
Washington, D.C. 20034

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Pursuant to Rule 33, subdivision 3(b), of the Supreme Court of the United States Revised Rules, the undersigned, a member of the Bar of the Supreme Court of the United States, having duly entered his appearance in the foregoing cause as counsel of record by the filing of the foregoing Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, hereby certifies that, in conformity with Rule 33, subdivision 1, the foregoing Petition was served upon Respondents Kerr-McGee Corporation and Kerr-McGee Chemical Corporation by depositing three copies thereof, including Appendices A, B and C thereto, in the United States Mails, with air mail postage prepaid, addressed to Respondents' counsel of record as follows, this 22d day of July, 1977:

FABIAN & CLENDENIN
PETER W. BILLINGS, ESQ.
ALBERT J. COLTON, ESQ.
STANFORD B. OWEN, ESQ.
PETER W. BILLINGS, JR., ESQ.
800 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

C. Keith Rooker
1800 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Appendix A

PUBLISH

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

No. 76-1238

Pacific Engineering & Production
Company of Nevada,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Kerr-McGee Corporation and
Kerr-McGee Chemical Corporation,
Defendants-Appellants.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Utah
(D.C. No. C-40-70)

Peter W. Billings (Albert J. Colton, Stanford B. Owen, and Peter W. Billings, Jr., Salt Lake City, Utah; Peter J. Nickles, Eugene D. Gulland, Washington, D.C.; Willard P. Scott, Thomas R. Cochran, and William Heimann, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, on the brief), Salt Lake City, Utah, for Defendants-Appellants.

C. Keith Rooker (Richard W. Giauque, Salt Lake City, Utah; William D. Hall and Kenneth L. King, Washington, D.C., on the brief), Salt Lake City, Utah, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Before HILL, McWILLIAMS and BARRETT, United States Circuit Judges.

HILL, Circuit Judge. [1]

This is an antitrust action brought by Pacific Engineering & Production Company of Nevada (PE) against Kerr-McGee Chemical Corporation (successor to American Potash and Chemical Co., which shall be referred to as AMPOT) and its parent corporation, Kerr-McGee Corporation. The trial court gave PE judgment for treble damages totaling $4,590,594 and for attorneys' fees of $528,000 [sic] based on its finding that AMPOT was guilty of monopolizing and attempting to monopolize in violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2, and of price discrimination in violation of § 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a). The court also dismissed AMPOT's counterclaims against PE.

The trial court's findings are commendably thorough and exact as to the basic facts. We disagree, however, with the application of the antitrust laws to those facts and reverse the judgment for treble damages. The judgment is affirmed as to the dismissal of AMPOT's counterclaims. We will first consider the Sherman Act issues.

Section 2 of the Sherman Act proscribes both monopolizing and attempting to monopolize any part of trade or commerce. The elements of a monopolization case are (1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of [2] a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966). A case of attempted monopolization requires proof that defendant's conduct was motivated by specific intent to monopolize and that a dangerous probability of monopoly existed. E. J. Delaney Corp. v. Bonne Bell, Inc., 525 F.2d 296 (10th Cir. 1975), *cert. denied*, ...U.S. ..... The distinctions between the two offenses are not relevant to our decision, because the same conduct was relied upon to estab-

lish both the attempt and the willful maintenance of monopoly. The fundamental issue is whether AMPOT engaged in predatory price cutting.

PE and AMPOT manufacture ammonium perchlorate (A/P), a chemical used almost exclusively as an oxidizer in solid rocket fuel. The ultimate consumer of A/P is the federal government. Demand is fixed by government procurement policies and thus is not responsive to price. The direct customers of PE and AMPOT are missile manufacturers for NASA and the Department of Defense.

The first A/P producer was Western Electrochemical Company which became AMPOT in 1954. Kerr-McGee acquired AMPOT in 1967 and reorganized it into the Kerr-McGee Chemical Corporation in 1970. PE was organized in 1955 by a former Western officer and began A/P production in 1958. The same year, two large industrial chemical manufacturers, Hooker [3] Chemical Co. and Pennwalt Chemical Corp., also entered the market.

In the period of 1954-1957, when AMPOT was the only A/P producer, the price was above 40 cents a pound. From 1958, when the other three firms entered the market, until 1961, the price ranged from 32 to 35 cents a pound. During this time the industry outlook was bright; the mood was characterized by one witness as euphoric. Industry capacity was increased in response.

By December 1963, this optimism had vanished. The anticipated demand did not materialize, primarily because of NASA's conversion from solid to liquid rocket fuel and the diversion of defense appropriations from missile programs to the Vietnam war effort. Prices continuously declined as the companies competed frantically for the work that existed. In 1964, prices first went below 20 cents a pound when PE bid a major order at 19.25 cents. In 1965, AMPOT bid 16.40 cents on another major procurement. The low point came early in 1966 at 14.92 cents,

bid by PE. Pennwalt closed its plant in 1965, and Hooker followed suit in 1966. Both continued to sell from inventory for about a year. The trial court found AMPOT's antitrust violations began in 1966 and continued through 1970. During this time, prices were between 15 and 20 cents a pound with the majority of sales being made at prices under 18.25 cents. [4]

The extent of the price cutting must be attributed in some part to the practices of the three major consumers of A/P which were prime contractors on such projects as Minuteman, Poseidon, and Titan missiles. The so-called Big Three[1] accounted for the bulk of total A/P sales. Their practice was to obtain all their A/P needs for a period of months or years in one contract. The winner of the contract secured a substantial share of the total market for the immediate future. In letting the contract, a buyer would first send out a request for quotes and bid the prime contract on the basis of the quotes received. These quotes in effect locked the A/P producers into a ceiling price. After receiving the prime contract, the buyer would again request quotes on which the A/P contract would supposedly be let. Instead of notifying the low bidder, however, the buyer would single out one or two low bidders and tell them to "sharpen their pencils" if they wanted the contract. Often a buyer would succeed in getting the low bidder to underbid itself. The trial court noted that these "whipsaw" tactics were "unethical if not unlawful."

The trial court recognized that until 1966 the decline in the A/P price was due to market forces beyond the control of AMPOT. The court held that after that time AMPOT began violating the antitrust laws because it "sought to take advantage of a troublesome situation and force PE out of the market." The primary

---

1. These companies were Thiokol Chemical Corp. (the largest single purchaser of A/P), Aerojet General (a subsidiary of General Tire and Rubber Co.), and United Technology Center (a subsidiary of United Aircraft). In most years, these companies purchased over 55 percent of all A/P produced. [5]

factor in the trial court's decision was AMPOT's below-cost pricing. It is uncontested that AMPOT's prices of 15 to 20 cents were well below its average total cost[2] which, although not specifically set out in the findings, was probably in the range of 20 to 26 cents. AMPOT's prices were above its "out of pocket cost," that is, above average variable cost.[3] At this price, it was more profitable to produce than to shut down. The cost of producing A/P is highly volume-responsive and decreases consistently with increased production until full plant capacity is reached. Both AMPOT and PE possessed plant capacity sufficient to supply substantially the entire market for A/P.[4]

There was ample evidence that AMPOT knew PE could not survive at the low price level. PE was a one-product company which was vastly undercapitalized, while AMPOT was larger and more diversified. In 1965, a memorandum on the situation was prepared for AMPOT by a Mr. Cable, its government contracts administrator and special financial analyst. Cable based his memorandum on the following assumptions which proved to be essentially correct:

1. The costs of producing A/P are approximately equal within the industry.
2. A/P consumers are interested in maintaining two sources.

---

2. Average total cost is the sum of fixed cost and total variable cost divided by output. Fixed costs are those expenses which do not vary with changes in output, including most management expenses, interest on bonded debt, depreciation of plant and equipment, property taxes, and other irreducible overhead. Variable costs are those which vary with changes in output, such as labor, material, fuel, etc. Areeda & Turner, *Predatory Pricing and Related Practices under Section 2 of the Sherman Act,* 88 Harv. L. Rev. 697, 700 (1975).

3. Average variable cost is the sum of all variable costs divided by output. *id.* [6]

4. PE's plant capacity was 20,000,000 pounds a year, and AMPOT's capacity was approximately 30,000,000 pounds a year. During the relevant period, demand was generally below 20,000,000 pounds a year. [7]

3. Pennwalt will not actively compete for business at the present price levels.
4. Present price levels for A/P will not give PE a profit and probably will not cover all its cost.

Cable observed that if PE were getting the same price as AMPOT, it could not survive and its plant would be of interest only to a consumer of A/P; if PE were getting a higher price, AMPOT could raise its prices without affecting its market share. Cable recommended prices be established with the expectation that the market must be shared with PE either as a going concern or as a subsidiary of a consumer. He recommended against pricing on the expectation of forcing PE to shut down. In the face of this knowledge, AMPOT continued its low prices. In 1968, AMPOT was bidding two to three cents a pound below PE. AMPOT's market share is indicative of the degree of its success in foreclosing PE from the market.[5]

Year	*Percentage*
1966	53.5
1967	80.0
1968	88.0
1969	67.0
1970	78.0

In the circumstances of the industry, the trial court found AMPOT's prices alone were not a sufficient basis for an inference of predatory intent. The evidence was found sufficient on the basis of other cumulative factors including AMPOT's market projections predicting the achievement of virtually all A/P business, its surveillance of PE's activities, its offer to "dump" a non-

5. There were issues at trial pertaining to the definition of the relevant market. A/P must be qualified for separate missile projects through a series of tests. AMPOT contended the market should not include several projects for which PE had not been qualified. The trial court found the relevant market included all A/P sold, and for our purposes we need not question that finding. However, the fact that PE was not qualified for certain projects (primarily because of the expense of the testing) did give AMPOT a significant head start in its market share. [8]

existent surplus of A/P to a PE customer at a drastically low price, AMPOT's opposition to PE's classification as a small business by the SBA, and AMPOT's forward price schedules which indicated an intention to raise prices after PE's demise.

The surveillance of PE was conducted by AMPOT's plant manager at Henderson, Nevada, where PE's plant also was located. It consisted of (1) a monthly check of the number of cars in PE's parking lot; (2) checking freight office records concerning the movement of freight cars in and out of PE's plant; (3) taking aerial photos of PE's plant on two or three occasions; (4) clipping articles in the local papers concerning PE's activities; (5) inquiring at the Colorado River Commission concerning PE's power consumption; and (6) encouraging the shipping foreman to inquire of truck drivers concerning shipments to PE.

AMPOT also engaged in intensive scrutiny of PE's relationship with American Cyanamid which had lent PE over $2,400,000 with a trust deed as security. When suit was filed to foreclose, AMPOT retained two Nevada attorneys to monitor the court files and keep it advised. In 1967, AMPOT learned American Cyanamid had agreed to subordinate its debt to allow PE to obtain a $500,000 loan and continue operating.

The "dumping" incident occurred in 1968 after PE had won a major contract from United Technology Center (UTC). J. C. Schumacher, AMPOT's vice president in charge of [9] manufacturing electrochemicals, visited UTC's president and asked if he would be interested in purchasing surplus A/P at nine or ten cents a pound. There was in fact no surplus. AMPOT's evidence indicated its sales department knew nothing of Schumacher's offer and repudiated it when inquiries were made. The trial court found this should be considered some evidence of the attitude of AMPOT in view of Schumacher's position with the company. Moreover, another AMPOT officer, in a subsequent memo to his file, relied on the incident as having placed a "seed of doubt" that a better price was available.

AMPOT's opposition to PE's reclassification as a small business for purposes of obtaining financial assistance from the Small Business Administration was found to be entirely legal. It was considered "symbolic" of AMPOT's intent to drive PE from the market.

The trial court attached major significance to AMPOT's forward pricing. On different occasions, the large A/P purchasers would request submission of tentative bids for future years. Generally, AMPOT's forward price schedules were high at times when it appeared PE's demise was imminent and were replaced by lower prices when it appeared PE would be able to continue. For example, in 1966 AMPOT learned that American Cyanamid had taken a summary judgment against PE and that an involuntary petition in bankruptcy had been filed against PE. AMPOT then submitted a higher forward price [10] schedule. In February 1967, AMPOT learned that American Cyanamid had agreed to subordinate its debt and that PE had obtained a loan. The next October, AMPOT submitted substantially lower forward prices.

AMPOT's witnesses testified that the forward prices were attempts to raise the A/P price and were withdrawn only under pressure from the purchasers. Shortly after the high price schedule was submitted in 1966, AMPOT met with representatives of two of the Big Three A/P consumers. AMPOT was told that its high prices were unacceptable. The consumers said they had been willing to let AMPOT become the sole supplier at the lower prices, but they would now attempt to keep PE alive. Two of the largest consumers did give PE "stay alive" orders at prices above those paid to AMPOT. The trial court rejected AMPOT's contention that it was forced to withdraw the higher prices and concluded instead that these events indicated AMPOT's intention to do whatever was necessary to drive out PE.

AMPOT also introduced evidence of its other attempts to rescue the A/P industry. In late 1965, AMPOT representatives

met with the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense in charge of procurement to complain about conditions in the industry. They pointed out that procurement practices and excess capacity were endangering the industry and that two [11] former suppliers had already "mothballed" their facilities. They said AMPOT desired a system providing both good prices for the government and a fair profit for suppliers. The government refused to take action and reminded AMPOT that it was bound by a "National Security Clause" in the contract under which it had purchased its plant from the Navy. The clause required that until March 1972 AMPOT maintain its plant so that it could be operable within 120 days. In light of this situation, AMPOT contended it had no choice but to produce at 15 cents a pound instead of shutting down.

By 1971, AMPOT felt it was close enough to the expiration of the National Security Clause that it could take affirmative action. It notified the Defense Department that it was considering permanent suspension of production. Subsequently, a solution known as the "SAMSO Agreement" was reached. The agreement imposed a division of the market between AMPOT and PE at a profitable price.

The trial court rejected AMPOT's contention that this evidence showed an absence of predatory intent. Another clause in AMPOT's government contract allowed it to petition for release from the National Security Clause in return for whatever consideration the government might request. Inquiries were made concerning whether AMPOT was interested in a release in return for a lump sum payment. AMPOT's failure to avail [12] itself of this relief was considered evidence that it was not seriously interested in exerting pressure to raise prices during the 1966-1970 period.

The trial court found AMPOT must have known it could raise prices without affecting its market share. The prices the court found could have been charged, however, were on the average higher than the forward prices which had provoked strenuous

objections from the powerful A/P buyers. During the period of alleged predation, prices actually became somewhat higher than they had been even though the industry continued to operate at less than 50 percent of capacity. Under the trial court's holding, the only way AMPOT could have avoided violating the antitrust laws was to raise prices to a noncompetitive level in order to save its smaller, undercapitalized rival. AMPOT's decision not to raise prices was held to be predatory conduct in violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act. Considering AMPOT's prices and its other practices together, the court found AMPOT's prices were predatory because they were set with the specific intent to drive PE from the market.

We believe there are fundamental flaws in the trial court's application of the Sherman Act. The court's holding that AMPOT's conduct was predatory is based on its effect as a competitor rather than its effect on [13] competition.[6] As we said in Atlas Building Products Co. v. Diamond Block & Gravel Co., 269 F.2d 950, 954 (10th Cir. 1959), *cert. denied*, 363 U.S. 843: "Antitrust legislation is concerned primarily with the health of the competitive process, not with the individual competitor who must sink or swim in competitive enterprise." In an industry plagued by falling demand and excess capacity, the sinking of a competitor may be an indication of a healthy competitive process.

In a two-firm industry, the exclusion of one firm necessarily results in a monopoly. That does not mean the survivor necessarily violates the antitrust laws. In Union Leader Corp. v. Newspapers of New England, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 125, 140, *modified*,

---

6. The court's opinion demonstrates excessive concern with preventing the appearance of monopoly even if it requires defiance of the realities of the market situation. The same prices and other competitive practices which were found legal so long as there were four firms in the market were held to become illegal when the number dwindled to two. The trial court's holding simply makes no provision for the natural demise of an industry due to changes in consumer desires. [14]

284 F.2d 582 (1st Cir. 1960), *cert. denied,* 365 U.S. 833, the district court correctly stated:

> [A] person does not necessarily have an exclusionary intent merely because he foresees that a market is only large enough to permit one successful enterprise, and intends that his enterprise shall be that one and that all other enterprises shall fail. . . . To prove that a person has that type of exclusionary intent which is condemned in anti-trust cases there must be evidence that the person who forsees a fight to the death intends to use or actually does use unfair weapons. Putting the same idea in another way, we may say that there is no sharp distinction between (a) the existence of an intent to exclude and (b) the use of unfair means. . . .

Predatory pricing is the essential unfair means alleged in this case. The other practices employed by AMPOT inflicted no independent harm. They were merely auxiliaries to its general pricing policy and indicate nothing more than an intent that its pricing succeed in excluding PE from the market. "But intending the natural consequences of acts which are in all respects lawful, does not constitute the 'exclusionary intent' that is a prerequisite for finding a violation of section 2 [of the Sherman Act]." Union Leader Corp. v. Newspapers of New England, Inc., *supra* at 584. If the trial court correctly found AMPOT's pricing was not predatory in itself, we do not believe AMPOT can be found guilty of violating the Sherman Act.

The use of the term "predatory" to describe conduct violative of the antitrust laws has left much to be desired. This court has noted, "The term probably does not have a well-defined meaning in the context it was used, but it certainly bears a sinister connotation." Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 510 F.2d 894, 927 (10th Cir. 1975), *cert. dismissed,* 423 U.S. 802. The Supreme Court has indicated that any price below cost may be considered predatory. Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685, 696 n.12 (1967). We do not believe, [15] however, that the Court

has established a definitive standard. The Court was speaking of the "inferential value" of below cost sales. In some instances there is no inference to be taken from selling below total cost. It may even be desirable and certainly could not be considered "sinister."

The common circumstance in which sales below total cost may be expected is that of excess capacity. Professor Samuelson has noted in this circumstance the distinction between the interest of individual competitors and the ideals of competition.

> Competition, which the businessman regards as destructive, cutthroat, and ruinous, may actually be the only way to get the redundant plant capacity into operation or to discourage its maintenance. . . . Losses or subnormal profits is the free enterprise way of discouraging excess capacity.

P. Samuelson, *Economics* 496 (8th ed. 1970).

Excess capacity was precisely the problem facing AMPOT and PE. Each had plant capacity sufficient to supply substantially the entire demand for A/P. Individually, AMPOT and PE faced demand curves sharply responsive to price. With the nearly identical products, a small price cut by either of them could result in the acquisition of virtually all the business. Each of them also faced consistently decreasing marginal costs.[7] Additional units of A/P could be produced at less cost than previous units. In this situation, each competitor would be tempted to lower price and expand output to reach a lower point on its marginal cost curve. This in turn would drive the other competitor back up its marginal cost curve and increase its losses at the new, lower price.

---

7. Marginal cost is the extra cost at any production level of producing one extra unit of the product. Marginal cost usually decreases over low levels of output and [16] increases as production approaches plant capacity. Areeda & Turner, *supra* 88 Harv. L. Rev. at 700. The consistently decreasing marginal costs in the A/P industry are abnormal. This phenomenon is a function of the industry's excess capacity and of the methods used in A/P production. [17]

The textbook response to this situation is either a price war resulting in the destruction of all but one firm or the establishment of some form of imperfectly competitive price leadership oligopoly. *See* Samuelson, *supra* at 452. AMPOT, with knowledge of the consequences, chose to engage in price competition and was found guilty of violating the Sherman Act. The trial court found that a rational, non-predatory duopolist would have employed price leadership to raise the price to a profitable level for both competitors.

Price leadership is not desirable competitive conduct. Any conduct tending to fix prices has been condemned in the strongest language. United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333 (1969); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940). Conscious parallel pricing is circumstantial evidence of price fixing and may involve many of the same vices. *See* Theater Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp., 346 U.S. 537 (1954); Cackling Acres, Inc. v. Olson Farms, Inc., 541 F.2d 242 (10th Cir. 1976).

In this case, price leadership would invoke virtually all the disadvantages of monopoly. Both PE and AMPOT would have had to restrict output and to incur higher production costs. The selling price of the product would then be forced higher than it would be if one producer left the market. In addition, society would be saddled with the deadweight welfare loss resulting from idle and misallocated plant capacity. We do not believe the antitrust laws should be interpreted to encourage this result.

We conclude that in the circumstances of this case prices below total cost would be more consistent with the competitive goals of the antitrust laws. In the case of Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp. *supra* at 927, we specifically noted that § 2 of the Sherman Act should not be construed "to prohibit price changes which are within a 'reasonable' range, up or down." Although this statement points to the correct result in this case, it still leaves something to be

desired. There is no indication of when downward price changes cease to be "reasonable." Even in the situation presented here, the price could be set so low that it should be considered predatory.

The proper identification of predatory pricing has [18] recently been a subject of controversy. The discussion has focused on the employment of marginal cost as the floor below which prices should be considered predatory. In *Predatory Pricing and Related Practices under Section 2 of the Sherman Act,* 88 Harv. L. Rev. 697 (1975), Professors Areeda and Turner argue that any price above a firm's marginal cost, or in the alternative its average variable cost, should be conclusively presumed lawful. Any price below that level should be conclusively presumed unlawful. However, in Scherer, *Predatory Pricing and the Sherman Act: A Comment,* 89 Harv. L. Rev. 869 (1976), the author takes issue with the short-run cost approach. Scherer contends Areeda and Turner's proposed rule would permit anticompetitive pricing inconsistent with long-run welfare maximization. He recommends that courts continue to inquire into the monopolist's subjective intent and that several long-run variables be considered in determining whether the monopolist's conduct is anticompetitive.[8]

We believe that evidence of marginal cost or average varable cost is extremely beneficial in establishing a case of monopolization through predatory pricing. The relationship of a firm's price and its marginal cost is regarded as the best indicator of the competitive health of an industry. Samuelson, *supra* at 438; C. McConnell, *Economics* 446-448, 464 (3d ed. 1966). As an indicator of preda-

---

8. Scherer lists several long-run variables at page 890 which we need not repeat here. These primarily concern whether the monopolist will be able to restrict output, reap monopoly profits, and leave residual demand unsatisfied, and whether the monopolist may become so entrenched through barriers to entry that it can never be dislodged. Areeda and Turner reject Scherer's long-run factors as a potential test for unlawful predation on the ground they are inherently speculative and indeterminate. Areeda & Turner, *Scherer on Predatory Pricing,* 89 Harv. L. Rev. 891 (1976). Scherer replies in *Some Last Words on Predatory Pricing,* 89 Harv. L. Rev. 901 (1976). [19]

tory pricing, marginal cost is extremely valuable because: "There is no reason consistent with an interest in efficiency for selling a unit at a price lower than the cost that the seller incurs by the sale." Posner, *Exclusionary Practices and the Antitrust Laws,* 41 U. Chi. L. Rev. 506, 519 (1974).

In the present case, the trial court specifically found that AMPOT's sales were always at prices above average variable cost and "contributed to the company's cash flow." These prices also were above AMPOT's marginal cost. AMPOT never reached its shutdown point—the point at which it would incur greater losses by operating than by shutting down. Under the circumstances, selling at these prices was rational, competitive behavior. [20]

Although we do not intend to adopt a solely cost-based test, there are no other relevant factors indicating AMPOT's conduct was anticompetitive even in the long run. The low prices for A/P persisted into the long run (a period of nearly seven years), and the industry's problems were resolved only by the imposition of external controls in the interest of national defense. The evidence shows this is not a case of short-run price cutting designed to secure monopoly profits in the long run. *See* International Air Indus., Inc. v. American Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1975), *cert. denied*, ... U.S. ..... There is nothing in the record to warrant a finding that AMPOT engaged in predatory pricing.

We turn now to the trial court's finding that AMPOT also violated the price discrimination prohibition of the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a).[9] The discriminatorily low price was found in the sales to the large-volume buyers which we

---

9. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) provides in pertinent part: It shall be unlawful . . . to discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality . . . where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them . . . . [21]

have been discussing up to this point. There also existed a number of small-volume purchasers constituting a relatively small percentage of the total A/P market.[10] To these purchasers, both AMPOT and PE sold on the basis of published price schedules rather than secret bids. These prices were higher than the competitive bid prices. In 1968, the only year for which the trial court made specific findings, AMPOT's schedule prices varied from 18.62 cents a pound on orders of 100,000 pounds or more to 32.5 cents for orders under 2,000 pounds. In the same year, AMPOT's bid prices to the major purchasers were from 16 to 18 cents a pound. The price difference could not be cost-justified because AMPOT produced all its A/P in a continuous process and made all sales from accumulated inventory. AMPOT dominated the small-sale market primarily because PE made only nominal efforts to compete for this business.

Based on its finding that AMPOT's competitive bid prices were predatory, the trial court found the price discrimination gave AMPOT "an illegal 'edge' in its ability to undercut PE" which supplied the necessary element of injury to competition. This edge was found to be "slight" but "not insubstantial." We disagree with the court's conclusion that the evidence established injury to competition.

Some cases suggest discriminatorily low prices might be considered a violation of the Robinson-Patman Act on facts which would not establish predatory pricing in violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act. *See* Areeda & Turner, *supra,* 88 Harv. L. Rev. at 726. As it applies to the primary-line injury in this case, the Robinson-Patman Act should be interpreted no differently from the Sherman Act. The Supreme Court has admonished that the Robinson-Patman Act should be reconciled "with the broader antitrust policies that have been laid down by Congress." Auto-

10. The trial court never made findings as to what percentage of total sales this group represented or what buyers constituted the group. [22]

matic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 74 (1953). However, we perceive no substantial conflict. The primary-line decisions have consistently emphasized the element of predation. Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., *supra* at 696 n.12, *citing* FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536, 548 (1960).

The reasoning employed by the trial court in finding injury to competition has been referred to as the "double inference test." International Air Indus., Inc. v. American Excelsior Co., *supra* at 723. From below-cost pricing, predatory intent is inferred; from the finding of predation, injury to competition is inferred. *See* Continental Baking Co. v. Old Homestead Bread Co., 476 F.2d 97, 104 (10th Cir. 1973), *cert. denied*, 414 U.S. 975. It follows that if the first inference is lacking, there is no basis for the second. [23]

We have held that AMPOT was competing on the merits; its prices were not predatory. The fact that AMPOT was charging higher prices in another submarket does not change its legitimate competition into an injury to competition. Areeda & Turner, *supra*, 88 Harv. L. Rev. at 727; *see* Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp., *supra*. Although PE may have been at a disadvantage because it was not competing effectively in the high-price submarket, that does not establish the injury to the health of the competitive process with which the Robinson-Patman Act is concerned. Atlas Building Products Co. v. Diamond Block & Gravel Co., *supra;* Anheuser-Busch v. FTC, 289 F.2d 835 (7th Cir. 1961).

We realize that our ruling leads to the somewhat untoward result that the larger of two competitors will survive while the smaller may expire. Bigness, however, is not a disqualification to compete. The Seventh Circuit made the point rhetorically in Anheuser-Busch v. FTC, *supra* at 843 n.12:

> If bigness be a disqualification for a firm to compete, interesting collateral questions arise, such as, how small does a company have to be before it has the right to enter

> into price competition with its competitors? And how large does it have to be before it must stop competing in price?

The Robinson-Patman Act was intended to provide small businesses with protection from abuses by large, powerful business, [24] but legitimate price competition is not such an abuse. "[N]either the Act nor any social value compels the sheltering of an individual competitor, at the expense of the public interest, from the competitive process." International Air Indus., Inc. v. American Excelsior Co., *supra* at 721, *accord*, Atlas Building Products Co. v. Diamond Block & Gravel Co., *supra* at 956.

Finally, we must consider AMPOT's appeal from the dismissal of its counterclaims. The only point urged on appeal is that an alleged agreement between PE and two major A/P purchasers to give PE "stay alive" orders constituted a group boycot [sic] illegal *per se* under Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959). We need only note that the findings of fact which defeat the group boycott claim are not clearly erroneous. F.R. Civ. P. 52(a).

The judgment is reversed insofar as it holds AMPOT liable for violations of the Sherman and Robinson-Patman Acts. The judgment is affirmed as to the dismissal of AMPOT's counterclaims. [25]

Appendix B

[¶ 75,054] Pacific Engineering & Production Co. of Nevada v. Kerr-McGee Corp. and Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp.

U.S. District Court, District of Utah, Central Division. No. C-40-70. Filed March 4, 1974.

Clayton, Sherman and Utah Unfair Practices Acts

Relevant Product Market—Cross-Elasticity of Demand—Government-Qualified v. Nonqualified Products—Government Bid Products v. Price Scheduled Products.—The relevant product market for an attempted monopoly case involving ammonium perchlorate (used in rocket fuel) was all of the market, rather than two markets, one of government-qualified A/P for customers who purchased in large volume in connection with the manufacturing of missiles for the Department of Defense and who purchased the product based on a government-required competitive bidding procedure, and a second market consisting of non-qualified A/P sold to customers who purchased in quantities of 100,000 pounds or less and who purchased at list price without competitive bidding. The requisite cross-elasticity of demand existed between the plaintiff's non-qualified product and the defendant's exclusively qualified product, and they competed. It was appropriate to note the fact that one of the defendant's main contentions was that it could not raise the price of its product for fear of losing business to the nonqualified product. As for the scheduled sales, while the plaintiff may not have achieved as much success as it desired, the company certainly was competing for this business, so that it had to be included in the market along with the government sales. See ¶ 760.

Attempt to Monopolize—Intent—Proof—Below-Cost Sales—Forward Pricing—Dumping—Sales Predictions.—The requisite element of an attempted monopoly in the ammonium perchlorate field, intent, was established by evidence of below-cost sales, notwithstanding defensive price reductions, forward pricing activities,

a "dumping" incident, and predictions of market sales indicating that the company's goal was to capture the entire market. See ¶ 770.

Monopoly—Market Shares—Power to Control Prices.—Monopoly could be inferred from market shares in a five year period of 53.5% (not allowing an inference), 80%, 88%, 67% (close, but allowing the inference) and 78%. Percentages, however, were not necessary. It was found that the company had the power to control prices, using its vast financial resources to subsidize below-cost pricing, and having the power to raise prices as established by the fact that the plaintiff would have followed any price increase as long as it would have allowed the firm a profit. See ¶ 755.

Combination and Conspiracy—Parent and Subsidiary—Subsidiary's Deception of Individual Link Between Firms.—Charges of conspiracy between related companies were rebutted by the plaintiff's own contention showing, if anything, that the individual who was the major link between parent and subsidiary was deceived by those in effective control of the subsidiary, indicating that there could not possibly have been any agreement express or implied between the two companies. See ¶ 725.

Price Discrimination—Applicability—Government as Ultimate Consumer.—The proposition that sales to private parties are exempt merely because the ultimate consumer is the government was rejected. Since the government as ultimate consumer would benefit by vigorous competition among those it buys from and their suppliers, no public policy would be served by such an exemption. See ¶ 3275.

Price Discrimination—Like Grade and Quality—Customer Usage—Purpose of Specifications—Seller's Pricing.—Two broad grades of ammonium perchlorate (rocket fuel) each constituted products of like grade and quality, rather than separate specifications within them. There was no substantial difference in functional customer usage of the product. The desire for particular

specifications was more the result of a desire for reproducibility rather than any initial desire for a "different" product than the broad classification. The seller's own course of conduct strongly suggested that a determination of like grade and quality was proper, since the price differences were not on the basis of differences in grade or quality but were based on differences in size of sales or the need for pricing to win a contract. See ¶ 3245.

Price Discrimination—Like Grade and Quality—Physical Differences.—Although two FTC cases supported the proposition that physical differences probably remove differential pricing from the reach of the Robinson-Patman Act, neither case holds that *any* physical differentiation is sufficient to eliminate comparisons under the like grade and quality test. In both cases there were considerably more substantial differences in the compared products than in the products in the instant case. See ¶ 3245.

Price Discrimination—Defenses—Absence of Competition Between Plaintiff and Defendant on Differentiated Goods.—The defense that higher prices charged small-volume buyers did not violate the Robinson-Patman Act because the plaintiff did not compete for the small-volume business was rejected as unsupported by law and fact. Legally, it is irrelevant whether or not the plaintiff competed for the small-volume business, since the most common type of price discrimination claim is that the defendant raised prices on the same goods in areas where there was no competition in order to support lower prices where there was competition; competition is only required on one "end" of the price differentiated sales in order for there to be competitive injury and a violation of the Act. See ¶ 3315.

Price Discrimination—Defenses—Availability of Quantity Discounts.—The defense that quantity discounts were available to all customers provided they ordered sufficient quantities was legally unsupportable. See ¶ 3380.

Price Discrimination—Competitive Injury—Subsidization of Below-Cost Sales.—Price discrimination favoring large-volume buy-

ers were a cause of injury to the plaintiff, since the higher profits gained from the small-volume sales would necessarily have given the defendant an illegal edge in its ability to undercut the plaintiff on larger-volume schedule sales and large-volume bid sales. The edge contributed substantially to the defendant's ability to undercut the plaintiff's prices and to hold the sales price of large-volume materials at a below cost level. See ¶ 3300.

Price Discrimination—Variances in Below-Cost Prices.—Variances in below-cost prices were not violative of the Robinson-Patman Act because it was the below-cost aspect of the prices, not the variances, that caused competitive injury. See ¶ 3300.

Sales Below Cost—Applicability to Retailers and Wholesalers —Inapplicability to Manufacturers.—A manufacturer's sales below cost to a Utah customer would not violate the Unfair Practices Act, since the Act does not apply to manufacturers. See ¶ 6641.47.

Price Discrimination—Defenses—Injury to Monopolist.—Although plaintiff in a monopoly case engaged in price discrimination, this did not involve competitive injury, in light of the findings as to the defendant's attempt to monopolize, monopoly power, and price discrimination, a showing of injury would be difficult. The plaintiff may have taken some of defendant's business. "But the effect of taking business from a monopolist is not 'substantially to lessen competition, or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce . . .' Indeed it has the opposite effect." (The court noted that it expressed no opinion as to whether the plaintiff would be able to defend against buyers who suffered.) See ¶ 3300, 3315.

Refusal to Deal—Boycott—Dual Sourcing.—Arrangements under which two companies undertook dual sourcing to include purchases from a particular company did not constitute a group boycott directed at the other supplier in the field. As for the boycott theory, a firm agreement did not exist, the allegedly excluded supplier was not forced by the arrangements to charge lower

prices (as demonstrated by a finding that the firm had the power to raise prices), the facts differed from *Klor's* in that there was no dominant economic power trying to drive a small competitor out of business, the purchasers were free to deal with the complaining supplier and to negotiate the price paid for the alleged beneficiary of the questioned arrangements, and even if the customers intended to follow the policy of dual sourcing there was nothing to compel them to do so. The governing law is contained in *Seagram* (CA-9, 1969, 1969 TRADE CASES ¶ 72,914). There was no evidence of anticompetitive motives. See ¶ 2450.

Exclusive Dealing—Customers' Dual Sourcing—Requirements Contract.—Arrangements under which two companies undertook dual sourcing to include purchases from a particular company did not constitute illegal exclusive dealing by requirement contract with respect to the other supplier in the field. The situation differed from *Tampa Electric* in that it included more than just a single buyer and a single seller. Also, the policy did not operate as a requirement contract because there were not any enforceable contracts requiring the customers to purchase from the seller. See ¶ 2920.

For plaintiff: C. Keith Rooker and Richard W. Giauque (Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy, on brief), Salt Lake City, Utah. For defendants: Peter W. Billings, Alfred J. Colton and Stanford B. Owen (Fabian & Clendenin, on brief), Salt Lake City, Utah, Willard P. Scott and Thomas R. Cochran (of counsel), Oklahoma City, Okla.

Opinion

HOFFMAN, D. J.: The controversy in this private anti-trust action pertains to the ammonium perchlorate (A/P) industry. The plaintiff, Pacific Engineering & Production Co. (PE), and Kerr-McGee Chemical Corporation, one of the defendants herein,

were, at the time this action was tried, the only producers of A/P. Prior to 1958 Western Electrochemical Company (Wecco) and its successor, American Potash and Chemical Company (AMPOT), were the only producers of this product. In 1958 H. E. F. (Hooker), a joint venture between Hooker Chemical Company and Foote Mineral Company; Pennwalt Corporation (Pennwalt); and PE all entered the industry as producers in competition with AMPOT. Later AMPOT was acquired by Kerr-McGee Corporation through the medium of a new subsidiary, American Potash and Chemical Corporation, and, a few years thereafter, Kerr-McGee Chemical Corporation, a wholly owned subsidiary of Kerr-McGee Corporation, took over the AMPOT operations. For convenient reference, unless otherwise designated, we will refer to the defendants as AMPOT.

Before 1958 the price of A/P was in excess of 40 cents per pound. When competition entered the field, combined with other developments, the price of A/P declined, at times very rapidly, until it was selling at between 15 and 20 cents per pound during March, 1966, and through December, 1970, which is the damage period involved in the present action.

This opinion deals only with the liability. Damages have been deferred for further consideration.

The Product

A/P is an oxidizer which is used primarily in solid fuel propellants for military and NASA rockets. It is also used to a lesser degree in explosives and pyrotechnics. The chemical constitutes slightly over two-thirds of the contents of the propellant in a solid fuel rocket. At the present time, A/P is the best oxidizer available for rocket motor programs. The majority of A/P is manufactured and sold as Class I (nominal 200 micron size—"standard") or Class II (nominal 400 micron size—"coarse").

Each rocket motor manufacturer to whom PE and AMPOT sell the bulk of their production has its own government approved

specifications for the components of the products which it manufactures. These specifications vary as to the different properties required of the A/P. The A/P used in these motors and rockets must meet these specifications and, in addition, must be qualified for the program. To become qualified the A/P must undergo several tests. These tests range from simple lab scale ballistic and physical tests to static test of loaded rocket motors. AMPOT's products are qualified for most of the missile programs, while PE's are not.

The main differences in the manufacturing process used by AMPOT and PE are in the annodes used in part of the process,[1] the character of the first two steps[2] and the operating conditions in the third step.

The Parties

1. *The Plaintiff*—PE was organized in November, 1955, in the State of Nevada by Fred D. Gibson, Sr., Edgar Marston, and John Mueller. Gibson was president from the creation of the company until 1966. He, as well as most of the other members of PE's staff, were former officers or employees of Wecco, the predecessor of AMPOT.

In 1958 PE began construction of a pilot plant at Henderson, Nevada. This plant was to test the feasibility of manufacturing A/P using the company's new process. In 1959 the plant's capacity was expanded to approximately 5,000,000 pounds of A/P per year. The plant was further enlarged in 1961, and the final capacity became 11,500,000 pounds per year if PE manufactured its own sodium chlorate, and 20,000,000 if the company purchased sodium chlorate elsewhere.

---

1. PE uses lead dioxide annodes, whereas AMPOT uses graphite annodes in the first step and platinum in the second.

2. AMPOT uses a continuous process while PE produces on a batch basis.

A loan of over $2,000,000 from American Cyanamid made the 1961 expansion possible. This loan was to be paid beginning with a balloon payment of $1,100,000 in January, 1966. It was secured by a deed of trust on the majority of PE's property. American Cyanamid was allowed two representatives on PE's board of directors, and also received an option to purchase either PE's assets or common stock. In 1964 American Cyanamid's representatives resigned from the board and the company released its option for reasons hereinafter mentioned.

PE was unable to meet the loan payments and, on March 16, 1966, American Cyanamid instituted a suit in the United States District Court for the District of Nevada to foreclose its deed of trust. In the same year, a group of PE's stockholders filed a petition in the district court for a reorganization of the company under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act.

These critical financial problems were resolved in March, 1967, when PE obtained a $500,000 Small Business Administration guaranteed loan from the First National Bank of Nevada. The proceeds were paid to American Cyanamid who then subordinated the balance of its debt to the bank loan.

In 1968 PE defaulted in the performance of its revised obligations to American Cyanamid and its obligation under its 1967 bank loan. Plaintiff raised $450,000 by an intrastate stock offering at $1.00 per share and the advance of $300,000 by Raymond Knisley. Knisley then used the entire $450,000 to buy the American Cyanamid note and then forgave the balance of the debt reducing the principal to $300,000.

PE discharged its obligation to the First National Bank, Knisley, and other creditors with the proceeds from a public offering. This registered offering was conducted from February 3-27, 1970, and raised approximately $1,555,000.

Since 1958, A/P has been PE's primary product and provided the majority of the company's revenues. The company showed a profit in the years 1960-64 and a loss in the years 1965-70.

2. *The Defendants*—Wecco was the first producer of A/P. In the early 1940's the company was founded to produce various perchlorates for experimental work in rocket propellants. In the middle 1940's a part of a government-owned electrolytic basic magnesium plant at Henderson, Nevada, was converted into a potassium perchlorate plant, and Wecco became the operator. In 1951 the company purchased this plant from the government.

1951 was also the year in which Wecco began building an A/P plant at Henderson. This plant was built for and owned by the Navy, and it became operational in 1953. Wecco operated the plant under contract with the Navy.

Commencing in 1954 American Potash and Chemical Company (OLD AMPOT) began negotiations concerning a merger with Wecco. This merger was completed by a series of transactions which occurred in 1954 and 1955. F. D. Gibson, a director and stockholder of Wecco, and Edgar Marston, Wecco's largest stockholder, initially opposed the merger, but finally sold their stock to AMPOT. Shortly after this merger, Gibson left OLD AMPOT and devoted his full time towards PE's activities. After the merger was completed, OLD AMPOT continued to operate the A/P plant for the Navy. In 1961 the government offered the plant for sale and, in 1962, AMPOT purchased it for slightly over $5,000,000.00.

On December 31, 1967, AMPOT was acquired by Kerr-McGee Corporation under a statutory merger proceeding which was a stock for stock transfer. By the terms of the merger, a wholly owned subsidiary of Kerr-McGee Corporation took over all assets and assumed all liabilities of AMPOT. The new subsidiary was named American Potash and Chemical Corporation (NEW AMPOT). In October, 1970,[3] fertilizer and non-fuel mineral opera-

3. Kelly, President of Kerr-McGee Corporation, testified that the consolidation occurred in 1969, but Kerr-McGee's 1970 Annual Report states the consolidation was effective October 1, 1970.

tions were combined with NEW AMPOT, and the new subsidiary was named Kerr-McGee Chemical Corporation.

This subsidiary continued to produce A/P until the spring of 1971 when Kerr-McGee announced it was closing its A/P plant. On September 1, 1971, the government held separate meetings with both PE and NEW AMPOT. These meetings were conducted at Norton Air Force Base, California, Headquarters, Space and Missile Systems Organization (SAMSO). As a result of these meetings, the government imposed a division of business by government contractors between both companies at prices which would yield them a potentially reasonable profit and the operation of Kerr-McGee Chemical Corporation continues.

Other A/P Producers

Hooker Chemical Company (Hooker)

Hooker is a large industrial chemical company located within the United States. Among other products, it produces sodium chlorates at a plant in Columbus, Mississippi. In 1958 Hooker and Foote Minerals Company formed a joint venture named H. E. F., Inc. H. E. F. was created in order to develop the capability to produce A/P at Columbus. The company began production in 1959. Due to its location, it had a freight advantage as to A/P shipments to the Southern and Eastern regions of the United States, and a disadvantage in shipments to the Western regions.

Hooker became the sole owner of the company in 1962 when it bought Foote's interest in the project. In early 1965, however, the company announced plans to close its A/P plant. The facility was mothballed in 1966, although in that year the company sold some A/P from existing inventories.

Pennwalt

Pennwalt Chemical Corporation is another large industrial chemical manufacturing and marketing company which entered the A/P field. The company is a major producer of sodium

chlorate at a plant near Portland, Oregon, and in 1958 the company (then Pennsalt) began a pilot plant for the production of A/P. This plant was gradually expanded until its capacity reached 12,000,000 pounds per year.

In early 1965 Pennsalt terminated most of its A/P production although it sold A/P from inventory until 1967.

Consumers of A/P

As previously mentioned, the primary use for A/P is as an oxidizer in solid fuel propellants for military and NASA rockets. Therefore, the ultimate consumer is the United States, and the Government determines what quantity of A/P will be purchased in any given year. Additionally, the procurement of A/P which is sold to the armed services is governed by the Armed Services Procurement Regulations. The actual purchase of A/P, however, is made by the companies producing the products in which the A/P is used. Although there are several of these companies, we are basically concerned with the three largest which are hereinafter described.

1. *Thiokol Chemical Corporation (Thiokol)*

During the 1960's Thiokol was the largest user of A/P. Its corporate headquarters are at Bristol, Pennsylvania, and it has five divisions which use A/P. These are Wasatch at Promontory, Utah; Longhorn at Marshall, Texas; Huntsville at Huntsville, Alabama; Elkton at Elkton, Maryland; and Georgia at Woodbine, Georgia. The main projects for which the company used A/P were the Minuteman and Poseidon missile programs.

2. *Aerojet General (Aerojet)*

Aerojet is a subsidiary of General Tire and Rubber Company, and its A/P plant is located near Sacramento, California. Its main use of A/P involved the 260-inch motor, Polaris and Minuteman programs.

3. *United Technology Center (U. T. C.)*

U. T. C. is a subsidiary of United Aircraft, and its A/P plants are located at Sunnyvale and Coyote, California. The main use which the company made of A/P was in the Titan III—C and D program.

Summary of Pricing in the A/P Industry

Wecco began the production of A/P in 1948; however, its sales volume did not begin to grow until 1950. Sales then grew to approximately 7,000,000 pounds yearly for the years 1954-57. The price of A/P during this period was above 40 cents per pound.

From 1958, immediately after AMPOT's three competitors entered the market, until 1961 the price declined to the 32-35 cents per pound level. From 1962-64 the price further declined until it was between 20-26 cents per pound. This trend continued in 1964 when PE received a U. T. C. order for 11,550,000 pounds at 19.25 cents per pound, and in 1965 when AMPOT bid 16.4 cents per pound on a large procurement at Thiokol Wasatch. Prices continued to decline and, during the damage period when PE and AMPOT were the only A/P suppliers, the price fluctuated between 15 and 20 cents per pound. The prices during the damage period were below fully allocated cost for both companies.

PE claims AMPOT's actions were unlawful and were responsible for the drastic decline in the price of A/P. The plaintiff maintains these actions were responsible for the following:

1. Violations of Section 2 of the Sherman Act—
   a. Monopolization of the A/P market.
   b. Attempt to monopolize the A/P market.
   c. Conspired to monopolize trade and commerce in the A/P market.
2. Violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act by conspiring and combining to monopolize the A/P market.
3. Violation of Section 2(a) of the Clayton Act as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act.
4. Violation of the Utah Unfair Practices Act.

Defendants counter with accusations that PE's actions violated the following:

1. Section 10(b) and Rule 10(b) 5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

2. Section 1 of the Sherman Act by conspiring illegally to restrain trade, and Section 3 of the Clayton Act.

3. The Robinson-Patman Act.

Factual Evidence Concerning the Monopoly and Attempted Monopoly Charges

The following facts are those which we have found proven by the evidence and relevant to PE's charges of monopoly and attempted monopoly and AMPOT's defenses to these claims.[4] We will first discuss PE's evidence and then AMPOT's although, where appropriate, AMPOT's contentions will be included with those of PE and vice versa. Even though we will defer a discussion of our findings concerning these claims until all of the facts have been presented, when it is convenient to do so, we will resolve the conflicting interpretations of the evidence within this section.

A. The following facts are those which PE relies upon to establish AMPOT's predatory intent and monopolistic practices.

1. *Market Forecast and Intent to Achieve all Existing Business.*

One of the basic elements of PE's claim is that AMPOT's[5] predatory intent can be seen by examining the actions of AMPOT's employees. These employees frequently made projections of future sales of A/P. Three of these are relevant on the attempted monopoly claim.

The first can be found in a memo from Schnier, AMPOT's Manager of Chemical Fuel Sales 1965-66, to Francis, AMPOT's

4. Where appropriate we will include additional facts within our conclusions of law.

5. Although the primary defendant is now Kerr-McGee Chemical Corporation, where appropriate the name AMPOT will be used.

Vice-President in Charge of Marketing. This memo contained a prediction that PE would receive only 45 tons of new A/P orders in 1966. The existing business which was credited to PE was the result of a 1964 contract with U. T. C. originally for 5,750 tons of A/P. This contract called for shipments to begin in December, 1964 and continue for 17 months.

The second projection is contained in a memo from Campbell, a member of AMPOT's Sales Department, to O'Brien, Director of Field Sales. This memo was written in October, 1967, and contained a prediction that in 1968 the total sales of A/P would be 11,738 tons and that AMPOT would sell 9,328 of them. This indicates that Campbell felt the company would have over 78% of the market in 1968.

The last projection is a graph made in July, 1968, by Jenny, Manager of AMPOT's Chemical Fuel Department. Jenny's prediction was that PE would sell 3,000 tons of A/P per year in the years 1968 through 1970, with 2,000 of the foregoing coming from PE's second long term contract with U. T. C. This contract called for PE to supply U. T. C. with up to 9,755 tons of A/P from the second quarter of 1968 through the second quarter of 1971. Jenny predicted that the rest of the sales in the A/P industry, which he felt would amount to 8,000 tons each year, would be awarded to AMPOT. Jenny thus was predicting that AMPOT would sell over 70% of all A/P sold.

Jenny justified his projections on the basis that, if they were accurate, both AMPOT and PE would be operating at 50% of their capacity. He hoped his calculations were correct and that AMPOT would sell this tonnage. His position reflected the company's attitude which was to obtain as much business as possible so that its plant would remain in a viable operating condition. Standing alone, of course, there is nothing unlawful in attempting to obtain as much business as possible.

In 1969, after AMPOT lost two competitive bids to PE, Jenny's figures were revised downward to 5,339 tons of A/P sales for

AMPOT. As a result of this loss of business, AMPOT established a new policy of reviewing each bid prior to submitting it. It was hoped that this policy would enable the company to obtain as much business as possible. It seemed to be successful as, in June, 1969, O'Brien wrote Jenny's superior that AMPOT had not lost any business since the new policy took effect.

As far as intent to achieve all existing business is concerned, AMPOT priced its A/P in order to obtain as much business as it could up to its productive capacity.[6] In addition, when AMPOT was not selling to a company such as U. T. C., it would make that company a target account in order to try to obtain that business. This policy, together with the actions of the company's employees, establishes PE's claim that AMPOT desired to obtain as much of the existing A/P business as possible.

2. *Major Sales of A/P Were Below Cost.*

Another aspect of PE's claims is that AMPOT sold its A/P below cost[7] for the entire damage period in order to drive PE out of business. The evidence establishes that AMPOT did submit bids on all major procurements during the damage period at prices below its fully allocated cost. In addition, the majority of

---

6. This capacity in later years was apparently more than the market capacity.

7. Although many types of cost were discussed at trial, there are three which the court considers significant. These are manufacturer's cost, out-of-pocket cost, and fully allocated cost. We will accept defendant's definitions of these costs. These are as follows:

(a) Manufacturer's cost—The fully allocated cost at Kerr-McGee's Henderson plant without the addition of general corporate overhead and selling expenses;

(b) Out-of-pocket cost—The cost necessary to produce the product which does not take into account plant depreciation, interest on debt, or any of the corporate overhead or selling expenses. This cost does, however, include labor, maintenance labor, and the cost of chemicals and electricity;

(c) Fully allocated cost—The full cost of manufacturing and selling the product.

sales made pursuant to these bids were also below the company's manufacturing cost.[8] All of AMPOT's sales, however, were above its out-of-pocket cost and contributed to the company's cash flow.

As might be expected, AMPOT's officers knew the cost of manufacturing and selling A/P. As early as 1963 one of the company's cost accountants prepared two graphs which showed the company's fully allocated cost and the suggested selling price. There [sic] graphs revealed the following:

Volume of A/P	*Fully Allocated Cost— Cents Per Pound*	*Suggested Selling Price Cents Per Pound*[9]
8½ tons	26.1	31.0
10 tons	23.7	28.9
12 tons	22.1	27.0
14 tons	21.0	25.6

It is quite likely that these figures are accurate since AMPOT bid on major sales of A/P during the year 1963 at between 25 and 30 cents per pound.

Further evidence of AMPOT's awareness of the cost of A/P is illustrated by a pro forma statement of manufacturing cost which was submitted to Stanford Research in September, 1965 by AMPOT's Vice-President in Charge of Finances and Administration. According to this statement,[10] the cost of A/P was between 25 cents per pound at a 4,500 ton capacity and 15.92 cents per pound at a 13,500 ton capacity.[11]

Internal communications among AMPOT's officers indicate the company not only knew the cost of A/P but realized the price had become greatly depressed. In fact, the price was so depressed that AMPOT's treasurer did not make an effort to determine

---

8. AMPOT's schedule or drug store sales were, however, always sold at prices equal to or above fully allocated cost.

9. This price includes an 18% pre-tax profit.

10. At trial Kerr-McGee claimed this statement was hypothetical.

11. This capacity was never obtained during the damage period.

the full complete cost of A/P. He felt this would only be academic since the manufacturing costs were considerably in excess of the sales price. Additionally, in January, 1967 a proxy statement and prospectus issued by AMPOT in connection with its merger with Kerr-McGee stated that the price received for A/P in recent years had been below cost.[12]

Although AMPOT did not reveal its exact cost for the years during the damage period, PE presented an expert who reconstructed AMPOT's fully allocated cost and revealed them to be as follows:

Year	Cents Per Pound
1965	29.37
1966	21.64
1967	19.32
1968	21.81
1969	21.53

When these costs are compared with AMPOT's bids on procurements of 250,000 pounds of A/P or more, [13] which during the damage period ranged between approximately 15 to 20 cents per pound with the majority below 18.5 cents per pound, it can be clearly seen that AMPOT was selling its A/P at prices far below cost.

Perhaps the clearest evidence that AMPOT set its pricing policies with full knowledge that its price was below cost can be found in an internal memo which was sent to AMPOT's Vice-President in Charge of Finances and Administration on June 10, 1965. This was the day before AMPOT submitted a bid of 15 cents per pound on a multi-year procurement at Thiokol-Wasatch. The memo was a voluntary non-routine memo prepared by Cable,

12. This reference was to fully allocated cost.

13. This figure was chosen by Kerr-McGee's expert as one which represented major sales.

administrator of government contracts and special financial analyst, and must be accepted as such.

In this memo, Cable made the following four assumptions:

1. The costs of producing A/P are approximately equal within the industry;
2. A/P consumers are interested in maintaining two sources;
3. Pennwalt (Pennsalt) will not actively compete for business at the present price levels; and
4. Present price levels for A/P will not give PE a profit and probably will not cover all of its cost.

After these assumptions, Cable posed the question of whether PE was getting the same price as AMPOT or whether it was being maintained as an alternate source and receiving a share of the A/P business regardless of its price.

He then observed that, if PE was getting the same price as AMPOT, it had a limited life expectancy and, if so, its facilities would only be of interest to a consumer of A/P. Acquisition by a consumer, Cable pointed out, would be a depressing influence on the price of A/P and undesirable. He further observed that, if PE was getting a higher price, AMPOT could raise its price to the level of PE without affecting its share of the market.

The conclusion reached in this memo was that, since the company must share the market with PE, either as a going concern or a captive capacity, AMPOT should price its A/P on that expectation rather than one of forcing PE to shut down. He added, however, that the company's price should be set low enough to discourage Pennwalt's (Pennsalt's) resumption of production.

In spite of this analysis, AMPOT bid 15 cents per pound and accepted a total loss of 13.4 cents per pound based on its fully allocated cost. Although this bid has been pointed to as crucial due to PE's claim that it represented a new step in the low pricing of A/P, it is not as important for this reason[14] as it is to show

14. We do not choose to give great weight to this particular bid due to the fact that its effect on pricing was minimal because of the extremely

that officials of AMPOT were aware that PE was facing bankruptcy if the price of A/P remained below cost.

AMPOT's below cost pricing policy resulted in heavy financial losses for the years 1965-1969. These losses were as follows:

Year	Loss
1965	$458,092.00
1966	$362,131.00
1967	$210,676.00
1968	$328,625.00
1969	$247,560.00[15]

As will be discussed in detail *infra*, AMPOT argues it was forced to sell A/P at these low prices due to the tactics of the rocket motor manufacturers and the conditions existing in the industry. However, the net result of AMPOT's pricing policies can be seen by analyzing one of its exhibits. This exhibit lists the competitive bids of A/P at volumes above 250,000 pounds which resulted in procurements for the years 1961-1971. This study reveals the following:

(a) Between June, 1963 and October 1964, when the price of A/P was above 20 cents per pound, PE and AMPOT were obtaining a similar number of awards;

(b) From January, 1965 through February, 1966, when the price of A/P fell below 20 cents per pound, PE did not obtain any major awards and it only obtained one during the remainder of 1966;

(c) During the period from March through December, 1966, AMPOT received six awards;

---

long period of time during which the prices were depressed. Even though this bid probably did reduce the price of A/P to new levels it was basically a continuation of an existing situation.

15. It should be noted that these losses take into account the "drug store" sales which were sold on a profitable basis.

(d) In 1967, PE received five awards while AMPOT received seven or eight.

(e) In 1968, when PE was bidding 2 to 3 cents per pound higher than AMPOT, PE received one award and AMPOT fifteen or sixteen.

(f) In 1969 PE received three awards and AMPOT six.

(g) In 1970 PE received three awards and AMPOT four.

Although these figures represent numbers and not volume, they are fairly indicative of the percentages of the A/P business which each company received. These percentages are as follows:[16]

Year	PE	AMPOT
1966	27.0	53.5
1967	19.0	80.0
1968	12.0	88.0
1969	33.0	67.0
1970	22.0	78.0

3. *AMPOT's Broad and Continuous Surveillance of PE*

Another aspect of PE's claims is that AMPOT's surveillance of PE is indicative of its predatory intent. The evidence shows that AMPOT conducted detailed investigations of PE's operations and activities. Although these investigations took several different forms, there are two which are most significant.

The first is AMPOT's scrutiny of PE's relationship with American Cyanamid. The interest in this relationship was due to the fact that PE had borrowed over $2,400,000 from this company. The loan was secured by a trust deed, and PE's ability to repay it was questionable. AMPOT's investigation of this situation

16. All of these percentages except those for 1966 were supplied by AMPOT. PE's percentages indicate that AMPOT received a higher share of the market. The difference, however, is slight and we will consider the above figures as accurate. These percentages include sales of both qualified and nonqualified A/P since the claims are based on AMPOT's attempt to monopolize or monopolization of the entire market.

began as early as 1963 and intensified a few years later when American Cyanamid instituted suit to enforce PE's obligation.

AMPOT initially checked records in Nevada's state and federal courts to discover if an action had been filed. Once the suit was filed, AMPOT closely followed its progress. AMPOT's inquiry became so intense that the company asked two Nevada attorneys to keep track of the court files and inform the company of all developments in the case. The company's tactics were successful and, by early 1967, it had learned that PE worked out an arrangement with American Cyanamid whereby PE's debt was subordinated so that PE could obtain a $500,000 loan.

The second activity was the detailed surveillance of operations at PE's plant. This surveillance was carried out by Henry Curtis, the manager of AMPOT's Henderson plant. Curtis gathered information and sent it to his superiors. On several occasions he was told that his work was very valuable. His activities consisted of the following:

(a) A monthly check of the number of cars in PE's parking lot;[17]

(b) Checking on the movement of freight cars in and out of PE's plant by examining records in the freight office;

(c) Taking aerial photos of PE's plant on two or three occasions;

(d) Clipping articles in the local papers concerning PE's activities;

(e) Inquiring at the Colorado River Commission concerning PE's power consumption; and

(f) Encouraging his shipping foreman to inquire of truck drivers concerning shipments made to PE's plant.

---

17. This check gave him a feeling for the number of employees working and allowed him to approximate PE's payroll and level of plant activity.

In addition to these activities, on one occasion a letter from a foreign country addressed to PE was deliverd to AMPOT by mistake. Curtis read through the envelope and saw that the letter contained a request for 100 pounds of A/P. He then made a Xerox copy of the envelope, passed the information contained in the letter to AMPOT's export salesman, and mailed the letter to PE.

This extensive surveillance was conducted only against PE, and Curtis was not instructed to cease these activities until sometime between one and three months prior to the taking of his deposition. AMPOT's evidence concerning this activity tends to support its claim that the surveillance was necessary in order for the company to be prepared to fill PE's A/P orders if PE should go out of business. We choose, however, to believe AMPOT's activities were far too extensive to be justified on this rationale and we believe that these activities are evidence of AMPOT's predatory intent. We agree that reasonable inquiries as to a competitor's activities are permissible, but AMPOT went beyond the rule of reasonableness.

4. *AMPOT's Efforts to Impair PE's Contract with U. T. C.*

In December, 1967 PE bid on a procurement of A/P at U. T. C. As a result of this bid in April, 1968 PE was awarded a blanket purchase order for up to 19,500,000 pounds of U. T. C.'s Class I A/P requirements for the Titan Rocket Motor Program. This A/P was to be supplied from May, 1968 through December, 1971 at a price of 17.94 cents per pound.

This award was one of the largest obtained by PE. As another aspect of its attempted monopoly claim, PE contends that AMPOT endeavored to induce U. T. C. to breach this contract. After the award, J. C. Schumacher, AMPOT's Vice-President in Charge of Manufacturing of Electrochemicals and Sales and Manufacturing of Rare Earth Products, and Freeman, AMPOT's A/P product manager, visited U. T. C. officials. During this visit Adelman,

U. T. C.'s President, was told that AMPOT was interested in selling a large quantity of surplus A/P. Adelman informed Schumacher and Freeman that U. T. C. had just purchased A/P from PE. In response, Schumacher stated that U. T. C. was not totally obligated to PE, and he asked if U. T. C. would be interested in A/P at a price of 9 or 10 cents per pound.[18]

After this meeting, Reddington, U. T. C.'s Manager of General Procurements, was asked to make inquiries concerning this surplus A/P. He called AMPOT's plant and was informed that AMPOT did not have a large supply of A/P on hand.

AMPOT's trial testimony indicates Schumacher took it upon himself to initiate this conversation with U. T. C. due to his personal animosity toward PE and its officers, and that AMPOT's sales department disavowed the offer when inquiries were made. Additionally, AMPOT's Vice-President in Charge of Sales told the company's marketing director that Schumacher did not have the authority to give U. T. C. a quotation. In essence, AMPOT admitted the episode but claimed that it was not responsible.

Although there may be some merit in AMPOT's response, we must consider the fact that this incident was carried out by one of the company's highest officers. Bearing this in mind, we find this incident does reflect predatory intent toward PE.

This finding is bolstered by a memo to file which was written by Jenny on February 17, 1970. The subject was a visit with Reddington concerning the sale of A/P. In a blind postscript to some of AMPOT's marketing people, Jenny stated that the seed of doubt had been placed, that perhaps a better price is available on the remaining U. T. C. requirement for regular A/P for use in the Titan 3-C program. This memo indicates AMPOT was attempting to obtain the business which U. T. C. had under con-

---

18. At this time A/P was selling at a price of 15 to 20 cents per pound, and the price of 10 cents per pound was below AMPOT's out-of-pocket cost.

tract with PE and gives credence to PE's claim that Schumacher's visit was more than just an "unauthorized gambit."

5. *Destruction of PE's Small Business Administration Classification*

Another aspect of the attempted monopoly claim is that AMPOT was responsible for PE's losing its Small Business Classification. This classification meant that PE was entitled to small business set-asides on certain procurements and that PE was eligible for favorable Small Business Administration financing.

The evidence presented conclusively establishes that AMPOT interfered with PE's classification. In June, 1962 a bid which contained a small business set-aside was issued for a November procurement of A/P. At this time AMPOT protested PE's classification[19] and, as a result of this protest, PE waived its claim to the set-aside. PE took this action due to the time pressures generated by the procurement.

AMPOT remained concerned about PE's status and continued to complain to government officials. As a result of these complaints, it was determined that PE was not a small business for purposes of government procurements.

In September, 1963, PE decided to apply for reinstatement of its Small Business Administration classification and AMPOT again objected. This objection continued even after PE was reclassified as a small business.[20] AMPOT's final action concerning PE's classification occurred in late 1966 and early 1967 when AMPOT again investigated PE's status.

6. *AMPOT's Forward Pricing Would Vary in Response to PE's Financial Condition*

The last, and perhaps one of the most significant, of PE's claims which we have found relevant is that AMPOT's forward

19. The basis of this protest was that, as a result of its loan to PE, American Cyanamid had options on PE and officials on PE's Board of Directors.

20. This reclassification was due to American Cyanamid's release of its options on PE.

pricing would vary in response to PE's financial condition. On occasions, the rocket motor manufacturers would request the A/P suppliers to submit bids for future years. PE claims that AMPOT would lower these prices when it appeared that PE would remain a competitor and raise them when it appeared the company was about to collapse.

PE claims AMPOT began this pricing activity with its 15 cents per pound bid to Thiokol in 1965. This bid was the result of a meeting held on June 11, 1965. In attendance were three of AMPOT's top officers, and they set the price knowing that PE might default on its mortgage to American Cyanamid and be forced into bankruptcy. AMPOT quoted this price of 15 cents per pound through June, 1967; however, for fiscal years 1967 and 1968 the company stated that the price would be the price for fiscal year 1966, increased or decreased to equal fully allocated cost plus 6% profit. Since the 15 cent bid was well below AMPOT's fully allocated cost, the bids in fiscal 1967 and 1968 represented a considerable rise in the price of A/P.

In January, 1966 AMPOT bid the following to Thiokol:

Time Period	Cents Per Pound
January 1, 1967—June 30, 1967	15.00
July 1, 1967—December 31, 1967	23.29
January 1, 1968—December 31, 1968	23.99
Calendar Year 1969	24.71[21]

In this same month (January, 1966) AMPOT computed its cost at 20.25 cents per pound.[22]

In May, 1966 these high forward prices were lowered. As a prelude to this lowering, American Cyanamid had informed AMPOT

---

21. These figures are based on certain volume levels but for our purposes these are not relevant.

22. This type of cost was not specified although it appears to be manufacturing cost.

that it had decided to delay bringing suit against PE. In addition, AMPOT also learned that Thiokol had awarded an order for 500 tons of A/P to PE. The new prices quoted were as follows:

Time Period	Cents Per Pound
January 1, 1967—June 30, 1967	15.00
July 1, 1967—December 31, 1967	15.75
January 1, 1968—December 31, 1968	16.50
January 1, 1969—December 31, 1969	18.15
January 1, 1970—December 31, 1970	19.97
January 1, 1971—December 31, 1971	21.97
January 1, 1972—December 31, 1972	24.17

The next event which affected forward pricing occurred on September 21, 1966, when American Cyanamid obtained summary judgment against PE. Paralleling this event was the fact that by October 6, 1966, AMPOT had learned that an involuntary petition in bankruptcy had been filed against PE. On November 30, 1966 AMPOT withdrew its May, 1966 quotes to Thiokol and replaced them with the following:

Time Period	Cents Per Pound
January 1, 1967—June 30, 1967	15.00
July 1, 1967—December 31, 1967	15.74
January 1, 1968—December 31, 1968	16.50
January 1, 1969—December 31, 1969	25.00
January 1, 1970—December 31, 1970	25.00
January 1, 1971—December 31, 1971	25.00
January 1, 1972—December 31, 1972	24.00
January 1, 1973—December 31, 1973	25.00

In December, 1966 and January, 1967, representatives of AMPOT met with officials of both Thiokol and Aerojet. These meetings were separately held but officials of both companies informed AMPOT that they were upset with the company's withdrawal of its forward prices. Thiokol informed AMPOT that it expected to have two sources of A/P available in 1967.[23] Aerojet

23. AMPOT felt certain that the other source was PE.

told the company's representatives that it was willing to support one supplier up until the time AMPOT's forward prices were withdrawn but that it would now try to keep PE alive.

Additionally, in February, 1967, AMPOT discovered that American Cyanamid had agreed to subordinate its $2,000,000 debt to allow PE to obtain a $500,000 bank loan. In the same month AMPOT undertook a financial analysis which revealed that this arrangement would allow PE to operate for slightly less than ten months. This analysis also showed that a price increase would be necessary in order for PE to avoid a cash drain and that PE's price would have to be raised to 19.25 cents per pound.

In October, 1967, AMPOT quoted Aerojet the following prices:

Time Period	Cents Per Pound
Last quarter of 1968	16.50
January/February 1969	17.25
March/September 1969	18.00

AMPOT claims that these forward pricing activities represented an attempt to raise the market price of A/P to a reasonable level. The company claims, however, that its efforts did not succeed due to the resistance of the rocket motor manufacturers and the conditions in the industry. In view of PE's evidence and AMPOT's lack of effective rebuttal, we choose to give weight to PE's interpretation of these activities.

[*Rebuttal*]

B. In rebuttal to PE's evidence, AMPOT claims the depressed prices were the result of the problems which existed within the industry and not its policies. The primary contentions which we find relevant and established by the evidence are the following:

1. *Problems in the A/P Industry*

The major problem which existed within the industry was an excess of supply. This condition was exacerbated by the fact that many of the major A/P procurements were stretched out over a

long period of time and by the fact that there were re-bids on many of the procurements.

This excess capacity existed due to predictions of great demand for A/P. These predictions induced all four major suppliers of A/P either to enter the field or expand their capacity. From 1959-1963 the attitude of the Department of Defense and propellant manufacturers was extremely bullish and there were estimates of future sales of A/P exceeding 100,000,000 pounds annually. As the president of U. T. C. stated in his deposition, in the early 60's there was almost a euphoria as far as the future was concerned and everyone visualized the field as a potential bonanza. By December, 1963, this optimism had vanished and the rocket people were competing frantically for the work which existed. It is this competition which AMPOT claims set the stage for the pressure which was exerted on the A/P suppliers.

An additional problem facing PE was the fact that the company was vastly under-capitalized. This meant that PE was faced with even more severe problems than the other A/P producers.

2. *Practices of the Rocket Motor Manufacturers*

Although AMPOT claims this overcapacity set the stage for the conditions which the A/P suppliers faced, the heart of the company's defense is that the rocket motor manufacturers took advantage of existing conditions and forced the suppliers to lower the price of A/P. It appears as if the manufacturers were able to carry out their activities due to the procurement practices in the A/P industry. Under these practices the rocket manufacturers would receive an indication of interest from the government concerning a particular program. The manufacturers would then send out Request for Quotes (RFQ's) to the suppliers. Once the manufacturers received quotes from the various suppliers[24] they would submit a bid to the government and a con-

24. Including those furnishing material other than A/P.

tract would be awarded to one of them. At this stage the winning manufacturer would send a second RFQ to the A/P suppliers. As a practical matter, however, the first RFQ set the ceiling price for the second.

The rocket manufacturers were interested in obtaining a high price for the first RFQ and a low price for the second. This desire can be explained by the fact that the manufacturer would share with the government in any savings between the first and the second bid. It was this arrangement which prompted the manufacturers to try to negotiate for a lower price with the A/P suppliers. They would carry out these negotiations by calling the suppliers and telling them to "sharpen their pencils."

The manufacturers negotiated with the low bidder without informing the bidder that its price was low. On several occasions this practice resulted in the low bidder further reducing its price. In addition to this type of negotiation, the manufacturers employed other methods of reducing the price. They would send RFQ's to both qualified and nonqualified sources and would never tell a company when it was the only qualified source. In fact, whenever a bidder asked if the bidding was going to be competitive, the response was always in the affirmative. The manufacturers strengthened their position in these activities by exchanging price and quantity information among themselves.

An example of these practices can be found in events surrounding a 1962 [sic] procurement of A/P. In July Thiokol decided to award PE a "stay alive" quantity as part of a larger procurement. This decision was made as it was thought PE probably could not as yet continue operations without Thiokol business. After this decision, one of Thiokol's officers had a conversation with War, PE's Vice-President. During this conversation War was told that PE's bid was high, but that Thiokol was considering awarding a "stay alive" quantity to the company. Soon after this conversation.

War telegraphed Thiokol that PE would meet any offer. Thus, PE lowered its price after a decision had been made to give the company an award at a higher price.

At one time even PE's counsel blamed the problems in the industry on the procurement contracts. This occurred on January 17, 1964, when Larson, PE's Washington counsel, stated that the incentive type contracts were responsible for the "whipsawing" which the raw material suppliers were taking on price.

3. *Pricing Sequences*

AMPOT claims the situation grew worse as the suppliers were forced to bid progressively lower prices for each procurement. It is this lowering of the price of A/P which AMPOT claims eventually forced Hooker and Pennwalt (Pennsalt) out of the industry. To establish this contention, AMPOT presented evidence concerning many of the A/P pricing sequences. We feel that a discussion of one will amply serve to illustrate this claim.

This sequence involves the 1964 U. T. C. procurement of over 11,000,000 pounds of A/P. PE offered to meet any price and was awarded the contract at 19.25 cents per pound. After this award, AMPOT considered each bid as critical since it appeared as if the U. T. C. business was tied up for the immediate future. In this regard AMPOT felt that it was essential to obtain the award for the upcoming Thiokol-Wasatch procurement and therefore bid 16.40 cents per pound in order to ensure that it would obtain a part of this award. It is this type of situation which AMPOT claims trapped the suppliers in a vicious circle from which they could not escape.

4. *AMPOT's Effort to Aid the A/P Industry*

AMPOT maintains that instead of attempting to establish a monopoly, it in fact made an effort to save the industry. In late 1965 AMPOT's representatives met with Malloy, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Procurement), to complain about con-

ditions existing in the industry. These emissaries told Malloy that procurement practices and excess capacity were endangering the industry. They also pointed out that two former suppliers had already "mothballed" their facilities. Malloy was informed that AMPOT desired a procurement system which would ensure both a good price for government contractors and a fair profit to suppliers.

This attempt to change the procurement system failed, and AMPOT felt that it could do very little to improve existing conditions. This feeling of resignation was due to the fact that AMPOT bought its A/P plant from the Navy and included within the contract of sale was a National Security Clause.[25] This clause required AMPOT to maintain the plant so that it could be placed in operable condition within 120 days. In light of this clause, AMPOT reviewed the financial consequences of abandoning the facility and concluded that it would be better for the company to sell A/P at 15 cents per pound and cover out-of-pocket cost rather than close down its operations.

In 1971, AMPOT felt as if it was close enough to the March 15, 1972 expiration of its National Security obligation that it could take some affirmative action. In February, 1971 Kelly, President of Kerr-McGee, told a meeting of SAMSO that his company had undertaken a study to determine if it should withdraw from the A/P industry. Additionally, in June, 1971, Kelly wrote to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installation and Logistics). His letter discussed the conditions in the industry and stated that AMPOT was planning to temporarily suspend operations at its A/P plant and was considering permanent suspension.

AMPOT claims this was the earliest it could have acted with any authority and that, as a result of this action, the SAMSO

---

25. Malloy was well aware of this clause and reminded AMPOT of its existence.

agreement was reached. AMPOT's contention has some merit; however, it is less convincing than it might have been due to the fact that AMPOT did not do everything within its power to be relieved from its obligation. This is due to the fact that the National Security Clause contained the following provision:

> "Provided, However, That the Government, at its own election, or upon a petition by the Purchaser, may reconsider the necessity for continuing all or any part of the Clause in effect and shall, in the event it determines such necessity no longer exists, and upon tender by the Purchaser of whatever consideration may be requested, revoke the Clause, in whole or in part, by executing and delivering to the Purchaser a release or whatever instrument is necessary to remove the encumbrance of the Clause, or of part thereof, from the properties."

This provision allowed AMPOT to petition the government for a revocation in whole or in part. AMPOT never petitioned the government and thus its lack of action flies in the face of its claim that the National Security Clause prevented it from leaving the industry or making a meaningful threat to do so.

Conclusions of Law

ATTEMPTED MONOPOLY

In reaching a conclusion concerning an attempted monopoly, there is authority for the proposition that we must first define the relevant market within which the attempt took place. *Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery and Chemical Corp.* [1965 TRADE CASES ¶ 71,625], 382 U. S. 172 (1965); *Agrashell, Inc. v. Hammons Products Company* [1973-1 TRADE CASES ¶ 74,446], 479 F. 2d 269 (8 Cir. 1973). Although we are not totally convinced that this determination is necessary, we will follow these authorities.

[*Geographic Market*]

The relevant geographical market does not present a problem as both parties have stipulated that it is the United States. The relevant product market, however, is not subject to such an easy resolution.

[*Product Market*]

On June 8, 1971, a supplemental preliminary pretrial order was entered by Judge Sherman Christensen. Prior to its being entered, it was approved by counsel for both plaintiff and defendants. The order stated that one of the issues to be determined was whether the relevant market included all A/P, as PE contended, or whether there were two markets, as Kerr-McGee contended. The defendants claimed that the first market consisted of A/P sold to customers who purchased in large volume in connection with the manufacturing of missiles for the Department of Defense and who purchased A/P based on a government required competitive bidding procedure, and that the second market consisted of A/P sold to customers who purchased in quantities of 100,000 pounds or less and who purchased at list price without competitive bidding. The first market is the one which Kerr-McGee claimed was the appropriate relevant market.

On May 7, 1973, at the outset of the trial, counsel for Kerr-McGee moved to amend this pretrial order so that we could consider whether the relevant market consisted solely of A/P sold to programs for which both plaintiff's and defendants' products were qualified. At that time, the court ruled that it would abide by Judge Christensen's order concerning the relevant market unless Kerr-McGee could convince the court that its version of the relevant market was appropriate. In effect, due to the lateness of the defendants' request, we placed the burden on Kerr-McGee to convince us that its new theory was correct.

At the outset of our determination of the relevant market, it is appropriate for us to comment on the use of Clayton Act cases in resolving the question of what products are to be included within this market. This is necessary because both plaintiff and defendants have relied on some of these authorities. After evaluating these cases, it is our conclusion that, where appropriate, we will rely on the cases dealing with a line of commerce. As was stated in *United States v. Grinnell* [1966 TRADE CASES ¶ 71,789], 384 U. S. 563 (1966), there is no reason to differentiate between line of commerce in the context of the Clayton Act and part of commerce for purposes of the Sherman Act. We also find support for this conclusion in *Telex Corp. and Telex Computer Products, Inc. v. I. B. M. Corp.* [1973-2 TRADE CASES ¶ 74,774], 367 F. Supp. 258, (D. C. Okla. 1973). In *Telex,* Judge Christensen stated that "while there may be a possible differentiation between a part of commerce and a line of commerce in the solution of some problems that might arise under the respective acts, no practical distinction would be justified in the context of the present case."

While we are willing to rely on many of these lines of commerce cases, we do not feel that cases such as *United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp.* [1973-1 TRADE CASES ¶ 74,377], 410 U. S. 526 (1973), are in point. These cases deal not with the Section 2 concept of relevant market, but rather with "the effect of a potential competitor upon the edge of the market in negating the desirability of its merger in a Section 7 case." *Telex, supra.* Here we deal not with probabilities but rather with what the defendant actually accomplished or attempted to accomplish within the market.

Defining the relevant market is important because it is the market within which the monopoly or attempted monopoly is to be measured. This market must include all A/P which effectively competed with Kerr-McGee's. Basically, the parties have

no dispute concerning the governing authorities on this issue. Both sides rely on such cases as *United States v. DuPont de Nemours and Co.* [1956 TRADE CASES ¶ 68,369], 351 U. S. 377 (1956); *United States v. Aluminum Co. of America* [1944-1945 TRADE CASES ¶ 57,342], 148 F. 2d 416 (2 Cir. 1945); *Brown Shoe Co. v. United States* [1962 TRADE CASES ¶ 70,366], 370 U. S. 294 (1962); *United States v. Grinnell, supra; United States v. Continental Can Co.* [1964 TRADE CASES ¶ 71,146], 378 U. S. 441 (1964); and *Continental Baking Co. v. Old Homestead Bread Co.* [1973-1 TRADE CASES ¶ 74,433], 476 F. 2d 97 (10 Cir. 1973). The parties, however, disagree as to the application of these authorities to the facts in the case at bar.

Their disagreement is quite understandable as all of the pertinent decisions indicate that the determination of which products are to be included within the relevant market turns almost exclusively on the factual posture of each case. These cases do, however, indicate that what is crucial to the final determination is the "cross-elasticity of demand" between the various products which are claimed to be within the market.

This concept involves the ease with which one product can be substituted for another. It was explained in *DuPont, supra,* when the court stated that, in considering the relevant market, no more definite rule can be declared than that commodities reasonably interchangeable by consumers for the same purpose make up that "part of the trade or commerce" monopolization which may be illegal. In elaborating on the teachings of *DuPont,* the court in *Grinnell, supra,* declared that a product was reasonably interchangeable if it may be of such a character that substitute products must also be considered, as customers may turn to them if there is a slight increase in the price of the main product.

As can be inferred, price is an important factor in determining which products are within the relevant market. Price, however, is not the only factor which we must consider. This was made

clear in *DuPont,* when the court observed that the question of cross-elasticity of demand is determined by this interchangeability which is largely gauged by the purchase of competing products for similar uses considering the price, characteristics and the adaptability of competing products. It is also abundantly clear that the term "reasonable interchangeability" should be given a practical application in view of conditions in the marketplace. *Telex, supra.*

[*Qualified v. Nonqualified Products*]

The problem in the case at bar centers around the fact that government regulations required rocket motor manufacturers to purchase A/P from sellers whose product was qualified for the particular rocket the manufacturer was producing. Kerr-McGee's A/P was qualified for most of the rocket programs while PE's was not. The rocket motor manufacturers, however, never informed a company when it was the only qualified source and thereby encouraged competitive bidding even in what could have been noncompetitive situations.

The prerequisites for qualification vary from program to program but, as previously mentioned, they usually include extensive laboratory testing and a static test firing of one or more rocket motors. Qualification is a one-time process, and the government pays for the cost if it occurs during the research and development stage of the program. The qualification test is, of course, the function of the rocket manufacturer and the supplier has no control over same.

Evidence presented indicates that the cost of qualification varies from $25,000 to $125,000. For most of the programs, however, PE's product could have been qualified for under $50,000. An example of these qualification expenses can be seen by noting Aerojet's cost figures which are as follows:

Program	Cost
Minuteman Stage II & III	$250,000
H. I. P.	30,000
Sparrow Shrike	20,000
Hawk	30,000
Standard Missile	45,000
Improved Shrike	25,000
Tartar/ARM	45,000

As near as we can determine,[26] the direct cost of qualification for most programs would, if prorated over the total program procurement, amount to a cost ranging from a fraction of a cent per pound to 2 or 3 cents per pound.

It is our belief that if cost alone were the only barrier to the qualification of PE's A/P, then there would be no question but that Kerr-McGee's qualified A/P would have to be included within the relevant market. This is because a slight increase in the price of Kerr-McGee's product would make it worthwhile for the rocket motor manufacturers to qualify PE's A/P. The problem, however, is that in addition to the cost of qualification, there is some evidence to support Kerr-McGee's contention that manufacturers were reluctant to undertake the qualification of nonqualified A/P. This reluctance was apparently due to the time factor involved in qualification as well as the lack of knowledge concerning the performance of nonqualified A/P. These factors, together with the cost, are the basis of Kerr-McGee's claim that its qualified A/P cannot be included within the relevant market if it was the only product qualified for a particular program.

Standing alone, this evidence would probably be sufficient to establish that the requisite cross-elasticity of demand between

26. We realize that our computations are not entirely accurate due to the lack of complete information on the subject; however, we are confident that they may be considered as fairly reliable "ballpark figures." We also feel that it was part of Kerr-McGee's burden to provide us with specific evidence on this issue per the pretrial stipulation.

qualified and nonqualified A/P did not exist. The defendants' evidence, however, does not stand uncontradicted and the plaintiff's evidence indicates that PE's product could have been easily qualified. Among other facts, this evidence includes the following:

1. A statement by Ritchey, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Thiokol, that PE could be qualified for all programs if it were not for the expense;
2. A statement by U. T. C.'s Procurement Manager that his company would submit RFQ's to nonqualified suppliers and qualify them if their price was low enough; and
3. A statement by Thiokol's Manager of Procurement that PE's A/P could be qualified if necessary and that, in an emergency type situation, there were many different and less expensive methods of qualifying A/P.

Additionally, Kerr-McGee's Vice-President of Corporate Services stated that the business for which his company was the only qualified source was not locked up or captive business.

After considering all of the evidence, it is our conclusion that the requisite cross-elasticity of demand did exist and that PE's nonqualified A/P was in competition with AMPOT's exclusively qualified A/P. Therefore, both must be included within the relevant market. This result is in accordance with the governing authorities, and Kerr-McGee's reliance on cases such as *Continental Baking Co., supra,* is misplaced. In *Continental Baking Co.,* the question of what products were within the relevant market was resolved in favor of the plaintiff. This resolution occurred when the court decided that the relevant market included only bread sold by independent wholesale bakers and not that produced by the baking operations of the retail food store chains. The court considered this a realistic construction of the relevant market as the customers of the independent bakers—independent retail grocers—could not purchase bread from the retail chains. It is clear

that this type of situation is different from the one in the case at bar as the rocket motor manufacturers could have purchased PE's product if they desired to undertake its qualification.

Admittedly this is a close question and our conclusion may be in error. In any event, however, we believe that the defendants' exclusively qualified material must be included within the relevant market as Kerr-McGee did not meet its burden of convincing us to disregard the initial stipulation. It is also appropriate to note the fact that one of Kerr-McGee's main contentions is that it could not raise the price of its A/P for fear of losing business to PE. This claim flies in the face of the company's argument that its exclusively qualified A/P was not in competition with PE's nonqualified A/P.

This brings us to the question posed in the original stipulation of whether the relevant market consists of all A/P as contended by plaintiff, or only the A/P sold to customers who purchased in large volume in connection with the manufacture of missiles for the Department of Defense and to those who purchased A/P based on a government required competitive bidding procedure. This problem arises due to the fact that almost all A/P was sold on a bid basis. As a result, the industry sales emphasis was primarily on these sales and not on the small quantities[27] of A/P which were priced pursuant to a schedule.

[*Scheduled Sales*]

Since the focus of attention at trial was on the issue of whether Kerr-McGee's exclusively qualified A/P was within the relevant market, neither plaintiff nor defendant presented a great deal of evidence concerning the question of whether the schedule sales were to be included within the relevant market. Enough evidence,

27. These sales were almost always in quantities of less than 100,000 pounds.

however, was presented to enable us to reach a determination that the relevant market includes all A/P.[28]

Defendants' primary contention is that PE did not compete for the schedule sales and that, therefore, these sales must be excluded from the relevant market. Although PE may not have achieved as much success with these sales as it desired, the company was certainly competing for this business. At trial, Fred D. Gibson, Jr., President and Chief Executive Officer of PE, testified that his company sold minor quantities of A/P based on a price schedule. In his posttrial deposition,[29] Gibson elaborated on PE's efforts in regard to these small sales and made it clear that PE did everything within its power to increase the number of these sales. Henry Curtis' testimony concerning his activities with regard to the 100 pound A/P order for PE which came to AMPOT by mistake resolves any doubt concerning the competition for these sales.

There is no question that the activities concerning the large competitive bid sales are at the heart of PE's claim. This, however, only reflects the fact that the schedule sales were a relatively insignificant aspect of the A/P market and does not by any means indicate that they are to be excluded from the relevant market. All A/P is basically the same and has only the few limited purposes previously described. We have concluded that AMPOT desired to obtain as much A/P business as possible. This includes these small schedule sales.

Of course, the A/P sold in schedule sales could probably be classified as a submarket but it is also true that most of the A/P

---

28. Although we find the schedule sales to be within the relevant market, it may be that the parties can stipulate that sales under a certain number of pounds were so insignificant as to be immaterial to our forthcoming consideration of damages.

29. We find that section of the deposition dealing with these sales is admissible as the information concerns the relevant market and responds to Kerr-McGee's contentions. However, even if this deposition was inadmissible, our opinion would be the same.

sold for specific programs could be classified as a separate submarket within the broad product market. It is, however, the broad overall A/P market within which the competition between the plaintiff and defendant took place and to subdivide this market into the various possible submarkets would be as unnecessary as it would be unwise.

[*Elements*]

Having decided on the appropriate relevant market, we now turn to the elements which comprise an attempted monopoly.

[*Intent*]

In order to establish such an attempt, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant had the specific intent to destroy competition or create a monopoly, that the defendant took overt acts pursuant to this intent, and that a dangerous probability of monopoly existed. *Swift and Company v. United States,* 196 U. S. 375 (1905); *United States v. Griffith* [1948-1949 TRADE CASES ¶ 62,246], 334 U. S. 100 (1948); *Lorain Journal v. United States* [1950-1951 TRADE CASES ¶ 62,957], 342 U. S. 143 (1951); *Kearney and Trecker Corp. v. Giddings and Lewis, Inc.* [1971 TRADE CASES ¶ 73,735], 452 F.2d 579 (7 Cir. 1971).

In the case at bar, the primary question is whether AMPOT possessed the requisite specific intent. We have studied the authorities cited by both parties and have concluded that whether the necessary specific or predatory intent existed cannot be determined by any set formula but depends entirely on the acts of the alleged predator. In order to fully evaluate these acts, we must consider the sum total of all the evidence. *Continental Baking Co. v. Old Homestead Bread Co.* [1973-1 TRADE CASES ¶ 74,433], 476 F. 2d 97 (10 Cir. 1973). We further realize that there must be some affirmative showing of conduct from which the wrongful intent can be inferred. *Union Leader Corp. v. Newspapers of New England, Inc.* [1960 TRADE CASES ¶ 69,862], 284 F. 2d 582 (1 Cir.

1960), and *Hiland Dairy, Inc. v. Kroger Co.* [1968 TRADE CASES ¶ 72,611], 402 F. 2d 968 (8 Cir. 1968). We have carefully weighed the evidence and have concluded that such conduct is present.

[*Below Cost Sales*]

As is claimed by PE there is ample evidence of predatory intent. The most convincing evidence is the fact that all of Kerr-McGee Chemical Corporation's and its predecessor's major sales during and for some years prior to the four year and nine month damage period were below cost. Price reduction in a competitive situation is not a wrong in itself; however, it can become a violation of Section 2 if shown to be motivated by a specific intent to drive a competitor from the field. *Gold Fuel Service, Inc. v. ESSO Standard Oil Co.* [1962 TRADE CASES ¶ 70,409], 306 F. 2d 61 (3 Cir. 1962). Historically, it does not take a great deal of evidence to prove this intent when a company has sold below cost. AMPOT's extended below cost selling combined with its other acts provide the specific intent in the case at bar.

We find this intent notwithstanding the fact that a company which reduces prices in defense of its economic life is not guilty of eliminating competition. *Ben Hur Coal Co. v. Wells* [1957 TRADE CASES ¶ 68,635], 242 F. 2d 481 (10 Cir. 1957). But for Kerr-McGee's extensive predatory activities, this defense would probably have saved the defendants as we find that the A/P industry was in trouble and that many practices of the rocket motor manufacturers were unethical if not unlawful. Kerr-McGee's activities, however, indicate that, even viewed in the most favorable light, AMPOT and its successor, Kerr-McGee Chemical Corporation, sought to take advantage of a troublesome situation and force PE out of the market.

Kerr-McGee's claim that it was not the first company to lower the price does not persuade us that it did not possess the requisite intent. It is true that AMPOT may not have been the first to bid

15 cents or to lower the price of A/P below 20 cents; however, when the company did bid 15 cents on a multi-year procurement at Thiokol-Wasatch in June, 1965, it did so with the clear knowledge that if this price were maintained it would drive PE into bankruptcy.

Most of Kerr-McGee's other contentions concerning these below cost sales are equally unpersuasive. For example, it claims that it could not raise its price for fear of losing business to PE. However, in 1968 PE was bidding 2 to 3 cents per pound higher than AMPOT and losing almost all of the major bids. The realities of the marketplace are such that AMPOT must have known that it could bid higher. Very few businesses in this situation would have overlooked the opportunity. This 1968 situation also undercuts AMPOT's argument that the company was trapped by the various pricing sequences.

The defendants' argument that it could never achieve a monopoly due to the manufacturers' "dual sourcing" also fails to persuade the Court. Again the realities of the marketplace are such that a company which really believed this to be the case would have concluded that this policy would allow both A/P suppliers to raise their prices. The SAMSO agreement was effective long after this litigation had been instituted.

It is not just the sales below cost, however, which convince us that AMPOT and its successor possessed the requisite predatory intent. Kerr-McGee's other activities are equally persuasive. The company's forward pricing activities are particularly telling since, as PE claims, AMPOT's forward prices were raised when PE appeared on the verge of bankruptcy and lowered when it looked as if PE would remain a viable competitor. The extensive surveillance is also indicative of predatory intent although, standing alone, it would not justify our decision. Additionally, we feel that AMPOT's extensive interest concerning PE's SBA status is symbolic of the company's efforts to drive PE from the market.

The alleged "dumping" incident must also be considered since it involved one of AMPOT's vice-presidents and the company's product manager. Although these men may not have been in sales, they did represent the company. Jenny's memo concerning the "seed of doubt" that a better price was available resolves any doubt in our minds that Schumacher's role was more than just an "unauthorized gambit."

Finally, AMPOT's predictions of market sales indicate that the company's goal was to capture the entire A/P market. Of course, it is only good business for salesmen to attempt to sell all the products which their company can produce; however, the fact that Kerr-McGee changed its pricing policy after it lost two competitive bids in 1969 indicates that it was not willing to share the market with PE and that the salesmen's statements were indicative of a policy which was more than just good business.

[*Acts; Probability*]

The other two elements required to establish an attempted monopoly present no problem. The overt acts are obviously the acts which gave rise to our finding of predatory intent. The dangerous probability of establishing a monopoly is present since we are about to conclude that AMPOT and its successor succeeded in establishing a monopoly. Thus, all three elements are met and we find that there was an attempt to establish a monopoly.

MONOPOLY

We now focus our attention on PE's monopoly claim. To support its charge, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant had possession of monopoly power within the relevant market and that this power was willfully acquired or maintained as distinguished from being secured by growth or development which was a consequence of a superior product, business acumen or historical accident, *United States v. Grinnell Corp., supra.* After a

thorough consideration of the record and evaluation of the facts heretofore presented, it is our conclusion that the plaintiff has met its burden and that AMPOT and its successor possessed a monopoly. Since we have previously ruled that there was the specific intent required to establish a monopoly, we feel certain that, if monopoly power did exist, it was willfully acquired and maintained. This leaves us with the question of whether Kerr-McGee Chemical Corporation or its predecessor actually possessed monopoly power within the relevant market. This market is, of course, the same as for the attempted monopoly.

Monopoly power is the power to control prices or exclude competition and, if it exists, it can furnish the basis for a monopoly even if it was never exercised. *American Tobacco Company v. United States* [1946-1947 TRADE CASES ¶ 57,468], 328 U. S. 781 (1946), and *Grinnell, supra.* This power may be inferred when a company has a predominant share of the market. Among other instances, it has been inferred when a company contolled over 87% of the insurance company accredited fire and burglary central service stations, *Grinnell, supra,* and when cigarette companies possessed over 66% of the entire domestic field of cigarettes and over 80% of the field of comparable cigarettes, *American Tobacco Co., supra.* On the other hand, it has been said that it is fairly clear that 51% of the market does not constitute a monopoly, *Continental Baking Co., supra.*

As previously mentioned, in the present case AMPOT and its successor possessed the following percentages of business within the relevant market:

Year	*Percentage*
1966	53.5
1967	80.0
1968	88.0
1969	67.0
1970	78.0

Certainly, AMPOT's market share in 1966 is not sufficiently large enough to allow us to infer a monopoly. Its 1967, 1968 and 1970 shares, however, do permit this inference. As to its 1969 share, this percentage is on the borderline but probably supports the inference.

Defendants suggest that, instead of these figures, we rely on the company's average percentage of the market for the years 1966 through 1971[30] which Kerr-McGee admits is 70%. Even using this percentage, however, would allow us to infer a monopoly.

In any event, we need not rest on any inferences from these percentages as we find that Kerr-McGee Chemical Corporation and/or its predecessor had the power to control prices. Even though there were many problems within the industry, we believe that the responsibility for the continued sales below cost rests with this defendant. We feel the defendant used its vast financial resources to subsidize its below cost pricing. Although we do not believe that the initial drop in the price of A/P[31] was AMPOT's responsibility, we do feel that, subsequent to the initial drop, AMPOT and its successor were responsible for maintaining the depressed prices. The information available to AMPOT's top officials at their June, 1965, pricing meeting together with the acts considered in connection with the attempted monopoly claim are sufficient to support this conclusion.

In addition to the ability to lower the price of A/P, we believe AMPOT could have also raised the price.[32] Gibson testified that, if AMPOT had published a price for A/P, PE would have followed that price as long as it would have allowed his company a profit. We firmly believe that, after Hooker and Pennwalt left

---

30. We note that 1971 is not included within the damage period.

31. This reduction occurred when Hooker, Pennwalt and PE entered the field.

32. Of course, the defendant could not have raised the price to 40 cents per pound, but it could have exercised leadership at least into the 20 cent range.

the industry, a business in the plaintiff's precarious financial position could not have afforded to reintroduce a dangerous price war by undercutting a higher price led by AMPOT. At trial Gibson said as much when he testified that his company would have followed AMPOT's price "for the same reason that we recognized our size, we recognized our limited financial ability, and would very much have welcomed to follow the price leadership of American Potash if it had been at that kind of level." Therefore, we have no doubt that AMPOT and its successor could control the price of A/P and possessed a monopoly.[33]

COMBINATION AND CONSPIRACY

We direct our attention to PE's charge that Kerr-McGee Chemical Corporation[34] and Kerr-McGee Corporation have since or prior to December 31, 1967, and continuing until after December 22, 1970, conspired to monopolize trade and commerce in Classes I and II A/P in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act and combined and conspired in restraint of trade and commerce in Classes I and II A/P in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Specifically, in regard to the Section 1 violation, PE contends that the defendants combined and conspired among themselves to control the supply, distribution, and price of A/P and to suppress and eliminate competition in the sale thereof. Although these

---

33. Since AMPOT possessed the power to control the price of A/P, we find it unnecessary to rule on whether the company also possessed the power to exclude competition. If we were to decide this issue, however, we would rule that the defendant had this power. AMPOT knew that Hooker and Pennwalt left the industry due to the low price of A/P and that by keeping the price low, or threatening to do so, it could prevent the re-entry of these companies and also eventually force PE out of the market. It is this knowledge combined with the company's power to control the price which gave AMPOT the power to exclude competition.

34. When used in connection with these charges as with others, we consider the activities of Old and New AMPOT to be considered as part of those of Kerr-McGee Chemical Corporation.

offenses under Section 1 and Section 2 are not identical, the substance of each claim is the same, and we will treat them together.

Both claims arise from the merger of AMPOT and Kerr-McGee, and a brief review of the history of Kerr-McGee's acquisition of AMPOT is in order. As previously mentioned, AMPOT was acquired by Kerr-McGee on December 31, 1967, and New AMPOT was merged with Kerr-McGee Chemical Corporation in October, 1970. PE's claims are based on the inferences to be drawn from the fact that these activities left Kerr-McGee Chemical Corporation as a subsidiary of Kerr-McGee Corporation, and that some directors were common to both companies. Primarily, PE relies on the fact that the acquisition left James J. Kelly, current President of Kerr-McGee Corporation, in a position of authority in both companies. In 1966 Kelly was President of Kerr-McGee Chemical Corporation which was then a division of Kerr-McGee Corporation engaged solely in agricultural chemical business. In early 1969 Kelly was elected a vice-president of AMPOT, and he became president later in the year. He continued as president after AMPOT was combined with Kerr-McGee Chemical Corporation. Kelly was also executive vice-president and a director of Kerr-McGee Corporation during most of this period.

As both plaintiff and defendants seem to realize, this particular aspect of the case does not merit a great deal of attention. As plaintiff contends, it is settled law that a parent and subsidiary can be guilty of either an unlawful combination or a conspiracy. *Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram and Sons* [1950-1951 TRADE CASES ¶ 62,737], 340 U. S. 211 (1951); *Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp.* [1968 TRADE CASES ¶ 72,486], 392 U. S. 134 (1968). It is equally well settled that a combination or conspiracy can be established by an informal agreement. As was said in *American Tobacco Co. v. United States* [1946-1947 TRADE CASES ¶ 57,468], 328 U. S. at 809-10, "No formal agreement is necessary to constitute an unlawful conspiracy. . . . The essential

combination or conspiracy in violation of the Sherman Act may be found in a course of dealing or other circumstances as well as in an exchange of words." Indeed, many courts have found a combination or conspiracy by drawing inferences from the knowledge of members of interlocking directorates. For example, in *United States v. N. Y. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co.* [1948-1949 TRADE CASES ¶ 62,375], 173 F. 2d 79 (7 Cir. 1949), the court stated that "the individual defendants are so high in the hierarchy of the A & P system that the policy of A & P, that is, the conspiracy here charged, was fully well known to all of them. . ."

According to these and other authorities, if there were any evidence to add to the facts presented, we would be justified in finding that an agreement existed between Kerr-McGee Corporation and Kerr-McGee Chemical Corporation whereby Kerr-McGee Corporation approved of or aided Kerr-McGee Chemical Corporation in its monopolistic activities. The record, however, is devoid of any such evidence. In fact, the evidence PE submitted as additional proof of the charges rebuts the company's claims. PE contends that when Kelly had control over the pricing of A/P he was seriously misled and/or uninformed concerning the A/P market. PE further points out that Kelly was told his company just was not getting the A/P business or a sufficient percentage of the market. Additionally, at trial, PE went to great lengths to convince us that, during the year 1969, Kelly spent very little of his time dealing with the problems in the A/P industry.

PE sums up its position quite accurately when it states the following:

> "Thus, although the control over A/P pricing technically shifted to Kelly in 1969, the same predatory policies continued because of Kelly's heavy reliance on Francis, who was one of the architects of AMPOT's plan to regain its monopoly." Plaintiff's port-trial brief, pp. 76-77.

This position negates rather than supports PE's claims. If anything, it shows that Kelly,[35] the major link between parent and subsidiary, was deceived by those in effective control of the subsidiary, and indicates that there could not possibly have been any agreement (whether express or implied) between the two corporations. In light of this situation, the inferences PE asks us to draw prove too much and we find for the defendants on both claims alleging combination and conspiracy.

UNFAIR COMPETITION

Plaintiff also alleges in its complaint that defendants have engaged in unfair competition by repeatedly disparaging the products and personnel of plaintiff and, by so doing, have diverted business from plaintiff to themselves regarding A/P and sodium chlorate, and have issued false and misleading statements with respect to plaintiff's financial responsibility and position. Apparently plaintiff has abandoned this claim as it has made no further reference to it. Even if this claim is still asserted, however, we find that there is no evidence to sustain the charge.

ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT CLAIMS

Plaintiff's claims under 15 U. S. C. § 13 (a) are broadly made. There appear to be two distinct claims. First, that the higher prices charged by defendant to small volume buyers were a violation of the Act and, second, that the different prices charged various large volume buyers were a violation of the Act.

A private claim under the Robinson-Patman Act, § 2(a), requires six elements:

1. The seller must be engaged in interstate commerce.
2. There must be differences in price in different sales.
3. The price differentiated commodities must be of like grade and quality.

---

35. If Kelly was deceived or misinformed, we feel certain that none of the other members of Kerr-McGee's Board of Directors fared any better.

4. At least one price differentiated sale must be in actual interstate commerce.

5. The price differentiation must be the cause of harm to competition in one of the ways enumerated in the Act.

6. None of the affirmative defenses enumerated in the Act can be applicable.

There is no controversy as to elements one, two, and four. AMPOT was clearly engaged in interstate commerce, did charge varying prices, and did make at least one price differentiated sale in interstate commerce.

There is controversy as to the remaining elements. In addition, AMPOT contends that its sales to rocket manufacturers should be exempt from the Act because the ultimate consumer was the government. Though government actions are excluded from the coverage of the Act [1932-1939 TRADE CASES ¶ 55,145] 38 Ops. Atty. Gen. 539 (1936), AMPOT has cited no support for the proposition that sales to private parties are exempt merely because the ultimate consumer is the government. Since the government as ultimate consumer would benefit by vigorous competition among those it buys from and their suppliers, no public policy would be served by such an exception.

The issue of like grade or quality will be considered separately, and the remaining elements of a Robinson-Patman Act violation considered under each of the two Robinson-Patman Act claims.

(A) *Like Grade and Quality*

The standards to be applied to determine whether commodities are of like grade and quality are not well defined. "Commercial identity or commercial fungibility,"[36] "substantially equivalent

---

36. *Fred Meyer, Inc. v. F. T. C.* [1966 TRADE CASES ¶ 71,721], 359 F. 2d 351 (9 Cir. 966, rev'd on other grounds [1968 TRADE CASES ¶ 72,383], 390 U. S. 541.

public demand," [37] "similar characteristics,"[38] "cross elasticity of demand, substitutability, physical appearance, identity of performance,"[39] "same general functions,"[40] and "similar swilling characteristics"[41] have all been used as factors determining "like grade or quality."

The disparity of the tests used suggests that the test to be applied is determined by the facts of each case. What constitutes bananas to be of like grade and quality and taxicabs to be of like grade and quality is not necessarily the same. The purpose of the inclusion of like grade and quality in the Robinson-Patman Act appears obvious: "To insure that the application of the anti-price discrimination law is confined to a comparison of two business transactions reasonably comparable . . ." *American Bar Association, Anti-Trust Developments 1955-1968,* p. 120. The proper test to apply to a particular case should reflect this purpose as well as the broader purposes of the anti-trust and price discrimination law.

The facts show that A/P was divided into two major classifications, Class I and Class II, by the manufacturers on the basis of particle size. Rocket manufacturers were concerned about uniformity of the product and would sometimes require the A/P to meet specifications more exacting as to particle size than the manufacturers' broad classification of Class I and Class II. Because the

---

37. *Callaway Mills Co. v. F. T. C.* [1966 TRADE CASES ¶ 71,799], 362 F. 2d 435 (5 Cir. 1966).

38. *Lubbock Glass and Mirror Co. v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.* [1970 TRADE CASES ¶ 73,355], 313 F. Supp. 1184 (N. D. Tex. 1970).

39. *Checker Motors Corp. v. Chrysler Corp.* [1968 TRADE CASES ¶ 72,392], 283 F. Supp. 876 (S. D. N. Y. 1968), aff'd [1969 TRADE CASES ¶ 72,672] 405 F. 2d 319, cert. den. 394 U. S. 999.

40. *McWhirter v. Monroe Calculating Machine Co., Inc.* [1948-1949 TRADE CASES ¶ 62,277], 76 F. Supp. 456 (W. D. Mo. 1948).

41. "Four Roses under any other name would still swill the same," *Hartley & Parker, Inc. v. Florida Beverage Corp.* [1962 TRADE CASES ¶ 70,441], 307 F. 2d 916, 923 (5 Cir. 1962).

crucial and critical burning characteristics of solid fuel rocket motors had not been reduced to an exact science capable of predicting the results of variations in specifications, these stricter specifications were frequently not so much an effort to obtain a particular form of A/P as to obtain a form of A/P nearly identical with that used previously. Government contractual requirements contributed to this need for identically specified A/P.

These requirements of uniformity were met by the producers of A/P in several ways, the most important of which was crossblending, that is, blending of inventory lots of different characteristics to ensure a homogeneous product. Selective crossblending met many of the specification requirements, though some required additional selection for size.[42] Crossblending is a common method of assuring uniformity of product in other industries including petroleum, dye, paint, gunpowder, whiskey, wine, tobacco and coffee.

AMPOT argues that the necessity of meeting each manufacturer's specifications and of ensuring that the product delivered to each manufacturer remained consistent should remove the bulk of A/P sales from being considered sales of like grade or quality.

We find that A/P within the two major classifications of Class I and Class II was A/P of "like grade and quality." We base this conclusion on several points which we find pertinent.

[*Usage*]

Initially there is no substantial difference in functional customer usage of the product. Practically all A/P was used by rocket motors. Though specifications may have differed among programs, frequently they overlapped, were interchangeable, or were differ-

42. Some procurements were for highly differentiated A/P of very high purity, chloride free, or other special characteristics. These specialty sales which constituted a very small portion of AMPOT's sales are not of like grade and quality and should be identified and excluded in the determination of damages.

ent for the same program. The situation is analogous to that of a paint manufacturer supplying paint to house painters. Though the buyer may specify a different color for each house, the usage is the same and like grade and quality should apply to the broader classification of usage rather than to the subclassification based on color.[43]

[*Physical Characteristics*]

Further, the desire of the customer for a particular specification was more the result of a desire for reproducibility rather than any initial desire for a "different" product than the larger classification. The rocket manufacturer is similar to the house painter who, initially having desired "green" paint and having painted half the house, now desires identical paint to that which he initially procured. To accept this desire for reproducibility as a determination of like grade and quality is to unduly restrict the Robinson-Patman Act by limiting its applicability while expanding the definition of "like grade and quality" beyond its purpose of limiting comparisons to comparable transactions. There would appear to be no injustice in comparing one transaction to another where both transactions involve the same product manufactured identically in the same process with only selections for variations in granular size differentiating the two.[44]

AMPOT has suggested that two Federal Trade Commission cases, *Universal-Rundle Corp.*, 65 F. T. C. 924 (1964), and *Quaker Oats Co.*, 66 F. T. C. 1131 (1964), stand for the proposition that "actual and genuine physical differentiations between two different products . . . probably remove differential pricing

---

43. *McWhirter v. Monroe Calculating Machine Co., Inc., supra.* The Court held adding machines to be of like grade and quality on the basis of functional similarities both in operation and in customer usage.

44. We regard it as significant that Congress used the term "like" rather than the more restrictive term "same." Similarly, the use of "grade" and "quality" suggests something other than a requirement of identical or near identical commodities.

of the two from the reach of the Robinson-Patman Act."[45] Both cases support the proposition, but neither case holds *any* physical differentiation is sufficient to eliminate comparisons under the "like grade and quality" test. In both cases there were considerably more substantial differences in the compared products than are present here.

In *Universal-Rundle Co.,* the examiner found various plumbing fixtures not to be of like grade or quality on the basis of differences in style, function, size, and marketability. In *Quaker Oats Co.,* the commission rejected the examiner's finding of like grade and quality with respect to two oat flours. Physical differences included particle size, fiber content, and the presence of pericarp and perisperm which caused discoloration of the cereal product. It is significant that the commission did not base its finding on the fact that Quaker custom tailored each oat flour process to its customer's needs, but rather on the actual physical differentiations and their effect on consumer preference or marketability.

[*Seller's Conduct*]

AMPOT's own course of conduct strongly suggests that a determination that the A/P was of like grade and quality is proper. The price differences applied by AMPOT were not on the basis of differences in grade or quality, but based on differences in size of sales or the need for pricing to win a contract. In an analogous case, *Moog Industries, Inc. v. F. T. C.,* 238 F. 2d 43 (8 Cir. 1956), aff'd 355 U. S. 411 (1958), cited with approval in *Universal-Rundle Corp., supra,* dealing with an auto parts manufacturer who provided volume discounts on each broad line of parts, the court held that like grade or quality was irrelevant when applied on a narrow basis:

> "The real and substantive answer is that, while leaf springs, coil action parts or piston rings for a Ford sedan of

45. Consumer preference, standing alone, has specifically been rejected as a determinant of like grade or quality. *F. T. C. v. Borden Co.* [1966 TRADE CASES ¶ 71,716], 383 U. S. 637 (1966).

> 1947 may be sufficiently different from those for a Chevrolet coach of 1950 that the former could lawfully be sold for *uniform* higher or lower prices than the latter, the question here is not related to uniform different prices for different items, nor, hence, to the like grade and quality concept, because the price discriminations here did not arise from uniform different prices for particular items, but, rather, they arose solely from the cumulative annual rebate plan, which applied to the aggregate dollar volume of all sales in a particular line to a particular purchaser in the preceding year, and, therefore, necessarily discriminated in price as to all items in the line, whether exactly alike and interchangeable or not." 238 F. 2d 43, 50.

This reasoning is directly applicable to price discrimination between large volume and small volume purchasers of A/P. Though not as directly, it is equally applicable to the various large volume bids for an examination of the evidence shows little relationship between the various specifications and the price discriminations.

For these reasons we conclude that all A/P sold within the broad Class I and Class II classifications was of like grade and quality.

(B) *Small Volume Purchases*

AMPOT's policy was to sell small quantities of A/P up to 100,000 pounds according to several price schedules.[46] Prices varied according to the quantities ordered, but all small volume prices were substantially above the prices bid on large volume orders.[47]

---

46. Some small quantity purchases appear to have been ordered on a bid basis. AMPOT's bids were substantially higher for small quantities than large quantities.

47. Some idea of the price differential may be obtained from AMPOT's exhibit 1080, the price schedule for 1968. During 1968 most large quantity bids of A/P were in a 16 to 18 cents per pound range. The prices for small quantities were: less than ton lots—32.5 cents per pound; ton lots—26.5 cents per pound; truck load (44,000 lbs. minimum) or carload up to 99,999 lbs.—19.62 cents per pound; over 100,000 lbs.—18.62 cents per pound.

AMPOT has made no substantial effort to cost justify these price differentials. It would appear difficult to do so since A/P is manufactured by AMPOT in a continuous process and orders, save for very large ones, are filled from a stockpile inventory. There would, of course, be some sales overhead cost such as billing, accounting, etc. that would justify a slightly higher price, but AMPOT did not make a substantial sales effort devoted to small sales (save for those that might possibly lead to future large sales) and the increased sales overhead would be negligible.

AMPOT instead relies on three defenses to the Robinson-Patman claim predicated on the small volume purchases:

1. PE did not compete for the small volume business.
2. The varying cost schedules were available to all customers provided they ordered sufficient quantities.
3. The small volume price discrimination did not cause substantial competitive injury.

The first defense is supported neither by law nor by fact. We have previously found that PE did compete with AMPOT for small volume purchases, though concededly neither company directed any large sales effort to small jobs save as they might later be the basis for large jobs. Legally, it is irrelevant whether or not PE competed with AMPOT for the small volume business. Indeed, the most common type of Robinson-Patman claim is that the defendant raised prices on the same goods in areas where there was no competition in order to support lower prices where there was competition, and the Robinson-Patman Act was designed to end this type of price cutting. Competition is only required on one "end" of the price differentiated sales in order for there to be competitive injury and a violation of the Act. *Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co.* [1954 TRADE CASES ¶ 67,906], 348 U. S. 115 (1954).

Nor is the second defense legally supportable. Price differentials based on volume constitute price discriminations under the Robin-

son-Patman Act unless cost justified. 15 U. S. C. § 12(a); *American Motors Specialties Co. v. F. T. C.* [1960 TRADE CASES ¶ 69,712], 278 F. 2d 225 (2 Cir. 1960), cert. den. 364 U. S. 884.

We are convinced that the price discriminations practiced by AMPOT were a cause of injury to plaintiff. The higher profits gained by AMPOT on its small volume sales would necessarily have given defendant an illegal "edge" in its ability to undercut PE both on larger volume schedule sales and large volume bid sales. Though slight, this edge was not insubstantial. AMPOT's post-trial brief shows the following computations for schedule sales:

Year	% of total lbs. sold	% of total revenue
1966	12%	14%
1967	15%	18%
1968	8%	9%

AMPOT did not provide computations for 1969 and 1970 though an examination of the exhibits suggests that, at least for 1969, the percentages would be very substantially larger.

It is our conclusion that this "edge" gained by discriminatory pricing contributed substantially to AMPOT's ability to undercut PE's prices and to hold the sales price of large volume A/P at a below cost level, thus causing competitive injury to PE.

(C) *Large Volume Purchases*

The second claim under the Robinson-Patman Act is that the varying bid prices charged on nonscheduled large volume orders were price discriminations which caused competitive injury to PE.

There is no disagreement that the bid prices varied and AMPOT's evidence demonstrates that the bid price often varied on sales very close in time.

AMPOT proposes the affirmative defense that the low bids were made to meet competition. We find it unnecessary to consider

this defense for we are not persuaded that AMPOT's price differentials were the cause of PE's competitive injury.

Price differentials may cause competitive injury only if losses incurred by the low price sales are offset by sales made at higher prices. In the common territorial price discrimination the low prices charged in the geographical area of competition are offset by higher prices charged in geographical areas without competition. Similarly, in nongeographical discrimination, one seller may selectively undercut another on some sales while recouping his losses on other sales.

In the present case virtually all large volume sales were made at or below fully allocated cost. Any offset made by the slightly higher, though still below cost, sales was only an offset in the sense that the loss was smaller. Though in a proper case this lesser loss might provide the causal effect of injury to another competitor, we are not persuaded that it does so here.

The injury to PE was caused by the below cost sales, not by the slight variations in price of the below cost sales.

> "When a seller underbids a competitor, thereby injuring him, the injury is an 'effect' of discrimination only if the low price is supported by other prices and their profits wherever charged." *Shore Gas & Oil Co. v. Humble Oil & Refining Co.* [1964 TRADE CASES ¶ 70,990], 224 F. Supp. 922, 926 (D. N. J. 1963).

Though it is a permissible inference that below cost sales are supported by other sales, such is not the case here. The below cost bid sales were not supported by other above cost bid sales of A/P.[48]

The Robinson-Patman Act does not require that prices on goods be uniform. It only makes illegal the use of varying prices to destroy competition. Varying prices were not used for this pur-

48. The schedule sales provided some support, of course, but these have been treated separately.

pose here; below cost sales were the principal weapon used to destroy competition. Accordingly, we disallow PE's claim under the Robinson-Patman Act for large volume purchases.

UTAH UNFAIR PRACTICE ACT

PE's final claim is that a number of AMPOT's sales below cost were in violation of Section 13-5-7 of the Utah Unfair Practice Act. The pertinent part of this section reads as follows:

> "It is hereby declared that any advertising, offer to sell, or sale of any merchandise, either by retailers or wholesalers, at less than cost as defined in this act with the intent and purpose of inducing the purchase of other merchandise or of unfairly diverting trade from a competitor or otherwise injuring a competitor, impairs and prevents fair competition, injures public welfare, is unfair competition contrary to public policy and the policy of this act and is declared to be a violation of this act."

This claim arises out of sales made to Thiokol's Wasatch Division which is located at Promontory, Utah. The transactions preceding sales commenced with Thiokol sending a RFQ to Kerr-McGee Chemical Corporation or its predecessor. This would be sent to the company's office in either Los Angeles or Oklahoma City. Kerr-McGee Chemical Corporation would respond with a written bid which would be considered by Thiokol. If the company decided to purchase Kerr-McGee Chemical Corporation's product, it would mail a contract. This contract would be mailed from Utah and received in either Los Angeles or Oklahoma City. Thiokol would then receive an acknowledgment copy from Kerr-McGee Chemical Corporation. Included within the contract was a standard provision stating acceptance would be at Thiokol's plant. The A/P, however, was to be shipped FOB Henderson, Nevada.

Even assuming[49] that Kerr-McGee Chemical Corporation offered or sold its A/P below cost within the State of Utah, we feel that the Utah statute is clearly inapplicable. There are many reasons for our belief; however, our discussion will focus only on the fact that the statute applies to retailers and wholesalers and not to manufacturers.

Although PE has tried to persuade us that the Utah legislature intended the word wholesalers to be given a broad interpretation, we are convinced otherwise. In *Burt v. Woolsulate* [1944-1945 TRADE CASES ¶ 57,217], 146 P. 2d 203, 205, the Utah Supreme Court discussed the reasons for the enactment of the various unfair practices acts. The court stated that "the immediate stimuli for the enactment of such acts were in part the rapid rise of chain stores and in part the general sharpening of competitive practices under pressure of the depression." Quoting from an article entitled "Prohibiting Price Discrimination and Sales Below Cost: The State Unfair Practices Acts," which appeared in 32 Ill. Law Rev. 816, the court stated:

> "One of the practices aimed at by these [unfair practices acts] statutes is that, common in chain stores, of selling at lower prices in one locality than in another and making up losses incurred by profits in other stores. Even more important in the application of anti-discrimination statutes today is the prevention of discrimination sales by manufacturers to customers with unusually strong bargaining power who can force large price concessions. * * *
>
> "On the whole the anti-discrimination provisions of the Unfair Practices Acts seem best fitted to reach manufacturers and producers who, in the past have placed certain retail buyers in preferred competitive positions by giving them special rebates or other price favors. Enforcement at this

49. We assume these facts as neither party presented any persuasive law concerning where these offers and sales took place.

> point can be doubly effective under the 'Little Robinson-Patman Acts' which penalize not only the seller but the buyer who knowingly induces or receives discrimination in price."

Although the word "manufacturers" is used, it is clear that the purpose of the act was to protect the small independent merchant. It is equally clear that the below cost provision should not be applied to manufacturers. This latter point is set forth in the law review article mentioned above.

In this article, the following is stated:

> "While the wording of the sales below cost provisions in most of the statutes is broad enough in scope to include those engaged in business in all its various phases, the types of businesses to which laws of this sort can be successfully applied are necessarily limited. The acts are inadequate for application to manufacturer's sales because of the complex factors involved in determining cost."

The article further states:

> "A few of the acts do not extend the sales below cost provisions to manufacturers. In view of the fact that the most undesirable practices of manufacturers are eliminated by the anti-discrimination sections, it seems proper that they should be exempt from the sales below cost provisions."

The statutes cited as being inapplicable to manufacturers were those of Tennessee and Pennsylvania. The provisions of both declare that sales below cost by retailers and wholesalers are illegal when made with the requisite intent of injuring a competitor, etc. The Pennsylvania act specifically states that the term "wholesaler shall mean and include every person, partnership, corporation or association other than a manufacturer (not operating a retail business or trade) engaged in the business of making sales at wholesale or performing the wholesale function of supplying any retailer or retail outlet with merchandise for retail sale

within this State . . ." The Tennessee statute does not specifically state that manufacturers are not to be considered as wholesalers. The statute, however, defines sales at wholesale as including "any transfer, for a valuable consideration made in the ordinary course of trade or the usual prosecution of the seller's business, of title to tangible personal property to the purchaser for resale either in its original form or as processed or prepared for resale by hotels, cafes, or hospitals or other institutions," and cost to the wholesaler as meaning and including whichever is the lower of "(1) the purchase price of the product or commodity to the wholesaler when invoice is dated not more than sixty (60) days prior to the sale of such product or commodity by the wholesaler, or (2) the replacement cost of such product or commodity to the wholesaler at the time of sale in the quantity last purchased by the wholesaler; less any legitimate trade discounts but exclusive of cash discounts for prompt payment." Under these definitions, it would be impossible for the statute to be applicable to a manufacturer.

In light of the aforementioned, we are convinced that the 1955 amendment to Section 13-5-7 of the Utah statute which changed the wording from "[I]t shall be unlawful for any person engaged in business within the State of Utah to sell, offer for sale or advertise for sale any article, product or commodity at less than the cost thereof to such vendor . . ." to "[I]t is hereby declared that any advertising, offer to sell, or sale of any merchandise, either by retailers or wholesalers, at less than cost as defined in this act . . ." narrower the scope of the act and restricted its application. Webster's Third New International Dictionary defines a retailer as "a merchant middleman who sells goods mainly to ultimate consumers" and a wholesaler as "a merchant middleman who sells chiefly to retailers, other merchants, or industrial, institutional, and commercial users mainly for resale or business use." These are the publicly accepted meanings, and we feel they are the definitions intended by the Utah legislature.

PE would have us consider Section 13-5-7(b)1 which says, "When used in this act, the term 'cost' as applied to production shall include the cost of raw materials, labor, and all overhead expenses of the producer" as indicating that Section 13-5-7 is applicable to manufacturers. However, if a manufacturer is to be considered as a wholesaler, then Section 13-5-7(b)2 which says, "When used in this act, the term 'cost to the wholesaler' shall mean the invoice cost of the merchandise to the wholesaler or the replacement cost of the merchandise to the wholesaler, whichever is lower; less all trade discounts except customary discounts for cash; to which shall be added: (a) Freight charges not otherwise included in the invoice cost or the replacement cost of the merchandise as herein set forth, and (b) cartage to the retail outlet if done or paid for by the wholesaler, which cartage cost, in the absence of proof of a lesser cost, shall be deemed to be three-fourths of one per cent of the cost to the wholesaler as herein set forth after adding thereto freight charges but before adding thereto cartage" would be the appropriate section to apply. This definition surely cannot be applicable to a manufacturer such as Kerr-McGee Chemical Corporation. As far as Section 13-5-7(b)1, which became part of the statute in 1939, is concerned, we can only surmise that it was rendered meaningless by the 1955 amendment. Although we have little doubt that wholesaler could be defined broadly enough to include a manufacturer, we are convinced that this is not the case and we dismiss this claim.

COUNTERCLAIMS

[*Securities*]

The defendant has filed three counterclaims. The first arises out of events surrounding a fully registered offering of PE's stock which began in February 3, 1970. All of the stock was sold by February 6, 1970, and the offering was closed on February

27, 1970. Kerr-McGee claims that PE's subsequent lawsuit[50] "was used as a vehicle for the promotion of the sale of plaintiff's high risk stock prior to and during the term of the offering, and as a psychological tool to maintain the after market at high levels." Defendant's pretrial brief at pp. VII6-7. Kerr-McGee claims this conduct violated Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and its implementing Rule 10b-5. Specifically, defendant claims the violation occurred when PE did not disclose the potential suit in its registration statement and then allegedly "leaked news of its intentions" to sue Kerr-McGee in order to stimulate the sale of its stock. Defendant maintains this conduct constituted a manipulative, deceptive, or other fraudulent device or contrivance and that "defendants have been damaged by such fraudulent conduct in that they have been put to great expense in the defense of his lawsuit . . ."

Assuming this claim is timely, we must dismiss it as being clearly without merit as the record is void of any proof that PE or its underwriters used the possibility of a suit as a means of selling the stock. Even if such proof existed, and we assume the required "casual connection",[51] there is absolutely no injury to Kerr-McGee. The injury suffered by the defendant as a result of this suit and the damages to be incurred are the direct result of AMPOT's illegal activities and not the plaintiff's stock offering.

[*Price Discrimination*]

The second counterclaim is that PE violated the Robinson-Patman Act by its price discriminations, both in higher prices charged small volume buyers and varying prices charged large volume buyers.

We find that PE did discriminate in price, but Kerr-McGee has not met its burden of showing competitive injury. In light of

50. The approval to commence this suit was given by PE's board of directors on February 26, 1970.

51. An assumption which is probably not warranted by the facts of this case.

our other findings as to AMPOT's attempt to monopolize, monopoly power, and price discrimination, a showing of competitive injury would be very difficult. PE may have, in individual cases, discriminated in price and, by so doing, taken from AMPOT business that it would otherwise have had. But the effect of taking business from a monopolist is not "substantially to lessen competition, or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce . . ." Indeed, it has the opposite effect.[52]

[*Requirements Contract*]

Kerr-McGee's final counterclaim is that PE, Thiokol, and Aerojet entered into a secret agreement by the terms of which Thiokol and Aerojet undertook to purchase at least one-half of their A/P requirements from PE at a premium price that this agreement violates Section 1 of the Sherman Act[53] and Section 3 of the Clayton Act.[54]

---

52. We express no opinion as to whether PE would be able to defend an action brought by buyers who suffered as the result of PE's price discrimination.

53. "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal . . ." 15 U.S.C. § 1.

54. "It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce, to lease or make a sale or contract for sale of goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other commodities, whether patented or unpatented, for use consumption, or resale within the United States or any Territory thereof or the District of Columbia or any insular possession or other place under the jurisdiction of the United States, or fix a price charged therefor, or discount from, or rebate upon, such price, on the condition, agreement, or understanding that the lessee of purchaser thereof shall not use or deal in the goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other commodities of a competitor or competitors of the lessor or seller, where the effect of such lease, sale, or contract for sale or such condition, agreement, or understanding may be to substantially lessen competition or trend to create a monopoly in any line of commence." 15 U.S.C. § 14.

[Group Boycott]

The basic contention is that the alleged agreement operated as an illegal group boycott of Kerr-McGee Chemical Corporation's A/P or that of its predecessor, AMPOT.

The events surrounding this claim began in 1966 when Thiokol and Aerojet requested a meeting with PE. These companies made this request as they were worried about developments within the A/P industry. Specifically, they were concerned about the possibility of AMPOT becoming the sole supplier of A/P if PE should be forced out of the market. The meeting was held on September 16, 1966, in Henderson, Nevada. Representatives from Thiokol, Aerojet and PE were in attendance.

The major discussion centered around how PE could settle its pending lawsuit with American Cyanamid and remain in business. Everyone present apparently realized that, in order to save PE, Thiokol and Aerojet would have to purchase approximately 50% of their A/P requirements from PE at a premium price during the next five years.

Shortly after the meeting, both companies independently notified PE of their intention to support the company. On September 20, 1966, PE received a telegram from Stoner of Thiokol. The telegram informed PE that Thiokol would dual source its A/P during the next five years and that the company would purchase 4,000,000 pounds of A/P from PE each year. The price was stated to be that listed in the telegram, or less. The prices[55] were listed as 19.5 cents per pound for 1967 and 1968; 20 cents per pound for 1969 and 1970; and 20.5 cents per pound for 1971 and 1972.

On November 18, 1966, Johnson of Aerojet wired PE that, subject to the approval of the premium by its customer, Aerojet would purchase approximately 3,000,000 pounds of A/P each year from PE. The prices which Aerojet stated that it would pay

---

55. The prices offered by both companies gave the plaintiff a 3 to 4 cents per pound premium over the market price.

were 21.5 cents per pound in 1967 and 1968; 22 cents per pound in 1969 and 1970; and 22.5 cents per pound in 1971.

Thiokol evidently revised its figures concerning the quantity of A/P it would purchase from PE as, on January 13, 1967, PE was advised that Thiokol would purchase 40% of its 1967 and 1968 A/P requirements from it.[56] One of Thiokol's internal communications concerning this situation stated that the company was dual sourcing for the purpose of retaining capability and providing insurance against monopolistic pricing by AMPOT.

This 10% reduction of the allegedly agreed upon percentage of Thiokol's A/P business which PE was to receive indicates that the alleged accord was more of an expression of intention than any firm arrangement. This is also indicated by a statement made by Ritchey in an internal memo dated January 18, 1967. Ritchey, in discussing Thiokol's dual sourcing policy, stated that "Aerojet and United Technology are reported to be willing to make similar agreements in order to keep them in business."

Perhaps the most persuasive evidence that a firm agreement did not exist is the fact that PE received little of Thiokol's and Aerojet's business during the pertinent years. PE admitted that, pursuant to its policy, Thiokol made three purchases of Class I A/P and two purchases of Class II A/P in 1967 and 1968. These five purchases amounted to 2,727,500 pounds of A/P. PE also admits that Aerojet made two purchases of Class I A/P and one of Class II A/P during these two years. These three sales amounted to 820,000 pounds of A/P. We have not found any other sales which were made pursuant to Thiokol's and Aerojet's dual sourcing policies, and it is abundantly clear[57] that these purchases did not represent 50% or 40% of either Thiokol's or Aerojet's purchases.

---

56. There is some uncertainty whether the 40% was to be 40% of all Thiokol's A/P requirements or just its Minuteman requirements. The difference, however, is immaterial to our decision.

Although the evidence does not warrant the inference that there was any firm agreement among Thiokol and Aerojet, the facts still present a unique situation and there does not appear to be any authority precisely on point.

Kerr-McGee claims that the alleged agreement had the effect of excluding its product from a portion of the market and forcing the company to sell at a lower price than PE was obtaining for its A/P which was not subject to the boycott. We reject the second aspect of this claim as we have previously found that Kerr-McGee had the power to raise the price of A/P. As far as the claimed group boycott, Kerr-McGee relies on *Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc.* [1959 TRADE CASES ¶ 69,316], 359 U. S. 207 (1959), as its primary authority.

In *Klor's,* the defendant operated a chain of department stores, one of which was located next door to plaintiff's store in San Francisco. Plaintiff claimed that the defendant, ten national manufacturers, and their distributors agreed among themselves that the manufacturers and distributors either would not sell to the plaintiff or would only sell to it at discriminatory prices and unfavorable terms. The question before the court was whether plaintiff's claim stated a cause of action. The court felt that the allegations were sufficient as they alleged a form of trade restraint and public harm which the Sherman Act forbids.

The court found that a cause of action existed and stated (359 U. S. 212-13):

> "Alleged in this complaint is a wide combination consisting of manufacturers, distributors and a retailer. This combination takes from Klor's its freedom to buy appliances in an open competitive market and drives it out of business as

57. AMPOT admits that it sold 17,240,000 pounds of A/P in 1967 and 14,040,000 pounds in 1968, while PE sold only 4,020,000 pounds in 1967 and 1,850,000 pounds in 1968. These admitted statistics, together with the fact that U. T. C. was buying almost exclusively from PE, clearly indicate that AMPOT was getting the predominant share of Thiokol's and Aerojet's business.

> a dealer in the defendants' products. It deprives the manufacturers and distributors of their freedom to sell to Klor's at the same prices and conditions made available to Broadway-Hale, and in some instances forbids them from selling to it on any terms whatsoever. It interferes with the natural flow of interstate commerce. It clearly has, by its nature and character, a monopolistic tendency."

Manifestly, the situation in the case at bar is far different from the one in *Klor's*. In the present case there is no dominant economic power trying to drive a small competitor out of business and here, even if there was an agreement, the purchasers were free to deal with AMPOT. In fact, as was previously mentioned, AMPOT received the overwhelming majority of the A/P business during 1967 and 1968. It is also evident that although Thiokol and Aerojet may have intended to follow a policy of dual sourcing there was nothing to compel them to do so. In fact, even Thiokol's support prices were subject to negotiation. We do not feel this situation can be characterized as a group boycott such as was in *Klor's*.

[*Exclusive Dealing*]

The plaintiff's primary theory is that, if anything, the alleged agreement was an exclusive dealing arrangement, and it relies on *Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co.* [1961 TRADE CASES ¶ 69,940], 365 U. S. 320 (1961), to establish the legality of such arrangements. *Tampa* does indeed stand for the proposition that an exclusive dealing arrangement does not violate Section 3 of the Clayton Act unless the court believes it probable that the performance of the contract would foreclose competition in a substantial share of the line of commerce affected. In *Tampa,* the court held that a twenty-year requirement contract between a coal producer and a utility company was permissible. Although plaintiff's authority may be closer to our factual situation than defend-

ant's, it also falls short of the mark as we have a situation with more than just a single buyer and a single seller. In addition, we cannot see how the dual sourcing policy can operate as a requirement contract since there were not any enforceable contracts requiring Thiokol and Aerojet to purchase A/P from PE.

[*Governing Law*]

Although neither plaintiff's nor defendant's primary authorities are appropriate, there is one case cited by PE which we feel contains the governing law. This case is *Joseph E. Seagram and Sons, Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke and Liquors, Ltd.* [1969 TRADE CASES ¶ 72,914], 416 F. 2d 71 (9 Cir. 1969). In this case, Hawaiian Oke, a wholesale liquor distributor in Hawaii, claimed that Joseph E. Seagram and Sons, Inc. and Barton Distilling Co., manufacturers of alcoholic beverages, and McKesson and Robins, Inc., a wholesale liquor distributor, combined or conspired to, and did, put it out of business. The plaintiff had been the sole distributor in Hawaii of most of Seagram's and Barton's products until both manufacturers switched their business to McKesson and Robins. Hawaiian Oke claimed this constituted a group boycott. The court assumed that there was an understanding between Seagram, Barton and McKesson that both manufacturers would transfer their business to McKesson but held that this did not constitute a group boycott. The court stated that not every agreement is *per se* "in restraint of trade" within the meaning of Section 1. It added further that "a manufacturer or supplier can do many things independently which he may not combine with others to accomplish . . . but the mere fact of combination or conspiracy does not necessarily result in *per se* liability." In discussing the group boycott cases cited by plaintiff,[58] the court said, "Such boycotts have been held to be illegal *per se* under Section One

58. Kerr-McGee relies on many of these same cases.

because they are naked restraints of trade with no purpose except stifling of competition . . ." and that "in all of plaintiff's cases there was a purpose either to exclude a person or group from the market, or to accomplish some other anti-competitive objective or both."

The court felt there was nothing in the situation facing it which was comparable to the group boycotts in the cases Hawaiian Oke relied upon and that the proper considerations were those stated by Barber in "Refusals to Deal under the Federal Antitrust Laws", 103 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 847 (1955), at 876-77:

> "When the element of purpose to coerce the trade policy of their parties or to secure their removal from competition is absent, the policy question raised by agreements under which the parties mutually limit their own freedom to deal with outsiders becomes more difficult, and the courts have appropriately outlined wider limits before declaring such agreements illegal.
>
> "There are many 'normal and usual agreements in aid of trade and commerce' . . . which involve the acceptance by the parties of limitations on their freedom individually to deal with others . . . Requirements contracts, exclusive dealing contracts and contracts involving exclusive territories all involve limitations on the freedom of one or more of the parties to do business with others . . .
>
> "Because all of these situations involve an agreement between two or more persons under which one or more of them agree not to deal with third persons and for that reason foreclose a part of the market to such third persons, they are all subject to scrutiny under the antitrust laws. But in the ordinary case these do not involve combining for the primary purpose of coercing or excluding; rather they involve combinations of two or more persons to further directly the business of the parties to the agreement, and the effect on third parties and on competition is indirect. The issue in these cases is not the existence or nonexistence of concerted refusal to deal, but rather whether the purpose and effect of the operation of the contract, association,

exchange or joint sales agency was such as unreasonably to exclude outsiders from participation in the trade in question. The principle of the group boycott cases—that it is prima facie unreasonable for a dominant group to combine to coerce—is not here applicable."

We feel the same considerations are applicable in the present case, and as in *Seagram,* there is no evidence to show any anti-competitive motives on the part of Thiokol, Aerojet or PE. As Aerojet and Thiokol both admitted, they were only concerned with the existence of two sources of A/P. And, as previously mentioned, there was not even a firm agreement as the defendant had 80% of the A/P business in 1967 and 88% in 1968. Thus, it is inconceivable that a group boycott could have existed. Even if there had been an effective agreement, this would have left AMPOT with 50% to 60% of Thiokol's and Aerojet's business, and this certainly cannot be considered as any type if combination in restraint of trade or commerce, or as an agreement which might substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce.[59] Therefore, we find defendant's claim to be without merit.

Conclusion

Having found for the plaintiff on certain issues presented, the case is now ready for a determination of damages. However, if the Court has erred in any conclusion with respect to a particular issue touching liability, the damages could not properly be ascertained. The Court, being of the opinion that any order hereafter entered pursuant to this opinion involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from such order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, will so certify in writing.

---

59. It might be noted that the present SAMSO agreement adopts just such a dual sourcing approach.

An order in accordance with this opinion will be prepared by counsel and, upon endorsement, will be entered. Such order shall be presented within sixty (60) days unless time is further extended by order of Court.

Appendix C

[¶ 60,724] Pacific Engineering & Production Co. of Nevada v. Kerr-McGee Corp. and Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp.

U. S. District Court, District of Utah, Central Division. Civil Action No. C-40-70. Filed February 2, 1976; corrected February 17, 1976.

Sherman and Clayton Acts

Private Enforcement and Procedure—Proving Damages—Monopolization—Hypothetical Profits—Lack of Competitors for Comparison—Changed Demand and Competitive Situation.—Expert opinion on hypothetical profits was the proper method for determining damages resulting from monopolization of the ammonium perchlorate (used in rocket fuel) industry. The demise of other competitors (only the plaintiff and defendant were producing at the time of trial) largely eliminated the "yardstick" or comparison method of estimating the amount of loss, and the "before and after theory" had only limited value in an industry with great changes in demand and the competitive situation at the inception of the damage period. See ¶ 9302.

Private Enforcement and Procedure—Proving Damages—Economic Outcome in Absence of Monopolization—Price Leadership Oligopoly.—Given the fact that the two producers of ammonium perchlorate (used in rocket fuel) would have experienced steadily declining marginal costs because of their excess capacity and ability to supply the total market demand, economic theory suggested that, had not one firm unlawfully monopolized the market, a situation either of successful price leadership or of failed price leadership with price wars and eventual monopoly would have resulted. The difference in damages was so great between the situations of successful and failed price leadership that the plaintiff had the burden of proving that a price leadership oligopoly would have been the probable result in the absence of monopolization and in the absence of illegal agreements between the producers as to price and market shares. This burden was sustained despite

the presence of numerous factors, such as sharp and questionable procurement practices by customers, that would have made the maintenance of price leadership difficult. See ¶ 9302.

Private Enforcement and Procedure—Proving Damages—Price in Absence of Monopolization—Actual v. Theoretical Price.—In determining what the actual price of ammonium perchlorate (used in rocket fuel) would have been in the absence of monopolization, assuming a situation of price leadership, the following considerations were germane: (1) the monopolizer's cost of production; (2) the oligopolistic nature of the industry; (3) the characteristics of the buyers; (4) the fact that demand was set by government policy rather than market forces; (5) the overcapacity present in the industry; and (6) the possible re-entry into the market of another producer. These considerations led to the conclusion that the price for the rocket fuel ingredient would not have varied significantly during the first part of the damage period from previous levels. Thereafter, the assumed condition of price leadership would have required fairly stable pricing. It also appeared that volume would not have changed significantly. Arguments that the proper price for determining damages was the "lowest lawful price" or a price that would have resulted in a reasonable profit were largely irrelevant. See ¶ 9302.

Private Enforcement and Procedure—Proving Damages—Monopoly Victim—Stock Losses—Ability to Raise Capital in Future.—A producer of ammonium perchlorate (used in rocket fuel) was not permitted to recover damages for the additional number of shares of stock that it had to offer as the result of a competitor's monopolization of the industry. The loss suffered was neither the loss of the firm as a going concern, nor the loss to its stockholders by the dilution of their stock. The loss, if any, was impairment of the firm's ability to raise capital in the future. A lack of substantial evidence on this loss precluded recovery. See ¶ 9302.

Private Enforcement and Procedure—Attorney's Fees and Costs —Counterclaims—State Law Claims—Paralegal Work—Risk Factor.—Monopoly plaintiffs were awarded attorney's fees for time spent on closely interwoven counterclaims and a novel and unsuccessful, though not spurious, claim for losses on stock transactions. There was no award for time spent on unsuccessful claims under state antitrust law and on an abandoned unfair trade count. Recovery also was denied for work done by paralegals and law clerks. Furthermore, paralegal fees could not be considered "costs of the suit." Such fees could be treated, rather, as items of overhead and thus a factor in the hourly rate of the attorney. Moreover, a risk factor to double the award was not appropriate, since the suit was not a class action. Costs covering court reporter fees, deposition costs, witnesses' mileage and attendance fees, and fees for copying also were awarded. See ¶ 9320.

For plaintiff: C. Keith Rooker, Salt Lake City, Utah (Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy, on briefs), Richard W. Giauque, Salt Lake City, Utah (Berman & Giauque, on briefs), William D. Hall and George VandeSande, Washington, D. C. For defendants: Peter W. Billings, Alfred J. Colton, and Stanford B. Owen, Salt Lake City, Utah (Fabian & Clendenin, on briefs), Willard P. Scott and Thomas R. Cochran (of counsel), Oklahoma City, Okla.

Memorandum Opinion

HOFFMAN, D. J.: The liability phase of this bifurcated antitrust case was decided in an opinion, as supplemented, dated February 28, 1974, with an interlocutory appeal by defendants being thereafter denied. In that opinion this Court concluded that defendants had violated the Sherman and Robinson-Patman Acts [1974-1 TRADE CASES ¶ 75,054]. The sole remaining issue is the amount of damages to which plaintiff is entitled.

Title 15 U. S. C. § 15 fixes the recovery at "threefold the damages by him (plaintiff) sustained." The damages are the difference between plaintiff's economic position as a result of the antitrust violations and what plaintiff's economic position would have been, absent the antitrust violations. They are plaintiff's pecuniary losses as a result of the violations, *Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Brookside Theater Corp.* [1952 TRADE CASES ¶ 67,218], 194 F. 2d 846 (8 Cir. 1952), cert denied, 343 U. S. 542. The task of the Court then is to determine what would have been rather than what was. That task necessarily involves inference, hypothesis, and extrapolation. In arriving at the damage the Court may not rely on mere speculation or guesswork, *Loew's, Inc. v. Cinema Amusements, Inc.* [1954 TRADE CASES ¶ 67,648], 210 F. 2d 86 (10 Cir. 1954), cert. denied 347 U. S. 976, but where the difficulties in arriving at a damage figure are the result of defendants' illegal actions, the defendants must bear the burden of the imprecision in proof. *Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures* [1946-1947 TRADE CASES ¶ 57,445], 327 U. S. 251 (1946). In short, the guess must be an educated one, and the plaintiff has the burden of providing the Court with the necessary education.

[*Methods for Estimating Loss*]

Three methods have evolved for estimating the amount of loss in antitrust cases. The "before and after theory" compares the earnings of the enterprise before the violation with those after. The "yardstick" method compares the earnings of the affected enterprise with those of an unaffected enterprise. Finally, expert evidence may be used to estimate the hypothetical gross receipts of the enterprise in the absence of antitrust violations, and derive from these the hypothetical profits of the enterprise. Timberlake, *Federal Treble Damage Antitrust Actions*, p. 317 (Callaghan, 1965); *Flintkote v. Lysfjord* [1957 TRADE CASES ¶ 68,674], 246 F. 2d 368, 392 (9 Cir. 1957).

The value of the first two methods is slight in this case. The demise of other competitors largely eliminates the "yardstick" method, and the "before and after theory" has only limited value in an industry with great changes in demand and the competitive situation at the inception of the damage period, see, Memorandum Order of November 18, 1974. Thus plaintiff is forced to rely largely on expert opinion to butress plaintiff's assertions as to damages. That expert opinion must provide answers to two questions:

1. What would have been the price plaintiff would have received for ammonium perchlorate absent defendants' unlawful conduct?
2. What volume of sales would defendants have had absent defendants' unlawful conduct?

[*Normal Economic Outcome*]

It is perfectly possible that normal business factors would have resulted in plaintiff having been almost driven out of business in a pricing pattern closely similar to that which actually occurred. Economic theory suggests this could be the result of the situation that existed in the ammonium perchlorate industry.

[*Declining Marginal Costs*]

Both plaintiff and defendants possessed excess capacity and either could have substantially supplied the total market demand during the damage period. This being the case, each company would have found that the marginal cost of producing additional quantities of ammonium perchlorate would steadily decline.[1] The more ammonium perchlorate produced, the less the cost of production. Given that fact, both firms could engage in a price war, hoping always that with increased volume their lower costs per

1. Marginal cost is defined as the additional cost of producing an additional unit of production.

unit would permit their lowered price to cover their average total costs.

Professor Samuelson in his text, *Economics,* p. 452 (McGraw Hill, 8 Ed. 1970), describes such a situation:

> Actually, if we review our argument telling us why a maximizing firm will want to produce where MC = P [Marginal Cost = Price], we see that the argument *fails completely* in the case where the firm's MC curve is a downward-sloping one. For if you move to the right of a point on a falling MC curve, you find that your additional P per unit is in excess of the now lower MC; and so in the case of decreasing Marginal Cost, the firm will expand its output more and more beyond the MC curve to gain extra profit.
>
> Under decreasing Marginal Cost, the first firm to get a head start will find its advantage increasing the greater it grows. As it forces other firms to contract their q's [volume] their disadvantage will become aggravated as they are forced to travel back up their falling MC curves. The result must be obvious . . . .

Samuelson's obvious result is (1) the destruction of all but one firm and the creation of a monopoly; (2) the creation of an oligopoly; (3) some kind of "imperfect competition" wherein the firms have control over industry price.

[*Price Leadership*]

The obligopoly (or, in this case, duopoly) result or the "imperfect competition" result theorized by Samuelson would have been the actual result if "price leadership" had been attainable in the ammonium perchlorate industry. "Price leadership" is a common situation in oligopolistic industries such as steel, tobacco, automobiles and aluminum. Under price leadership, the pricing decisions for the industry are made by one or more dominant firms and the other firms follow that price making a smaller or larger profit than the leader depending on their individual costs.

Price leadership is not the idealized competitive free enterprise system favored by our economic philosophy. It can be, however, a legal marketing structure in an industry, *Theater Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp.* [1954 TRADE CASES ¶ 67,640], 346 U. S. 537 (1954); *United States v. National Malleable & Steel Castings Co.,* 1957 TRADE CASES ¶ 68,890 (N. D. Ohio 1957), aff'd *per curiam* [1958 TRADE CASES ¶ 69,154] 358 U. S. 38 (1959).

[*Three Possible Outcomes*]

Implicit in price leadership is the division of the market into relatively stable shares. Given the situation of the ammonium perchlorate industry, there were three possible outcomes of the market conditions at the start of the damage period in this case:

1. Defendants could decide that they would recoup the losses of a price war by monopoly pricing and could actively pursue the acquisition of a monopoly.

2. Price leadership oligopoly could be attempted and fail, resulting in a price war with eventual acquisition of a monopoly by defendants because of defendants' superior financial resources.

3. Price leadership oligopoly could be attempted and succeed with a relatively stable price and a division of the market.

In the liability opinion we determined that defendants consciously chose and implemented the first outcome, thereby violating the antitrust laws. Had it not done so, either the second or third outcome would have been the result. If the result is the second outcome, then there are little or no damages to the plaintiff. If the result is the third outcome, then plaintiff's damages are the difference in the profits it actually had received compared to the profits it could have had under the third outcome.[2]

[*Burden of Proof*]

Plaintiff suggests that the uncertainty as to whether the second or third outcome would have been the actual outcome is the result

of defendants' illegal acts and thus defendants must accept the burden of uncertainty, citing *Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, supra,* and other cases in that line of decisions. That legal theory as to the measure of proof is not, however, applicable in choosing between the second outcome where there would be little or no damages and the third outcome where there would be substantial damages. As stated in *Story Parchment Co., supra:*

> It is true that there was uncertainty as to the extent of the damage, but there was none as to the fact of damage; and there is a clear distinction between the measure of proof necessary to establish the fact that petitioner had sustained some damage and the measure of proof necessary to enable the jury to fix the amount. The rule which precludes the recovery of uncertain damages applies to such as are not the certain result of the wrong, not to those damages which are definitely attributable to the wrong and only uncertain in respect of their amount.

Accord, *Kobe, Inc. v. Dempsey Pump Co.,* [1952 TRADE CASES ¶ 67,312], 198 F. 2d 416, 426-27 (10 Cir. 1952), and cases cited therein.

Though concededly there could have been some minimal damage under the second outcome,[3] the disparity is so great between the second outcome and the third, and the damage assessment so different, that the burden remains with the plaintiff to show by a fair preponderance of the evidence that a price leadership oligopoly would have been the probable result in the absence of defendants' unlawful conduct and in the absence of illegal express agreements between plaintiff and defendants as to price and market shares.

---

2. In addition plaintiff would be entitled to any loss in the value of its property. *Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Co.,* 282 U.S. 555 (1931).

3. The rate of monopolization might be different between an intentionally implemented monopoly policy, and monopoly that was the incidental result of a protracted price war. Thus there might be some minimal damage due plaintiff if the second outcome occurred rather than the first.

[*Maintenance of Price Leadership*]

The evidence shows that ammonium perchlorate costs vary markedly with volume, that both firms had large excess capacity, that most buying of ammonium perchlorate was by sealed bid, that the major buyers practiced sharp and questionable procurement policies that included the misrepresentation of the amounts of other manufacturers' bids, and that many procurements were made for contract amounts that were large portions of the total available business. Each of these factors would make the maintenance of price leadership difficult.

Countervailing considerations include plaintiff's desire to have a price leadership situation, the advantages to plaintiff and defendants of a price leadership situation, and at least partial support among the buyers for dual sourcing. Plaintiff's president, Fred Gibson, has consistently testified in both the liability and damage phases of this case that he desired a price leadership situation, that he was aware of the necessity of following and not undercutting defendants' prices in order for price leadership to work, and that he would in fact have followed defendants' prices so long as they were at a level where plaintiff could make a profit. For a substantial period plaintiff in fact maintained its prices at a level above defendants' bid range in an attempt to "signal" plaintiff's willingness to end the price war and accept the price leadership of defendants, Liability Opinion p. 42, 46-47. This attempt to institute price leadership resulted in very substantial losses of business (Liability Opinion p. 17, ¶ e; Defendants' Exhibit 707A, pp. 8-10). Both the Government and the rocket manufacturers had a strong desire to maintain two sources of ammonium perchlorate, a desire that eventually ended in an artificial division of the market and price maintenance under the SAMSO agreement. That desire sprang from the danger of having only one manufacturing facility of a highly explosive substance and an unwillingness to be subjected to a monopoly. The desire

may have been more in the abstract than the real during the damage period, for while wishing to have two sources, the sharp buying practices of most buyers made more likely the eventual monopoly,[4] but presumably that desire would have permitted a certain tolerance of price leadership so long as the price was not set at an unreasonably high level.

Price leadership would have been more advantageous to both firms than the price war that existed, though it might not be more advantageous to defendants over the long run than the monopoly profits they might be able to realize after victory in the price war.

Based upon these facts and the evidence in this case, it is our conclusion that plaintiff has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that, absent defendants' unlawful conduct, a price leadership type of pricing could and would have existed in the ammonium perchlorate industry.

Price

Having determined that a price leadership pricing situation would have existed in the ammonium perchlorate industry, we must now determine what the price would have been as a result of that situation. Defendants have asserted that the proper determination of price would be a determination of the "lowest lawful price" that defendants could have set. For determining that price, defendants rely on the reasoning of a law review article, Areeda and Turner, *Predatory Pricing and Related Practices under Section 2 of the Sherman Act,* 88 Harvard L. Rev. 697 (1975),[5] to show that the lowest lawful price would have been a price

4. The desire for dual sourcing was partially converted into practice by awards to plaintiff when its bid was not low for the purpose of maintaining competition by keeping plaintiff in business. See Defendants' Exhibit 707A.

5. The theory spoused in the Areeda and Turner article has been accepted by the Fifth Circuit, *Int. Air Industries v. American Excelsior, Inc.*, 1975-2 TRADE CASES ¶ 60,447 (5 Cir. August 18, 1975).

equal to the marginal cost of production. Plaintiff has at least partially argued that the price would have been a reasonable profit based on a profit to sales ratio, profit to capital ratio, or profit to cost ratio, and has supported this argument with the testimony of an expert, Dr. Arthur Burns, as to these rates in Government contract work and the chemical industry.

We think both lines of argument are largely irrelevant. The criteria for the price of ammonium perchlorate in fixing damages is neither the lowest lawful price nor a reasonable return or reasonable profit. The criteria is what the price would actually have been.

> A wide range of factors influence a company's pricing policies. Normally the impact of a single change in the relevant conditions cannot be measured after the fact; indeed a businessman may be unable to state whether, had one fact been different (a single supply less expensive, general economic conditions more buoyant, or the labor market tighter, for example), he would have chosen a different price. Equally difficult to determine, in the real economic world rather than an economist's hypothetical model, is what effect a change in a company's price will have on its total sales. Finally, costs per unit for a different volume of total sales are hard to estimate.
>
> *Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.* [1968 TRADE CASES ¶ 72,490], 392 U. S. 481, 492-93.

Economic theories that fail to take into account the specific circumstances of what was a highly atypical industry are of minimal aid in that determination.[6]

Even if the lowest lawful price were the criteria, the Areeda and Turner article is inapplicable in this case. Areeda and Turner rest their theory of lawful pricing on the economic theory that maximum profit (or minimum losses) are obtained when the

---

6. Dr. Burns' testimony is of some value as to what the Government might regard as a maximum price, above which it might act to reduce the price.

marginal cost of production equals the price. That theory is only valid when the marginal cost follows the typical pattern of first decreasing as output increases (because the manufacturer is able to utilize his excess capacity), and then increasing with further output (because the plant exceeds optimum efficient production rates or because it becomes necessary to make further capital outlays). In the ammonium perchlorate industry excess capacity was so great that the marginal cost would never increase with any possible quantity of demand.[7] As Professor Samuelson stated in the portion of his text previously quoted: "Actually, if we review our argument . . . telling us why a maximizing firm will want to produce where MC = P [Marginal Cost equals Price], we see that the argument *fails completely* in the case where the firm's MC curve is a downward sloping one." The profit maximization theory relies on the fact that P = MC is a break-even point in the sense that previous volumes of output will show a profit because the marginal cost was less than the price, and increases in output above this point will show a loss because the marginal cost will be greater than the price. If the marginal cost curve always declines and one prices at marginal cost, one will never have previous lower marginal cost output to make a profit on, and there will be a loss equal to the fixed costs. Accordingly, we reject the reasoning of the Areeda and Turner article as applied to the facts of this case.

We think the following considerations are all germane in determining the price that would have been realized for ammonium perchlorate:

1. Defendants' cost of production.
2. The oligopolistic nature of the industry.
3. The characteristics of the buyers.
4. The fact that demand was set by Government policy rather than market forces.

---

7. The demand maximum was largely fixed by Government defense policy and thus had a limit largely unresponsive to price.

5. The overcapacity present in the industry.

6. The possible re-entry into the market of Pennsalt and Hooker Chemical Co.

[*Cost of Production*]

Defendants' cost of production is an important factor in pricing, if for no other reason than that a profit is the goal of all manufacturers. There is little disagreement between the parties as to the figures for determining defendants' cost. (Compare Plaintiff's Exhibit 1205 with Defendants' Exhibit 1451.) Defendants' fully allocated cost of ammonium perchlorate ranged from about 17 cents per pound in 1970 to about 21½ cents per pound in 1966, with a fixed cost of about $850,000 a year and a variable cost per pound of from 12 to 14 cents (Plaintiff's Exhibit 1205).

[*Depreciation*]

Defendants suggest that the use of rate of depreciation values carried on defendants' books for tax purposes is inappropriate since these may exceed the actual depreciation and thereby inflate the fixed costs. The argument has merit, but where the depreciation values are derived from defendants' own books, records and reports, it is defendants' burden to show the depreciation to be other than that which it has previously publicly maintained it to be. Defendants have not met this burden.

Defendants also contend that the inclusion of all depreciation as fixed costs is inappropriate because these costs reflect an error of judgment in the past when over-capacity was purchased and should be partially or wholly written off as a sunk cost. Similarly, the figure of interest represents a past decision to debt finance and should also be regarded as a "sunk cost" and not part of the basis for the cost of production of ammonium perchlorate. The short answer is that these costs, whether the result of past correct decisions or past erroneous decisions, must be

recovered if the business is to show a profit. The businessman who regards these costs as "water over the dam" and neglects them in determining price will find that financial solvency has also flowed over the dam. To avoid a loss defendants had to price so as to recover their average total cost (the sum of fixed and variable costs per pound) and this figure would be the same as their fully allocated cost per pound.

Defendants' own records show that, in general, they made price estimates on the basis of average total cost prior to the damage period. Absent predatory intent and other factors, defendants would have probably continued to attempt to price on that basis.

After the withdrawal of Hooker and Pennsalt from the market an oligopoly, or more precisely a duopoly, existed. Samuelson characterizes the possible pricing in oligopolies as follows:

> The richness of possible outcomes would exhaust a specialized book on the subject. The final equilibrium may end up much or little above the firm's marginal cost level . . . But if sellers are few, and if they are large relative to the total demand, not very fearful of new entrants, and keenly conscious of the mutuality of their interest, the tacit price pattern may become a very high one relative to long run or short run marginal cost. Samuelson, op. cit., p. 492.

Given the situation in the ammonium perchlorate industry we think the oligopolistic nature would tend (1) to make prices lower for an initial phase of the damage period while both producers effectively competed, and (2) make prices higher after both firms realized their mutuality of interest and perceived the pricing and market share division expectations of each other. The probability of an equilibrium point above cost is high. Once we foreclose the possibility of defendants' initiating and maintaining a price war for the purpose of becoming a monopoly and recouping their price war losses by monopoly profits, it becomes defendants' inter-

est to avoid the losses of a price war. Setting of the price (and division of the market) at a level below that where plaintiff could survive would be the trigger for plaintiff to cut its prices in the hope of increasing its market share, thereby lowering its cost per pound and hopefully lessening its losses. Such a move by plaintiff would, in the end, be suicidal, since defendants with superior financial resources would cut and maintain their prices below plaintiff's prices, but at some point in pricing and market share, plaintiff would be forced into the suicidal move. Thus it would be to defendants' advantage to maintain prices above those where plaintiff could not survive. Once that is the case, it becomes in defendants' interest to maintain prices as high as possible, the limit on pricing becoming an external one which depends on other factors such as Government regulation and the negotiating power of the buyers.

[*Buyer Strength*]

The rocket manufacturers have shown themselves to be shrewd buyers in a market which could fairly be characterized as a buyer's market because of the large overcapacity present in the industry. Nevertheless, the buyers' desire to maintain two sources of ammonium perchlorate would have induced them to accept the necessity of a price leadership situation, so long as they were not paying much above the minimum price necessary to maintain two sources of ammonium perchlorate. The economic strength of the buyers would have been an important upper limit on the price of ammonium perchlorate.

[*Government-Set Demand*]

In classic economic theory a closely dependent relationship exists between price, supply, and demand. In the ammonium perchlorate industry this relationship was not present. Demand was set by Government defense policy and increases or decreases in price

had little effect on demand.[8] Normally such a situation of necessity demand would tend to permit very high pricing.

[*Overcapacity*]

The large excess capacity of the industry was a major cause of depressed prices.[9] As well as creating the possibility of price wars, the overcapacity meant that fixed costs were considerably higher than optimum. The manufacture of ammonium perchlorate was thus inefficient, and the chance for profit seriously reduced. In addition to the existing overcapacity, Hooker and Pennsalt had, in 1965 or 1966, shut down plants that could be returned to production during the early part of the damage period.

An internal study by Hooker showed that the shut down point (where it was more economical to abandon production than produce at a loss), assuming a production volume for its plant that would increase to ten or twelve million pounds a year in three to four years, would be at a price of about 19½ cents per pound. Historically Hooker's average total cost for ammonium perchlorate was about 25.8 cents per pound (Defendants' Exhibits 270, 278). The volume level hypothesized in the 19½ cents per pound shut down point would be unlikely of realization, but at a higher price Hooker would have found it advantageous to enter at a lower volume.

After careful consideration of all these factors, we conclude that the price for ammonium perchlorate would not have varied significantly during 1966 from the price levels that existed. A policy of price leadership would have taken a significant period of adjust-

---

8. Presumably very drastic changes in price might eventually have an effect on demand by making alternative weapons systems more or less advantageous but, for practical purposes, demand could be regarded as independent of price.

9. The combined capacities of plaintiff's plant (20,000,000 lbs. per year) and defendants' plant (30,000,000 lbs. per year) far exceeded a demand that was generally below 20,000,000 lbs. per year during the damage period.

ment and "feeling out" of the other parties' intentions before it would be achieved. Even if a price leadership policy had existed prior to 1966 the withdrawal of Hooker and Pennsalt would have caused a period of instability and price war similar to what occurred before price leadership would have been feasible.

After 1966 we think that the prices bid on contracts would have fluctuated around a fairly narrow range with prices being quite rigid. Though normally prices would tend to vary with each year's volume assuring a stable market division, nonetheless price leadership would require fairly stable pricing to work and changes in price would lag behind changes in volume.

[*Costs*]

Before determining the actual prices, it is necessary to determine what volume levels each party would have had during the damage period in order to estimate their costs, for cost would be a major factor in determining the price levels under price leadership.

Volume

The determination of the volume which each manufacturer would have had is essentially a determination of the point where plaintiff's ability to force defendants into a price war and defendants' ability to win that price war would be in equilibrium.

[*Product Qualification*]

Defendants have introduced considerable evidence relating to the qualification of a manufacturer's ammonium perchlorate for a specific program and defendants' greater sales effort in the small volume buyer market. The implication of this evidence was that defendants had some portion of the market "locked up" and thus that portion should not be considered when dividing the market.

The evidence on qualification of ammonium perchlorate for specific programs was conflicting. There appeared to be consider-

able difference in opinion between high level rocket manufacturer executives and their field level technical people as to what tests would be required for qualification. The evidence showed that, in many programs, qualification tests would be combined with routine quality assurance tests so as to qualify another source of ammonium perchlorate at little additional expense.

Though some programs undoubtedly were "locked up" for one manufacturer or the other, the total percentage of locked up business was small compared to the whole. In general, the additional evidence reinforced our determination in the liability phase that "requisite cross elasticity of demand did exist and that PE's non-qualified A/P was in competition with Ampot's exclusively qualified A/P."

So long as programs for which only one manufacturer was and could have been qualified constitute a minority of the total market, the question of exclusive qualification is irrelevant. The market shares are principally determined by the volume and price level that would have forced plaintiff to abandon price leadership and enter into a suicidal price war. If defendants had a greater portion of the market "locked up", it only implies that plaintiff would have had to acquire a larger share of the mutually available business in order to reach the needed volume level. Only if the portion of locked up business was so large that the mutually available business was insufficient to permit plaintiff to reach needed volumes would exclusive qualification become relevant. We are satisfied that the locked up business of defendants because of exclusive possible qualification and greater sales ability was far smaller than that amount.

[*Plaintiffs' Actual Costs*]

The level of volume at which plaintiff would have been forced to abandon price leadership is largely determined by plaintiff's costs. The parties were in fierce disagreement as to plaintiff's

actual costs over the damage period. Plaintiff arrived at its cost figures by performing a detailed line-by-line analysis of each of the costs associated with the production of ammonium perchlorate and estimating by what amount those costs that varied with volume would have varied. Defendants approached the cost question by examining plaintiff's historical costs at various volume levels and extrapolating to different volume levels.[10]

The difficulty with defendants' method of analysis is that many of the plaintiff's costs varied over the damage period, but did not vary according to volume. For example, property taxes and patent amortization costs would presumably be largely independent of volume, yet they did vary markedly during the damage period (Plaintiff's Exhibit 1206). Extrapolation based in part on these varying costs would obviously be inaccurate. The difficulty becomes more acute when one includes as the basis for extrapolation years when extraordinary costs were incurred, such as 1962, plaintiff's first year of operation.

[*Estimates Prepared for Trial*]

Plaintiff's method is superior to that of defendants in approach. It lacks, however, in its execution. Because the line-by-line estimates were prepared for purposes of this trial, they are inherently suspect and that suspicion is encouraged by assumptions in Plaintiff's Exhibit 1206 that costs such as maintenance materials, truck and auto rental, professional services, travel and telephone expenses, would remain constant if volume increased substantially However, Plaintiff's Exhibit 1206 would appear to be the most accurate indicator of plaintiff's actual cost, and we shall use it as the principal basis for estimating plaintiff's costs, adding a slight amount to cover the increased cost of those figures which

10. This was done both to estimate average total cost and to estimate average variable cost by subtracting some, but not all, fixed costs.

the exhibit assumes to be fixed and which the evidence indicates would increase with volume.

[*Total Available Market*]

It is also necessary to fix, for purposes of computing damages, the total market available to be split between plaintiff and defendants. Defendants suggest in their post-trial brief that the proper criteria would be orders placed in the damage period rather than sales actually made. Defendants' position carries with it the necessary logical argument that sales made early in the damage period were the result of orders placed outside the damage period and since no antitrust violation has been shown outside the damage period, those sales cannot be regarded as other than sales made lawfully and not subject to change in estimating what the sales levels would have been absent unlawful conduct. The situation is closely analogous to that presented in *Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research* [1971 TRADE CASES ¶ 73,484], 401 U. S. 321 (1971), wherein the Supreme Court held that damages occurring within the damage period were recoverable even when the damages were the result of overt acts occurring outside the damage period. Thus sales made rather than orders placed will be the criteria.

Examination of the costs for plaintiff and defendants shows that, in general, plaintiff's costs are nearly equal to defendants' costs at a 40%/60% volume level (Plaintiff's Exhibits 1206). At a 35%/65% split plaintiff's costs generally exceed defendants'.[11] Since the price would normally be set at a price equal to defendants' costs, plus a small margin, and since plaintiff

---

11. Extracting from the exhibits:

35%/65%	1967	1968	1969	1970
Plaintiff's costs	.237	.258	.250	.228
Defendants' costs	.206	.234	.218	.190
40%/60%	**1967**	**1968**	**1969**	**1970**
Plaintiff's costs	.221	.238	.230	.216
Defendants' costs	.211	.212	.224	.193

would follow that price with a volume that would permit him to break even, we think that the range between 30% and 40% of the market is likely for plaintiff's volume.

For the same reasons given earlier when considering price, there would not have been a significant change in volume levels in 1966 from those levels which existed.

We find that plaintiff would have sold the following volumes of ammonium perchlorate absent defendants' unlawful conduct.

1966	no change
1967	7,400,000 lbs.
1968	5,500,000 lbs.
1969	5,750,000 lbs.
1970	6,750,000 lbs.

At these volume levels we find that plaintiff would have had the following average total cost per pound:

1967	.24
1968	.26
1969	.25
1970	.23

With this division of the market and at these volume levels, we find that defendants could and would have maintained the price of ammonium perchlorate as follows:

1967	.23
1968	.23
1969	.24
1970	.25

Accordingly it becomes a matter of calculation to derive plaintiff's damages:

1967	
Plaintiff's volume	7,400,000 lbs.
Plaintiff's cost per lb.	.24
Price per lb.	.23
Net loss per lb.	.01
Net loss	$ 74,000.00
Actual loss	$592,968.00
Damages	$518,968.00
1968	
Plaintiff's volume	5,500,000 lbs.
Plaintiff's cost per lb.	.26
Price per lb.	.23
Net loss per lb.	.03
Net loss	$165,000.00
Actual loss	$498,262.00
Damages	$333,262.00
1969	
Plaintiff's volume	5,750,000 lbs.
Plaintiff's cost per lb.	.25
Price per lb.	.24
Net loss per lb.	.01
Net loss	$ 57,500.00
Actual loss	$320,281.00
Damages	$262,781.00
1970	
Plaintiff's volume	6,750,000 lbs.
Plaintiff's cost per lb.	.23
Price per lb.	.25
Net profit per lb.	.02
Net profit	$135,000.00*
Actual loss	$280,187.00
Damages	$415,187.00

*The figure of $135,000.00 is what the plaintiff should have realized as profit for 1970. It is, therefore, added to the actual loss.

Total damages before trebling $1,530,198.00

Total damages after trebling $4,590,594.00

Stock Losses

Plaintiff sold 570,644 shares of its common stock to the public in 1968 and 1969 at $1.00 per share in an unregistered public, intrastate offering in Nevada. Plaintiff sold an additional 800,000 shares of its common stock to the public in 1970 at $2.25 per share in a registered public offering.

Plaintiff contends that the prices it received for its stock were depressed because of plaintiff's poor earnings record, that plaintiff's poor earnings record was the result of defendants' antitrust violations, and that, therefore, plaintiff suffered damage equivalent to the difference between the price at which it sold its stock and the price at which its stock would have sold absent defendants' illegal conduct. The difficulty is with the conclusion of this argument. Plaintiff's chief executive officer testified that, in both stock sales, the plaintiff raised the amount of money it intended to raise (Gibson Tr. 351-352), albeit that in both cases more shares had to be sold than would have been the case absent defendants' unlawful conduct. Thus, if there were damage to plaintiff, the damage was the result of having to sell an increased number of shares.

Neither plaintiff nor defendants have cited any cases directly on point which decide the specific question of whether or not a corporation can recover for the additional numbers of shares of stock that it had to offer as the result of an antitrust violator's illegal conduct. Plaintiff has suggested that since recovery is permitted for the value of plaintiff's business as a going concern when plaintiff is driven out of business, *Continental Baking Co. v. Old Homestead Baking Co.* [1973-1 TRADE CASES ¶ 74,433], 476 F. 2d 97, 110 (10 Cir. 1973), plaintiff should be able to recover for the diminution in the value of its shares. Such an argument neglects the fact that the former going concern value of a business that has failed and the value of the shares of stock of a going business, though related, are different concepts. It also

fails to consider that the recovery of lost profits, which has been allowed in this case, serves in whole or in part to repair the loss in going concern value caused by defendants' illegal conduct.

Plaintiff also suggests that since the various shareholders suffered a loss in the value of their shares by their dilution as a result of the stock offering, and since these shareholders may not assert their claim directly, *McDaniel v. Painter,* 418 F.2d 545, 547 (10 Cir. 1969); *New Sanitary Towel Supply, Inc. v. Consolidated Laundries Corp.* [1963 TRADE CASES ¶ 70,642], 211 F. Supp. 276 (S. D. N. Y. 1962); *Kauffman v. Dreyfus Fund, Inc.* [1970 TRADE CASES ¶ 73,333], 434 F. 2d 727 (3 Cir. 1970) cert. denied 401 U. S. 974, the corporation should be entitled to sue in behalf of the stockholders for their losses as a result of the dilution of their stock. Such an argument neglects the reason why a shareholder cannot sue for losses as a result of the dilution of his stock. It is not because the corporation should sue in his behalf but rather because the amount of his damages is too remote and hypothetical to permit recovery.

> The reason for the rule against such recoveries is not so much to prevent overlapping recompense to both corporation and stockholders, but is rather to prevent the recovery for injuries which are indirect in nature. *New Sanitary Towel Supply, Inc. v. Consolidated Laundries* [1963 TRADE CASES ¶ 70,642], 211 F. Supp. 276 (S. D. N. Y. 1962).

The loss suffered by plaintiff is thus neither the loss of its value as a going concern, nor the loss to its stockholders by the dilution of their stock. The loss, if any, is the result of the fact that plaintiff's future ability to raise capital by selling stock may be impaired. Presumably the willingness of current stockholders to suffer dilution of their stock and public resistance to the purchase of the stock of a company, no matter how low the price, places a limit on the number of shares of stock that a corporation may sell. If such a limit exists, then the past sale

of stock at reduced prices would reduce the amount of capital a company can raise in the future by sale of stock.

Plaintiff has not offered any substantial convincing evidence on the extent to which plaintiff's future ability to obtain financing has been impaired. In the majority of cases, because the ability of a corporation to sell stock depends on a variety of varying, intangible, unmeasurable, and highly speculative factors, the assessment of the amount of damage by reason of the impairment would be exceedingly difficult, particularly since all of the factors affecting a corporation's ability to sell shares of stock are subject to change, and the damage to the corporation as a result of its inability to obtain financing may not occur until some date far in the future. The effect of defendants' illegal acts is only one of many factors affecting plaintiff's ability to sell its stock. We do not suggest that those injured by violation of the antitrust laws can never recover for the impairment of their ability to sell stock, but in this case we think the measure of those damages is too remote and hypothetical to permit recovery absent more convincing evidence. We are not unmindful of the rule that defendant must accept the burden of the uncertainty of the damages resulting from its unlawful conduct, *Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, supra,* but in the present case plaintiff has failed to prove that any damages other than speculative damages exist beyond those compensated for by our award for lost profits.

Attorneys' Fees

Title 15 U. S. C. § 15 provides that a successful plaintiff is entitled to "the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorneys fee." Plaintiff has submitted affidavits asserting that a reasonable attorney's fee in this action would be $845,530.75, doubled because of the risk factor involved.

That figure, before doubling, is arrived at on the basis of the following time records and rates:

Trial Attorneys and Senior Partners

R. W. Giauque	1356 hrs. at $75.00	$101,700.00
C. Keith Rooker	2685.75 hrs. at $75.00	201,431.25
C. L. Ashton	84 hrs. at $75.00	6,300.00
W. D. Hall	2112 hrs. at $75.00	158,400.00
Elliott Pollock	199.5 hrs. at $75.00	14,962.50

Experienced Attorneys and General Partners

George VandeSande	1051.75 hrs. at $60.00	$ 63,105.00
K. L. King	2620.45 hrs. at $60.00	157,227.00
Dale A. Kimball	940 hrs. at $60.00	56,400.00
Other Van Cott Attorneys	123 hrs. at $60	7,380.00
James Tassin	72 hrs. at $60.00	4,320.00
Rex E. Lee	82 hrs. at $60.00	4,920.00

Associates

R. N. Weatherbee	243 hrs. at $40.00	$ 9,720.00

Law Clerks

	91 hrs. at $25.00	$ 2,275.00

Paralegal Work

	1516 hrs. at $15.00	$ 22,740.00
	Total	$810,880.75

Estimated time to take discovery on the issue of attorneys' fees, write reply brief and attend final argument:

450 hrs. at $75.00	$ 33,750.00
150 hrs. at $60.00	9,000.00
Total fees	$845,530.75

Both parties are in agreement as to the factors to be considered by the Court in its determination of reasonable attorneys' fees. They include:

1. The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal services properly.

2. The likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of a particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer.

3. The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services.

4. The amounts involved and the results obtained.

5. The time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances.

6. The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client.

7. The experience, reputation and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services.

8. Whether the fee is fixed or contingent.

Farmington Dowel Products v. Forster Mfg. Co. [1969 TRADE CASES ¶ 72,738], 297 F. Supp. 924 (D. Me. 1969), reversed [1970 TRADE CASES ¶ 73,075], 421 F. 2d 61 (1 Cir. 1970), and cases cited therein; *TransWorld Airlines v. Hughes* [1970 TRADE CASES ¶ 73,142], 312 F. Supp. 478 (S. D. N. Y. 1970), aff'd as to attorneys' fees [1971 TRADE CASES ¶ 73,690], 449 F. 2d 51 (2 Cir. 1971).

Though perhaps included in the fourth and seventh factors, the skill with which counsel represents his client is a factor that should be emphasized over the experience, reputation and ability of counsel, the performance being more important than the reputation for performance.

Defendants object to the amount requested by plaintiffs on two grounds. First, defendants assert that a considerable portion of the time spent by plaintiff's counsel is not compensable because excessive or because expended on noncompensable claims or theories. Secondly, defendants state that the fees requested, if awarded, would be in violation of the Canons of Ethics as excessive and that this Court has the inherent power to reduce such an excessive award.

[*Time Spent on Other Claims*]

Under the first argument, defendants suggest that plaintiff should not recover for time spent on plaintiff's unsuccessful claims

under the Utah Unfair Practices Act, the defense of counterclaims raised by defendants, or the time spent on plaintiff's theory of recovery for the lessened value of stock sold by plaintiff.

The counterclaims in this case were so closely interwoven with plaintiff's claim that the allowance of attorneys' fees should properly be considered for the time spent on the counterclaims, *Trans-World Airlines v. Hughes, supra, Cackling Acres, Inc. v. Olson Farms, Inc.* (D. Utah, August 20, 1974, Case No. D-29627). In regard, however, to the Utah Unfair Practices Act, we think no award can be made. It is difficult for us to perceive how plaintiff can recover, under a federal statute providing for attorneys' fees for successful claims under the federal antitrust statutes, attorneys' fees for an unsuccessful claim under a state antitrust law. It is, of course, difficult to segregate that portion of the attorneys' fees attributable solely to the claim under the state law since the bases for the federal and state claims largely overlap.

[*Stock Damage Claims*]

Though unsuccessful, plaintiff is entitled to attorneys' fees for the time spent on the stock damage theory. Though novel, the claim is not spurious, and to disallow the time spent because this damage theory was not accepted by the Court would logically require us to disallow the time spent by plaintiff in attempting to prove all of the theories and facts that would have led to a higher award than that which we have made.

Defendants also suggest that plaintiff should not recover for the time spent on the claims for injunctive relief. Since the basis for these claims was the same as for the claims for damages, the amount of time spent on these claims is minimal, but will be excluded, *TransWorld Airlines, Inc. v. Hughes, supra.*

In addition, a minimal amount of time was spent by counsel on an unfair trade count, which was essentially abandoned early in the proceedings. This time will also be excluded.

[*Paralegals*]

Defendants also argue that recovery should not be allowed for work done by paralegals and law clerks. The decisions are split on this point. Compare, *TransWorld Airlines, Inc. v. Hughes, supra, Cackling Acres Farms, Inc. v. Olson Farms, Inc., supra,* with *Pacific Coast Agricultural Export Assoc. v. Sunkist Growers,* 1973-1 TRADE CASES (CCH) [¶ 74,523] at p. 94,345 (N.D. Cal. 1973). The policy arguments on both sides of this question are meritorious. It would promote inefficiency in the providing of legal services to refuse compensation for legal work that could be effectively done by a non-attorney and thereby encourage the inefficient use of skilled attorneys. On the other hand, to compensate a "paralegal" for the time spent on the case would invite the compensation of secretaries, accountants, clerks and others who may provide services to the attorney.

We are, however, construing statutory language and the statutory language in this case is quite clear. It refers to "the costs of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee." The "costs of the suit" has been uniformly interpreted to mean the costs that may be awarded under Rule 54 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. *Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Goldwyn* [1964 TRADE CASES ¶ 71,010], 328 F. 2d 190 (9 Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U. S. 880. Paralegal fees would not be one of these costs. Nor can paralegal fees or law clerks' fees be considered "attorneys' fees."

[*Overhead*]

Such a result is not as harsh as it may seem since paralegal fees may be considered a part of the overhead of the attorney and thus a factor in his hourly rate just as his secretary's salary is an element in the hourly rate.

Defendants also submit that the time spent on certain aspects of this case was excessive. We cannot agree with the proposition

that the case has been either overprepared or overtried. The case has been both complex and difficult and plaintiff's counsel—in part through the preparation of various summaries of evidence—has contributed to the Court's comprehension of the case. Though certainly some of the testimony and evidence produced was superfluous, any complex case will have evidence and testimony that the Court will regard as repetitive and superabundant, and the superfluous evidence and testimony in this case was neither excessive in quantity nor obviously irrelevant.

The efforts of Washington counsel in this case have largely been hidden from the Court. Though the arrangement between plaintiff's two firms specifies that Mr. Hall of Moore and Hall would be chief counsel in the case, he has not apparently exercised that leadership in the courtroom or conferences in which the Court has participated, though he may well have exercised it outside of the Court's view. Without expressing any opinion as to the contribution of each attorney, we think that there must necessarily be one lead counsel in a case who would be entitled to a higher hourly rate than other counsel. Though counsel may divide that leadership as they see fit, it would be unreasonable to pay three attorneys the premium that should attach to one.

Moreover, we are troubled by the inclusion in certain of the time records of most or all the time spent on Pacific Engineering Company's account, when it appears probable that at least some of that time was devoted to matters other than this suit.

Considering all of these factors, and the testimony of Mr. Billings and Mr. Berman as to rates in the Salt Lake City area,[12]

---

12. In arriving at an hourly rate figure, we have made allowance for the fact that this litigation has spanned several years and the rates would presumably have been lower at the inception of the case than they are presently.

we think the following provides the proper basis for the reasonable award of attorneys' fees:

Lead counsel	
2,500 hrs. at $75.00	$187,500.00
Trial attorneys and senior partners	
3,500 hrs. at $50.00	175,000.00
Experienced attorneys and general partners	
4,000 hrs. at $40.00	160,000.00
Associates	
200 hrs. at $30.00	6,000.00
Total	$528,500.00

The remaining question is whether or not it is appropriate to include a "risk" factor which would increase this award. Though it is clear that a risk factor is appropriate in class action cases, plaintiffs have cited no nonclass action case where a risk factor has been used, nor has it generally been listed as a factor to be considered. It would not be proper to extend a statute awarding attorneys' fees to the successful litigant so as to compensate the litigant for the possibility of failure as well as the reality of success.

We think the award to plaintiff's counsel of fees in the neighborhood of one-third of the single damage award is neither excessive nor unreasonable. We do not have before us the consideration of plaintiff's private 40% contingent fee arrangement with counsel.

Costs

Counsel have requested a determination of costs prior to entry of final judgment. The plaintiff has substantially prevailed but a few items require comment.

In general, 28 U.S.C. § 1920 is the controlling statute, coupled with the exercise of sound discretion on the part of the Court. *Utah v. United States,* 304 F. 2d 23, 27 (10 Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 826 (1962). The discretion should be sparingly exercised in the absence of statute. *Farmer v. Arabian American Oil Co.,* 379 U.S. 227, 235 (1964).

Plaintiff submitted a Bill of Costs aggregating $13,017.38, which did not include the reporter's cost of transcribing the brief testimony on attorneys' fees and the final argument on June 16, 1975. Plaintiff's cost expended for the transcribing of the original and one copy of the hearing on June 16, 1975, should be added to the determination by the Court.

Items such as fees of the clerk ($15.00), fees of the marshal ($13.00), and docket fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1923 are not in dispute. Presumably they have been correctly computed.

(a) *Fees of Court Reporters*

No *extra* copy of the various transcripts was supplied for the use of the Court. The reporter provided and charged the original for court use; the so-called *extra* copy was the statutory "free" copy required under 28 U. S. C. § 753(f) for which no charge was made. It was not appropriate for the Court to use the statutory "free" copy as the judge-designate was from a distant area and the potential loss of the original by mail was distinct.

Plaintiff is, therefore, entitled to the amounts expended for the costs of the original transcripts provided. Daily transcripts were provided for the liability and damage trials.

Plaintiff's cost for one copy of the liability and damages transcripts should also be allowed, *assuming that the cost of only one copy was included.* There would be little or no need for a daily transcript if counsel and the Court did not each have a copy available during the course of the continued hearings. Such transcripts were "necessarily obtained for use in the case." 28 U. S. C. § 1920.

With one exception the Court is not convinced that counsel's copy of the various pre-trial proceedings should be taxed as a part of the costs. That exception is the hearing on May 4, 1973, where exhibits were introduced and defendant moved to amend its previously asserted position on the relevant market; all of which was

essentially a part of the trial which actually commenced on the following Monday. The cost of the originals for the use of the Court is allowed. While the copy for counsel is a distinct convenience, it is not necessarily obtained for use in the case. The statutory free copy was always available in the office of the clerk.

(b) *Deposition Cost*

Approximately 31 depositions were taken at the instance of the parties. There is no available breakdown of the cost of the original versus the cost of the copy. Plaintiff claims a total expenditure of $3795.60, including one post-liability trial deposition taken by leave of Court. Many of the depositions were summarized at the direction of the Court. The cost of the original and one copy of the post-trial deposition of Fred D. Gibson, Jr. is allowed. As to the witnesses who appeared and testified at the trial, no allowance will be made for the origial or copy of their depositions. While it is true that occasional reference was made to pretrial deposition testimony, the essential or kindred purpose was for thorough preparation by way of discovery. 6 *Moore's Federal Practice*, ¶ 54.77(4), p. 1723.

As to depositions which were introduced into evidence involving witnesses who did not testify at the actual trials, the Court will allow the taxation of the cost of the original and one copy. *Sperry Rand Corp. v. A-T-O, Inc.*, 58 F. R. D. 132 E. D. Va. 1973). These depositions were introduced without objection.

Counsel will review the depositions taken and advise the clerk as to the category into which each deposition falls, together with the amount if allowed under the above ruling.

(c) *Witnesses' Mileage and Attendance Fees*

As to the attendance fees and mileage for Fred D. Gibson, Jr., it is the view of the Court that this should not be allowed. He is the principal officer of the plaintiff corporation but is not a party to the action. His presence during all stages of the trial was more

than a natural concern of a corporate officer. As a founder and substantial stockholder he has devoted the greater portion of his life to the plaintiff corporation. While there is authority to the contrary, the rule as applied to Gibson should treat him to the same degree as though he were the plaintiff. 57 A. L. R. 2d 1243, 1245. A party generally may not recover costs for travel in connection with his own appearance as a witness, *Katz v. Cie Generale Transatlantique,* 190 F. Supp. 435 (E. D. Va. 1960).

Local Rule 16(e), as adopted by Judge Christensen to whom this case was originally assigned, provides for the taxation of costs only to the extent of 100 miles for witnesses traveling in excess thereof to testify at the trial. While *Farmer v. Arabian American Co., supra,* does vest discretion in the district court to allow excess mileage, the Court would prefer following the local rule in the absence of a compelling showing as to the necessity for actual appearance at the trial as contrasted with the taking of a deposition. True, several of the witnesses for whom the excess is claimed were experts but this fact, standing alone, does not mandate a departure from the local rule. Defendants take no exception in its brief to the claimed attendance fees for witnesses other than Gibson, and these items will be allowed.

(d) *Fees for Copying*

The final item is a requested allowance of ten cents per sheet for 10,600 pages of documents. This is broken down as follows:

3800—Plaintiff's trial exhibits (Court's copy)
3800—Defendants' copy of plaintiff's trial exhibits
1500—Evidence books (Court's copy)
1500—Evidence books (defendants' copy)

The statute, 28 U. S. C. § 1920, does provide for taxation of "fees for exemplification and copies of papers necessarily obtained for use in the case." Again, as to the necessity for providing the

Court with copies of these exhibits, it is proper to make this allowance by reason of the possible loss in the mail, the designated judge not maintaining his quarters in proximity to the courthouse where the original exhibits were stored. It follows without argument that plaintiff was required to supply defendants' counsel with copies of these exhibits.

Plaintiff also claims reimbursement at the rate of ten cents per sheet for "Evidence Books" especially prepared for final argument. While this may have been of convenience to the Court and counsel by reason of the vast number of exhibits, it was, in the opinion of the Court, a luxury item which should not be allowed.

Defendants' brief states that the parties had agreed to exchange trial documents "without expense." If this is the true agreement, and it was clearly stated that no taxable costs would be claimed for defendants' copies, it would fall outside of the statute and could not be claimed as to the 3800 sheets provided the defendants.

Conclusion

Counsel for plaintiff will prepare for entry a final judgment in accordance with the rulings made herein. An opportunity for inspection and discussion on the part of defendants' counsel shall be afforded prior to presentation to the Court. If there is agreement on the wording of the judgment order, local counsel shall endorse the order as "Seen" which will indicate that no further hearing is required. The endorsement by local counsel for any of the parties will not reflect any agreement with the Court's rulings.

[¶ 60,737] Pacific Engineering & Production Co. of Nevada v. Kerr-McGee Corp. and Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp.

U.S. District Court, District of Utah, Central Division. Civil action No. C-40-70. Dated February 17, 1976.

Private Enforcement and Procedure—Proving Damages—Corrected Damage Figures—Monopoly Victim's Costs—Prices of Product.—Correction of errors in damage figures resulted in a $462,975 reduction in treble damages recoverable by a monopoly victim in the ammonium perchlorate industry. Additionally, an increase in the calculation of the victim's costs, after an adjustment based upon direct variable costs, was denied, and an increase in the calculation for prices of the product, in view of the monopolizer's forward pricing and a university research study, also was denied. See ¶ 9302.

Correcting and supplementing 1976-1 Trade Cases ¶ 60,724.

For plaintiff: C. Keith Rooker (Martineau and Maak, on briefs), Salt Lake City, Utah, Richard W. Giauque (Berman & Giauque, on briefs), Salt Lake City, Utah, Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy, Salt Lake City, Utah, William D. Hall and George VandeSande, Washington, D.C. For defendants: Peter W. Billings, Albert J. Colton and Stanford B. Owen (Fabian & Clendenin, on briefs), Salt Lake City, Utah, Covington & Burling, Washington, D.C., and Willard P. Scott and Thomas R. Cochran (of counsel), Oklahoma City, Okla.

Supplemental Memorandum and Order

HOFFMAN, D. J.: Prior to the entry of a final judgment order presented in accordance with the Court's Memorandum Opinion Dated January 29, 1976, defendants, quite properly, called to the attention of the Court and opposing counsel certain obvious errors appearing on pages 21 and 21-a of the Memorandum Opinion. These obvious errors were occasioned by transposing certain figures from Plaintiff's Exhibit 1207, errors with respect to years involved and actual losses being confused with the total damage claim of plaintiff. These errors may be more appropriately corrected by substituting new pages 21 and 21-a.

It is therefore Ordered that the Clerk substitute the attached new pages 21 and 21-a in the Memorandum Opinion dated January 29, 1976, and the Clerk will thereupon attach the pages so substituted to this Supplemental Memorandum and Order, all of which will be done by the Clerk prior to the docketing of the final judgment herein [corrected figures incorporated in memorandum opinion, 1976-1 TRADE CASES ¶ 60,724.—CCH].

The Court apologizes to counsel for these errors and regrets the inconvenience occasioned thereby. At the hearing on February 10, 1976, the reason for the errors was explained to counsel but the Court must accept the full responsibility.

I

The admitted errors have been corrected and no further reference to same will be made. The reduction in total damages before trebling is $154,325.00 and, after trebling, is $462,975.00.

II

[*Cost Per Pound*]

Defendants also take exception to the Court's determination of the cost per pound for 1967, 1968, 1969, and 1970. It will be noted that the Court, in fixing the plaintiff's cost per pound, generally rounded off the figures appearing in Plaintiff's Exhibit 1207 as follows:

	As per exhibit	Court finding
1967	.2367	.24
1968	.2584	.26
1969	.2502	.25
1970	.2281	.23

The "rounding off" process resulted in a benefit to defendants for 1967, 1968, and 1970, but operated to defendants' detriment for 1969.

On page 19 of the Memorandum Opinion the Court pointed out that plaintiff's expert had assumed certain cost items would remain constant even if the volume increased substantially. The cost items specifically mentioned on Plaintiff's Exhibit 1206 were maintenance materials, truck and auto rental, professional services, travel and telephone and telegraph expense. These items are not in the true sense directly variable; nor may they be characterized as fixed. In oral argument on February 10, 1974, the Court described them as "semi-fixed" and "semi-variable."

Available to the Court were the fixed costs determined by plaintiff's expert, Caldwell, and the variable costs computed by defendants' expert, Campbell. There was no "in-between" evidence upon which the Court could make a finding.

[*Direct Variable Costs*]

Defendants now compute plaintiff's costs per pound, after adjustment based upon direct variable costs, as follows:

	Adjusted cost	Court finding
1967	.2530	.24
1968	.2781	.26
1969	.2524	.25
1970	.2437	.23

It is, of course, axiomatic from the formula adopted by the Court that the greater plaintiff's cost will result in a reduction the total damage. During the year 1969, the principal focus of defendants' attack on plaintiff's cost as determined by the Court, the differential is only .0024 computed on direct variable cost method. The adjustment for that year would be minimal due largely to the fact that the Court increased plaintiff's potential sales by only approximately 600,000 pounds of A/P.

The fallacy in using the direct variable method is demonstrated by a comparison of the item of "professional services." In 1969

plaintiff expended $6016.00. In 1970 this item was increased to $48,034.00 due principally to the registered public stock offering in that particular year. It follows that the direct variable cost as reflected by that particular item is not in line with the normal or customary cost for "professional services" as evidenced by other years; 1967—$33,766.00 and 1968—$4,538.00. Other items among the five involved likewise to a degree variable, although it stands to reason that a large proportion of the cost remained fixed.

On page 2 of the Memorandum Opinion we called attention to the leading case of *Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures* [1946-1947 TRADE CASES ¶ 57,445], 327 U. S. 251, 265 (1946), where the Supreme Court said that the "most elementary conceptions of justice and public policy require that the wrongdoer shall bear the risk of the uncertainty which his own wrong has created" and "the wrongdoer may not object to the plaintiff's reasonable estimate of the cause of injury and of its amount, supported by the evidence, because not based on more accurate data which the wrongdoer's misconduct has rendered unavailable." Cited with approval in *Bigelow* is *Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Corp.*, 309 U. S. 390, 406 (1940), a copyright infringement case, which states, "Where there is a commingling of gains, he [the wrongdoer] must abide the consequences unless he can make a separation of the profits so as to assure to the injured party all that justly belongs to him." In *Sheldon* the lower court did not accept the experts' testimony "at its face value" and the Supreme Court held that the wrongdoers were "not in a position to complain that the amount thus allowed by the court was greater than the expert evidence warranted," and further pointed out "that what is required is not mathematical exactness but only a reasonable approximation."

We feel that the evidence, taken as a whole, reasonably justifies the findings of cost per pound for the product and the defendants' post opinion motion to alter the findings is *overruled.*

III

[*Prices*]

Plaintiff complains as to the prices found by the Court as follows:

1967	.23
1968	.23
1969	.24
1970	.25

It is fundamental that the higher the price found, the greater plaintiff's damages will be.

Plaintiff points to the price found for 1968 and urges that defendants' forward pricing and the Stanford Research study demonstrated a price in the .25 range for 1968. In short, plaintiff contends that defendants have not met the burden imposed upon them by *Bigelow*.

These factors were not overlooked but again we point to *Sheldon* which suggests that mathematical exactness is not required and only a reasonable approximation is expected. The price, as defendants argue, was determined primarily by defendants' costs, the Government defense policy and excess capacity. In fact, defendants contend that the prices determined by the Court should have been even lower.

We find no merit to plaintiff's position here asserted and its post opinion motion to alter the findings is overruled.

It is so Ordered.

Supreme Court, U. S.
FILED
AUG 22 1977
MICHAEL RODAK, JR., CLERK

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1977

No. 77-118

PACIFIC ENGINEERING & PRODUCTION CO. OF NEVADA,
Petitioner,

v.

KERR-McGEE CORPORATION AND KERR-McGEE CHEMICAL CORPORATION, *Respondents.*

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENTS IN OPPOSITION

Of Counsel:

WILLARD P. SCOTT
THOMAS R. COCHRAN
WILLIAM HEIMANN

Kerr-McGee
Corporation
P.O. Box 25861
Oklahoma City
Oklahoma 73125

PETER J. NICKLES
EUGENE D. GULLAND

COVINGTON & BURLING
888 Sixteenth Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006

PETER W. BILLINGS
ALBERT J. COLTON
STANFORD B. OWEN
PETER W. BILLINGS, JR.

FABIAN & CLENDENIN
800 Continental Bank Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

Attorneys for Respondents

August 1977

conclusion during a fourth year. (App. 63-64.) The district court also found that respondent had the power to control the price for A/P; it observed that respondent had already demonstrated power to *lower* prices by the predatory pricing on which it was held to have attempted to secure a monopoly; the court also concluded that respondent possessed power to *raise* prices for A/P solely on the strength of the testimony of petitioner's chief executive officer that, "if [respondent] had published a price for A/P, [petitioner] would have followed that price as long as it would have allowed his company a profit." (App. 64.)

2. Award of Damages

The district court computed petitioner's damages on the premise that any and all injury which petitioner had sustained derived from what it supposed to be respondent's unlawfully low, "predatory," bids.[n] The Court hypothesized an industry structure of "price leadership oligopoly" or "duopoly" (App. 98) under which petitioner would "follow" respondent's price.

[n] Petitioner offered no separate proof of injury or damages sustained in consequence of respondent's alleged attempt to monopolize, successful monopolization and price discrimination under the Robinson-Patman Act. All of petitioner's damages proof was directed to the hypothesis that petitioner would have followed respondent's unlawfully low bids and that petitioner's revenues would have been higher, and it would have won more bids, had it been able to follow respondent's bid prices at a higher level. Thus, petitioner wrote in its brief to the court of appeals,

> "All three violations related to the obtaining or retaining of the monopoly, and to the unreasonably low price and volume of sales [petitioner] received. To measure the damages, the [district court] simply compared that low price and low volume with what they would have been in a market untainted by [respondent's] unlawful conduct." (Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee, p. 84.)

increased its 1971 market share to 56 percent from its 1970 share of 22 percent. (*See* p. 6, n.6, *supra*.) Had petitioner won another major bid in 1971, it would have possessed a market share that, in respondent's hands, the district court regarded as monopolistic.

Third, the evidence establishes that entry into the A/P industry is quite a simple and relatively inexpensive proposition for any chemical company and that after it ceased A/P production, Hooker "mothballed" its plant and remained ready to reenter if circumstances warranted. (App. 28.) Nor are there other barriers to entry such as restricted access to raw materials, restraints arising from leases or other agreements, or need to insure against patent infringing. Barriers of those sorts almost always accompany genuine monopoly. *See, e.g., American Tobacco Co.* v. *United States, supra; United States* v. *Aluminum Company of America, supra; United States* v. *Grinnell Corp., supra; United States* v. *United Shoe Machinery Corp.*, 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), *aff'd per curiam*, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).

Fourth, petitioner would have to explain how respondent could wield "monopoly power" in a market that the district court itself termed a "buyer's market" (App. 107), in which the major purchasers of A/P possessed and constantly exerted power to depress the price of A/P. Finally, assuming that it prevailed on each of the foregoing points, petitioner would have to demonstrate that the principles enunciated in cases such as *Union Leader Corp.* v. *Newspapers of New England, Inc., supra*, are either inapplicable or erroneous.

There is an additional reason why rejection of petitioner's attempt to monopolize allegations disposed

to destroy competition or create a monopoly." (App. B 59.[1]) Finally, the Court of Appeals erroneously adopted as the standard for predatory pricing in a Section 2 Sherman Act attempted monopoly case (and because of its first error, in a monopolization case) the fiction of marginal cost pricing.

In its brief in opposition, Respondent does not engage these issues. Rather, Respondent rests its entire case on the assertion that the judgment of the trial court in its totality is based on the premise that Respondent was obligated to engage in price leadership to avoid liability under the antitrust laws.[2]

This assertion, which underlies Respondent's entire brief, is false.

By failing to engage the issues that were presented by the trial court's exhaustive findings, and that are therefore presented by the ruling of the Court of Appeals reversing the trial court judgment, Respondent, like the Court of Appeals, has conceded those findings and left them intact. By placing the case in such a posture, Respondent has made clear that it is the opinions of the trial court, rather than the opinion of the Court of Appeals, that is at issue on this Petition for Certiorari.

It is important to an understanding of Respondent's error that Judge Hoffman wrote *two separate opinions*. The first, filed March 4, 1974, found that Respondent violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act by monopolizing and attempting to monopolize the ammonium perchlorate (A/P) market, and the Robinson-Patman Act by discriminating in price in sales of A/P. The second opinion, rendered almost two years later after a separate damage trial, and after denial of an interlocutory appeal by the Court of Ap-

---

1. "App. B" refers to the liability opinion of the district court, Appendix B to the Petition.

2. Respondent's Brief also notes that the order of the Court of Appeals denying Petitioner's timely Petition for Rehearing is not included in the Appendix. That order was filed with the Court.

These "other activities" are summarized in Point I at page 5, infra.

The Court of Appeals dealt with this simple and straight-forward finding of the trial court by grossly mis-stating it, and then apparently overturning it without reference to the "clearly erroneous" standard of review imposed by Rule 52(a), Fed.R.Civ. Pro.[3]

> In the circumstances of the industry, the trial court found AMPOT's prices alone were not a sufficient basis for an inference of predatory intent.[4]
>
> * * *
>
> The court's holding that AMPOT's conduct was predatory is based on its effect as a competitor rather than its effect on competition. . . .
>
> Predatory pricing is the essential unfair means alleged in this case. The other practices employed by AMPOT inflicted no independent harm. They were merely auxiliaries to its general pricing policy and indicate nothing more than an intent that its pricing succeed in excluding PE from the market. . . .
>
> If the trial court correctly found AMPOT's pricing was not predatory in itself, we do not believe AMPOT can be found guilty of violating the Sherman Act.
>
> * * *
>
> The evidence shows this is not a case of short-run price cutting designed to secure monopoly profits in the long run. . . . There is nothing in the record to warrant a finding that AMPOT engaged in predatory pricing. (App. A, pp. 6, 10-11, 14.)

---

3. In the Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Petitioner adverted to the violation of Rule 52(a) by the Court of Appeals, but did not make an issue of it. (Petition, pp. 5, 13, 23, 25, 29.) Thus, the Court of Appeals' violation of Rule 52(a) is a substantial ground of error available to Petitioner although not previously presented.

4. This statement is obviously wrong, as the above-quoted language of the trial court amply demonstrates.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
Opinions Below	1
Question Presented	2
Statement	3
A. Factual Background	3
B. The District Court's Opinions	6
1. Attempt to Monopolize	7
2. Monopolization	9
3. Award of Damages	10
C. The Opinion of the Court of Appeals	11
Reasons for Denying the Writ	13
I. The Court of Appeals Did Not Require that Plaintiff Prove Predatory Conduct in Order to Establish a Specific Intent to Monopolize	15
A. The Court of Appeals Properly Rejected the District Court's Erroneous View of Section 2 of the Sherman Act	15
B. The Court of Appeals' Decision Does Not Conflict With Decisions of This Court or Other Courts of Appeal	18
II. The Court of Appeals Did Not "Implicitly Approve" the District Court's Conclusion that Respondent Monopolized A/P Production	21
III. The Court of Appeals Adopted No "Conclusive Presumption" Governing the Lawfulness of Pricing Practices	25
Conclusion	29

11

This market structure, the court explained, would "make prices higher after both firms realized their mutuality of interest and perceived the pricing and market share division expectations of each other." (App. 106.) The court concluded that "price leadership" could not have taken hold until 1967 (App. 108-09) and awarded damages for the period 1967-70 on the assumption that prices would have equalled respondent's fully allocated cost plus a small profit margin at a production level under which respondent would have enjoyed 65 percent of the market and petitioner the remaining 35 percent. (App. 112-14.)

C. The Opinion of the Court of Appeals

Finding "fundamental flaws in the trial court's application of the Sherman Act" (App. 10), the court of appeals reversed. Construing the unique circumstances accounting for the plight of producers in the A/P industry, the court criticized the "excessive concern with preventing the appearance of monopoly" and the "obeisance of the realities of the market situation" (App. 10, n. 6) inherent in the district court's holding that "the only way [respondent] could have avoided violating the antitrust laws was to raise prices to a noncompetitive level in order to save its smaller, undercapitalized rival." (App. 10.)[*]

[*] The court observed that the market behavior dictated by the district court's failure to accord due weight to the unique circumstances of the A/P industry—its requirement that respondent attempt to institute a "price leadership oligopoly" market structure —also offends the policies of the antitrust laws. Thus, it noted that "artificial pricing" is often evidence of illegal price fixing and that, in this case, "price leadership" would be a euphemism for shared monopoly under which each firm would restrict its output in order to raise prices. (App. 13.)

25

also of its monopolization claims. Petitioner's proof of injury and damages rested entirely on evidence of what its revenues as a "price follower" would have been had respondent not engaged in "below cost" bidding; the court of appeals recognized that respondent's other practices "inflicted no independent harm." (App. 11; *see* p. 10, *supra*.) If respondent's bidding practices were lawful or—as petitioner contends—also offends the policies of the antitrust laws. Thus, it noted that "artificial pricing" is often evidence of illegal price fixing and that, in this case, "price leadership" would be a euphemism for shared monopoly under which each firm would restrict its output in order to raise prices. (App. 13.)

III.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ADOPTED NO "CONCLUSIVE PRESUMPTION" GOVERNING THE LAWFULNESS OF PRICING PRACTICES.

On the sheer fiction that the court of appeals embraced a rule that prices above marginal or variable cost should be "conclusively presumed lawful," petitioner constructs its argument that the court of appeals erred in faulting the district court's holding that pricing below "fully allocated" cost is itself "convincing evidence" of monopolistic intent.[*] Petitioner contends

[*] Petitioner refers to "the Court of Appeals' flat adoption of *conclusively* legal marginal cost pricing in this case" (Pet., p. 34); to the "Court of Appeals' adoption of the conclusive legality of marginal cost pricing" (*id.*, p. 38), and to the court's "holding" that "such pricing practices [are] conclusively lawful." (*Id.*)

3

peals, was filed on February 2, 1976, and dealt *exclusively* with the damage issues.

In its brief in opposition, Respondent quotes interchangeably and out of context from these two separate opinions, as if they dealt with the same issues—as if both dealt with the issues of liability presented by the Petition. Such treatment of the trial court opinions is unfair to Judge Hoffman and potentially misleading to this Court. It is only the first of the district court's opinions, that dealing with the liability issues, that is relevant to the issues presented in the Petition.

Respondent's Brief in Opposition is premised from the beginning and throughout on a flat misstatement of what Judge Hoffman did in deciding this case. Respondent falsely claims that Judge Hoffman held that Respondent specifically intended to monopolize the A/P market *because* it failed "to attempt the creation of a 'price leadership oligopoly' under which each producer would enjoy 'a relatively stable price and a division of the market.'" (Res. Br. 9.) Respondent falsely claims that Judge Hoffman held that Respondent willfully acquired and maintained monopoly power in the A/P market on the same basis.

Judge Hoffman's two separate opinions are separately attached to the Petition as Appendices B and C. In the liability opinion, Appendix B, the district judge held:

> In order to establish such an attempt [to monopolize], the [Petitioner] must prove that the [Respondent] had the specific intent to destroy competition or create a monopoly, that the [Respondent] took overt acts pursuant to this intent, and that a dangerous probability of monopoly existed. . . .
>
> In the case at bar, the primary question is whether [Respondent] possessed the requisite specific intent. . . . We have carefully weighed the evidence and have concluded that such conduct [from which the wrongful intent can be inferred] is present.
>
> As is claimed by [Petitioner] there is ample evidence of predatory intent." (App. B 59-60.)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
Table of Authorities	ii
Argument	
I. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in This Case Evidences a Growing Hostility Toward Private Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws—A Trend That Must Be Reviewed and Reversed	2
II. The Court of Appeals' Adoption of Conclusively Legal Marginal Cost Pricing Conflicts with Congressional Declaration of Fair Pricing	7
III. The Court of Appeals Flagrantly Violated the "Clearly Erroneous" Standard of Rule 52(a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure	9
Conclusion	12
Certificate of Counsel	13
Certificate of Service	14

11

The findings of the trial court are those of one of the most distinguished district judges in the nation. Judge Hoffman was designated by the Chief Justice to try this case. Judge Hoffman studied the case for nearly a full year after the liability trial before rendering his Opinion as to liability. It is outrageous that the Court of Appeals permitted itself to be seduced into a patent misconstruction and reversal of Judge Hoffman's findings of specific intent to monopolize (on the attempted monopoly claim) and willful maintenance of monopoly power (on the monopoly claim).

Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969), involved substantially less abuse of Rule 52(a) by the appellate court. Yet the Court granted certiorari in that case,

> to consider among other things the question whether the Court of Appeals properly discharged its appellate function under Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which specifies that the findings of fact made by a District Judge sitting without a jury are not to be set aside unless "clearly erroneous." (395 U.S. at 108.)

In reviewing the actions of the appellate court in *Hazeltine*, Mr. Justice White, for a virtually unanimous court, held that the strictures of Rule 52(a) had been violated:

> In applying the clearly erroneous standard to the findings of a district court sitting without a jury, appellate courts must constantly have in mind that their function is not to decide factual issues *de novo*. The authority of an appellate court, when reviewing the findings of a judge as well as those of a jury, is circumscribed by the deference it must give to decisions of the trier of the fact, who is usually in a superior position to appraise and weigh the evidence. The question for the appellate court under Rule 52(a) is not whether it would have made the findings the trial court did, but whether "on the entire evidence [it] is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." (395 U.S. at 123.)

INDEX TO CITATIONS

Cases: Page

American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946) 22, 24

Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., ——— U.S. ——, No. 75-904, decided January 25, 1977 .. 25

Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962) 19

E. B. Muller & Co. v. FTC, 142 F.2d 511 (6th Cir. 1944) 27

Forster Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 335 F.2d 47 (1st Cir. 1964), *cert. denied*, 380 U.S. 906 (1965) 26, 27

Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968) 27

Hanson v. Shell Oil Co., 541 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1976), *cert. denied*, ——— U.S. ——, No. 76-756, January 24, 1977 27

Illinois Brick Co. v. State of Illinois, ——— U.S. ——, No. 76-404, decided June 9, 1977 27

International Air Industries, Inc. v. American Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1975), *cert. denied*, 424 U.S. 943 (1976) 27

Maryland Baking Co. v. FTC, 343 F.2d 716 (4th Cir. 1957) 1

Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co., 348 U.S. 115 (1954) .. 26

National Dairy Products Corp. v. United States, 350 F.2d 321 (8th Cir. 1965), *vacated and remanded*, 384 U.S. 883 (1966) 26

Porto Rican American Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 30 F.2d 234 (2d Cir.), *cert. denied*, 279 U.S. 858 (1929) 27

Sanitary Milk Producers v. Bergjans Farm Dairy, Inc., 368 F.2d 679 (8th Cir. 1966) 19

Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949) 23

Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905) 1

Union Leader Corp. v. Newspapers of New England, Inc., 180 F.Supp. 125 (D. Mass.), 284 F.2d 582 (1st Cir. 1960), *cert. denied*, 365 U.S. 833 (1961) .. 12, 17, 24

United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) 19, 24

United States v. Container Corporation of America, 393 U.S. 333 (1969) 18

United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948) 19

Page

United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966) .. 22, 24

United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) 18

United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), *aff'd per curiam*, 347 U.S. 521 (1954) 24

United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 338 U.S. 338 (1949) .. 19

Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967) 20, 26

Statutory Provisions:

Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) ... 6, 10, 20, 26, 27

Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, *et seq.* 18, 19, 20
Section 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 2
Section 2, 15 U.S.C. § 2 ..... 3, 6, 12,13, 14, 15, 23
Section 15, 15 U.S.C. § 15 23

Administrative Regulations:

Armed Services Procurement Regulations (ASPR), 32 C.F.R. §§ 1-100, *et seq.* (1975) 18
32 C.F.R. § 1.111.2(a) (1975) 18

Miscellaneous:

Areeda & Turner, "Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act," 88 Harv.L.Rev. 697 (1975) 26, 27

The court of appeals explained that the trial court erred in equating what it had termed respondent's "below-cost" bids—and respondent's knowledge of the likely impact on petitioner if those bids were successful—with the specific intent to monopolize that might be inferred from similar conduct in a healthy industry containing a number of competitors. (App. 10, n.6.) Thus, it stressed that respondent's bid prices reflected "rational, competitive behavior" in an industry plotted with productive capacity and inhabited by powerful buyers. (App. 15.) And since, in the distressed twofirm industry, competitive bidding practices and related conduct of necessity reflected "an intent that [respondent's] pricing augured in excluding [petitioner] from the market," (App. 11), the court observed that "'intending the natural consequences of acts which are in all respects lawful, does not constitute the 'exclusionary intent' that is a prerequisite for finding a violation of section 2 [of the Sherman Act].'" (*Id.*, *quoting*, *Union Leader Corp. v. Newspapers of New England, Inc.*, 284 F.2d 582, 594 (1st Cir. 1960), *cert. denied*, 365 U.S. 833 (1961).)

Reviewing the other conduct the trial court thought symbolic of "predatory" intent, the court of appeals discerned nothing improper or unusual, nothing that inflicted harm on petitioner (App. 11) and "nothing in the record to warrant a finding that [respondent] engaged in predatory pricing." (App. 15.) Of the district court's surmise that respondent should have known it could have raised its bids, the court of appeals pointed out that the hypothetical "non-predatory" prices on which the district court computed damages "were on the average higher than the forward prices which had provoked strenuous objections from the powerful A/P

buyers." (App. 9-10.) Because the district court—at petitioner's urging—had built its conclusion that respondent monopolized the A/P industry on the identical bidding behavior that it supposed to embody an unlawful attempt to monopolize, the court of appeals regarded its analysis of the pricing issues to be dispositive also of the monopolization issues. It said, "[t]he distinctions between the two offenses are not relevant to our decision because the same conduct was relied upon to establish both the attempt and the willful maintenance of monopoly. The fundamental issue is whether [respondent] engaged in predatory pricecutting." (App. 2-3.)

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT

The issues petitioner tenders for review are not fairly presented by this case. Petitioner builds its questions presented on a palpable misreading of the court of appeals' opinion. It attributes to the court of appeals findings of fact which that court never accepted. It distorts the district court's own fact findings and attempts to endow the distortions with legitimacy by citing controverted evidence concerning which no court has made a finding. Most importantly, it does not so much as acknowledge the single issue of law that *is* squarely presented by this case. That issue is the proposition, which petitioner successfully urged on the district court, that regardless of the circumstances of the A/P industry, Section 2 of the Sherman Act precluded respondent from engaging in any form of competitive conduct inconsistent with the creation of a "price leadership oligopoly" under which both producers would enjoy stable market shares at relatively high prices.

that the court below was impelled into error on this score by an influential recent article, Areeda & Turner, *Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act*, 88 Harv. L.Rev. 697 (1975).

Areeda and Turner, as the court of appeals recognized (App. 14), propose that prices above a firm's marginal, or average variable, costs of production be "conclusively presumed lawful." 88 Harv.L.Rev. at 709, 733. But the court of appeals adopted no such hard-and-fast rule. The court's discussion of the point is clear. It observed, "[w]e believe that evidence of marginal cost or average variable cost is extremely beneficial in establishing a case of monopolization through predatory pricing." (App. 14.) It expressly stated that "we do not intend to adopt a solely cost-based test . . ." (App. 15) and engaged in a careful review of the district court's opinion. And it rejected the district court's belief that respondent's "below cost" pricing, rather than "price leadership" based on fully allocated costs was "convincing evidence" of specific intent to monopolize. (*See*, pp. 13-15, 16-17, *supra*.) Indeed, it is petitioner that contends for a conclusive presumption when it repeats its argument that this Court's opinion in *Utah Pie* commands that, regardless of the circumstances affecting a particular industry, "prolonged sales below full cost constitutes evidence of predatory intent . . ." (Pet., p. 36.)[*]

[*] Petitioner would draw its own "conclusive presumption" that sales below full cost reflect monopolistic intent from several additional Robinson-Patman Act price discrimination cases, Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co., 348 U.S. 115, 118 (1954); National Dairy Products Corp. v. United States, 350 F.2d 321, 327 (8th Cir. 1965), *vacated and remanded*, 384 U.S. 883 (1966); *Forster* Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 335 . 2d 47, 58 (1st Cir. 1964), *cert. denied*, 380 U.S.

Petitioner also notes that two other courts of appeal have recognized the usefulness of the Areeda and Turner analysis—the Fifth Circuit in *International Air Industries, Inc. v. American Excelsior Co.*, 517 F.2d 714 (1975), *cert. denied*, 424 U.S. 943 (1976), and the Ninth Circuit in *Hanson v. Shell Oil Co.*, 541 F.2d 1352 (1976), *cert. denied*, ——— U.S. ——— (No. 76-756, January 24, 1977). Like the court below, neither the Fifth Circuit nor the Ninth Circuit has presumed conclusively that marginal or variable cost pricing is lawful without regard to surrounding circumstances. There is no basis for petitioner's unexplained assertion that this emerging consensus, which recognizes the significance of a firm's production costs in any balanced analysis of all the facts and circumstances surrounding a firm's pricing practices, has "created a serious conflict among the Circuits." (Pet., p. 34.)

---

906 (1965); Maryland Baking Co. v. FTC, 343 F.2d 716, 718 (4th Cir. 1957); E. B. Muller & Co. v. FTC, 142 F.2d 511, 517 (6th Cir. 1944); Porto Rican American Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 30 F.2d 234, 236 (2d Cir.), *cert. denied*, 279 U.S. 858 (1929). (See Pet., p. 34.) None of the cases so much as hints at such a proposition. Each underscores the importance of careful analysis of the surrounding facts and circumstances in determining the lawfulness of pricing practices under the Robinson-Patman Act. So too, this Court's decisions in Illinois Brick Co. v. State of Illinois, No. 76-404 (decided June 9, 1977), and Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968), do not conflict with the decision below. Those decisions, which deal with the "passing on" defense in treble damages litigation, bear no relation to the issues presented by this case. And the general principle that petitioner draws from the cases—that the "economist's hypothetical model" provides no basis for ignoring "real-world facts" (Pet., p. 35)—certainly does not mean that the court of appeals' insistence that all relevant factors be assessed, but petitioner's view that pricing below fully allocated cost is the conclusive measure of monopolistic intent.

Judge Hoffman then reviewed the facts upon which his finding of fact that "there is ample evidence of predatory intent" was based:

> (1) "The most convincing evidence is the fact that all of [Respondent's] sales during and for some years prior to the four year and nine month period here were below cost." (App. B-60.)
>
> (2) "[Respondent's] forward pricing activities are particularly telling since, as [Petitioner] claims, [Respondent's] forward prices were raised when [Petitioner] appeared on the verge of bankruptcy and lowered when it looked as if [Petitioner] would remain a viable competitor." (App. B-61.)
>
> (3) "The extensive surveillance is also indicative of predatory intent although, standing alone, it would not justify our decision." (App. B 61.)
>
> (4) "Additionally, we feel that [Respondent's] extensive interest concerning [Petitioner's] SBA status is symbolic of the company's efforts to drive [Petitioner] from the market." (App. B-61.)
>
> (5) "The alleged 'dumping' incident must also be considered since it involved one of [Respondent's] vice-presidents and the company's product manager." (App. B 62.)
>
> (6) "Finally, [Respondent's] predictions of market sales indicate that their company's goal was to capture the entire A/P market." (App. B-62.)

Pages 59 through 62 of Appendix B, Judge Hoffman's liability opinion, contain his findings of fact on the issue of specific intent. Those pages may be searched in vain for the words "price leadership" or for any other reference suggesting that Judge Hoffman predicated his finding of specific intent in any part on the economic concept of price leadership, as distinguished from Respondent's affirmative misconduct therein detailed. Similarly, one can search Appendix B pages 31 through 50, wherein Respondent's misconduct is treated in greater detail as a discussion of the evidence.

Nowhere is "price leadership" mentioned, or even implied.

Judge Hoffman's findings of Respondent's specific intent to monopolize were properly regarded by him as conclusive on the less strict monopolization issue of willful acquisition and maintenance of monopoly power:

> Since we have previously ruled that there was the specific intent required to establish a monopoly, we feel certain that, if monopoly power did exist, it was willfully acquired and maintained. (App. B 65.)

This finding *is* likewise unrelated in any way to notions of price leadership.

The only reference to price leadership contained in the liability opinion is oblique, and is found at Appendix B pages 64-65. There Judge Hoffman held that Petitioner was obliged by its circumstances to follow a reasonable and Respondent set one, and that Petitioner would have done so. This finding reinforced the district judge's conclusion that Respondent possessed monopoly power over price. The sole relevance of this finding, in context, is to the issue whether Respondent had power over price.

In fact, the first explicit reference to price leadership by the district court is to be found in its *damage opinion*. In introducing that opinion, Judge Hoffman stated:

> In that [liability] opinion this Court concluded that [Respondent] had violated the Sherman and Robinson-Patman Acts. The sole remaining issue is the amount of damages to which [Petitioner] is entitled. (App. C 95.)

After meticulous analysis, Judge Hoffman concluded that absent Respondent's unlawful conduct, a price leadership type of pricing could and would have existed in the ammonium perchlorate industry. (App. C 102.)

It is therefore absolutely clear that Judge Hoffman did not hold that Respondent was obliged to engage in a price leadership

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Statutes Cited Pages

Antidumping Act, 19 U.S.C. §§ 160, *et seq.* 8

Antidumping Act, 19 U.S.C. § 165 8

Rule 52(a), Fed.R.Civ.Pro. 2, 9, 10, 11, 12

Other Authorities Cited

42 Federal Register, 54480, et seq., October 6, 1977 8

The Wall Street Journal, Western Edition, September 20, 1977 p.2 7

The Wall Street Journal, Western Edition, September 29, 1977 p.4 7

The Wall Street Journal, Western Edition, October 7, 1977 p.8 7

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

Chisholm Bros. Farm Equipment Co. v. International Harvester, 498 F.2d 1137 (9th Cir. 1974) 4

Hanson v. Shell Oil Co., 1976-2 Trade Cases Par. 61,052 (9th Cir. 1976) 4

International Air Indus. Inc. v. American Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1975) 4

Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co., 348 U.S. 115 (1954) 3

Morning Pioneer Inc. v. Bismarck Tribune Co., 1974-1 Trade Cases Par. 74,956 (6th Cir. 1974) 4

Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., 1972-2 Trade Cases Par. 61,641 (2nd Cir. September 20, 1977) 4

Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. Int'l Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968) 3

Telex Corp. v. International Business Mach. Corp., 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir. 1975) 4

United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) 4

United States v. General Motors, 384 U.S. 127 (1966) 4

United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948) 3

United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 338 U.S. 338 (1949) 3

Ungar v. Dunkin' Donuts of America Inc., 531 F.2d 1211 (3d Cir. 1976) 4

Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967) 3

Yoder Bros. Inc. v. California-Florida *Plant* Corp., 537 F.2d 1347 (5th Cir. 1976) 4

Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969) 11

In this case the Court of Appeals did not consider, and plainly violated, Rule 52(a). Judge Hoffman's findings of specific intent and willful acquisition and maintenance of monopoly power were not clearly erroneous. They were amply supported by the record.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth herein, as well as for the reasons urged in the Petition for Writ of Certiorari originally filed, review of the incorrect and misplaced decision of the Court of Appeals by this Court is warranted. The decision of the Court of Appeals is so wrong that this Court would be fully justified in granting certiorari and summarily reversing and reinstating the judgment of the trial court.

Dated October 27, 1977.

C. Keith Rooker
1800 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Richard W. Gologer
Suite 500
Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Attorneys for Petitioner

Of Counsel:

Rex E. Lee
2040 Iroquois Drive
Provo, Utah 84601

William D. Hall
P.O. Box 34456
Washington, D.C. 20054

CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL

Pursuant to Rule 33, Subdivision 2, of the Supreme Court Rules, the undersigned, one of counsel for Petitioner, hereby certifies that the within Petition for Rehearing is presented in good faith and not for delay, and that the Petition for Rehearing states grounds which are confined to intervening circumstances of substantial or controlling effect or to other substantial grounds available to Petitioner although not previously presented. As to Point III in the within Petition for Rehearing, this Certificate is subject to the notation in Note 3 at page 10 of the Petition that the standards of Rule 52(a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, were adverted to in the original Petition for Writ of Certiorari.

Dated October 27, 1977.

s/ C. Keith Rooker
C. Keith Rooker

no market other than the Federal Government purchasing directly, or indirectly through its contractors. Prices steadily declined.[3]

A key factor in the decline of bid prices was the practices of the large government contractors that purchased A/P for use in the missiles and rockets they built. The three largest purchasers themselves consumed more than 55 percent of the A/P manufactured during most of the years relevant to this case, and consciously used their "buyers' market" power to exploit the A/P producers' distress. These "Big Three" purchasers in particular succeeded in manipulating the blind competitive bidding procedures governing procurement of A/P:[4] they invited bids covering all their needs for months and even years at a time, so that on a single bid a substantial share of all A/P demand for a year or more could be won or lost; they solicited "rebids" if they were not satisfied with the first round; they would "negotiate" with one or more low bidders, advising the producers to "sharpen their pencils;" and

---

[3] From a price of 32-35 cents per pound in 1961, the price fell beneath 20 cents in 1964, when petitioner bid for a major procurement at 19.25 cents. In 1965, the price declined to 16.40 cents when respondent won a large contract at that bid. Prices dropped to their nadir in early 1966 when petitioner bid 14.92 cents and secured a large procurement. Between 1966 and 1970, the period during which petitioner alleged that respondent unlawfully depressed bid prices, they gradually increased within the range of 15 to 20 cents, with the majority of sales being made at prices at or under 18.25 cents.

[4] Except for Longhorn Army Ammunition Plant, which publicly opened A/P bids, the major buyers of A/P did not disclose the price of the low bid winning each procurement. As to each procurement, therefore, the bidder knew only its own bid and whether it was successful. The A/P purchasers, however, regularly exchanged A/P price information. (*See* J.A. 1809.)

occasionally they even succeeded in persuading the low bidder—who did not know what his competitors had bid—to underbid himself. The district court found these practices to be "unethical if not unlawful." (App. 60.)

During 1965-67, Hooker and Pennwalt, which foresaw no improvement in A/P prices, withdrew from the industry. But demand for A/P remained so slack in the years that followed that petitioner and respondent each possessed enough productive capacity to satisfy substantially all the demand for A/P.[5] Except when specifications or lack of qualification precluded use of one producer's A/P, differences between competing bids of but a fraction of a penny per pound would determine which firm would win a major procurement. And, because the cost of producing A/P is highly volume-responsive and capacity was so underutilized, each producer knew that increased production volume would sharply reduce its unit costs of producing A/P.

Respondent bid with the intention of winning all possible business. Its bids always exceeded its average variable, or out-of-pocket, costs of producing A/P so that it was better off by winning procurements at its bid prices than it would have been either by shutting down its plant or by foregoing the procurements for which it bid. A price of 15 cents per pound—the lowest respondent ever bid—covered all its costs except approximately one half of plant and equipment depreciation. Respondent knew that petitioner's precarious financial structure, which had been built on the expecta-

[5] During 1966-70, the industry operated at less than half its capacity of 50 million pounds per year, of which petitioner's capacity was 20 million and respondent's 30 million pounds.

tion that the A/P industry would expand, probably could not endure if petitioner did not obtain business at prices higher than those prevailing.

During the period 1966-70, respondent accounted for about 70 percent of all A/P produced and sold in the United States, with annual shares ranging between 53.5 and 88 percent.[6] In 1971, respondent notified the Department of Defense of the likelihood that it would cease production of A/P upon the upcoming expiration of the 10-year "National Security Clause" of the contract under which it had purchased A/P manufacturing facilities from the Navy. That clause required respondent to maintain the plant in operational status. Concerned, in the interests of national defense, that there remain two sources of A/P, the Government instituted a procurement allocation program designed to sustain both A/P producers at higher prices.

B. The District Court's Opinions

There were separate trials of the issues of liability and damages. After trial of the liability issues, the district court held that respondent violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2, by attempting to monopolize the manufacture and sale of A/P in the United States, and by actually monopolizing the production and sale of A/P within that market; the court also found that respondent violated the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a), by selling relatively small amounts of A/P in accordance with a schedule of prices

---

[6] In late 1970, petitioner's 15-cent bid won a "winner-take-all" procurement consisting of the entire requirements of one major manufacturer; accordingly, petitioner held 56 percent of A/P sales in the United States during 1971 and respondent's share fell to 44 percent. (J.A. 4265-78, 4753-54.)

that exceeded the prices at which respondent bid for large procurements. (App. 19-92.) After trial on the issues of damages, the district court issued an opinion explaining the basis of its award to petitioner of $4,590,594 in treble damages and attorneys' fees of $528,500. (App. 93-132.)

1. Attempt to Monopolize

The district court concluded that respondent attempted to monopolize the A/P industry by inferring specific intent to monopolize from respondent's submission of bids at prices insufficient to cover the fully-allocated costs[7] of manufacturing A/P, accompanied by (1) knowledge of petitioner's precarious financial condition and (2) conduct attesting to respondent's intention to win all possible business. The court found that the "most convincing evidence" of respondent's unlawful intent was its "below cost" sales, by which it meant below fully-allocated costs. It added that "it does not take a great deal of evidence to prove this intent when a company has sold below cost." (App. 60.)

Acknowledging that respondent was not the first firm to bid under 20 cents or under 15 cents—because petitioner had been first—the court observed that respondent knew when it bid 15 cents on a major procurement in 1965 that petitioner probably could not survive if that price level were maintained. (App. 61.)[8]

---

[7] The district court defined "fully-allocated cost" as "[t]he full cost of manufacturing and selling the product" (App. 33, n.7), which includes all fixed and variable costs such as depreciation, taxes, insurance, general and administrative expenses, overhead, and interest on short and long-term debt. The court of appeals referred to the fully allocated cost per unit of output as the "average total cost." (App. 5, n.2.) *See also,* Petition, p. 9.

[8] The court elsewhere found that prices did not become "predatory" until 1967. (App. 108-09.)

The court then said that during 1968, petitioner was bidding 2-3 cents per pound more than respondent, and losing "almost all major bids;" it inferred from this that "realities of the marketplace are such that [respondent] must have known that it could bid higher." (App. 61.) The court also observed that respondent's "forward pricing activities"—under which A/P producers submitted long-range price projections (not bids) at the request of A/P purchasers—were "particularly telling" because the "forward prices" seemed to vary with petitioner's financial condition. (*Id.*)[9]

Finally, the court took special note of petitioner's contention that respondent "desired to obtain as much of the existing A/P business as possible" (App. 33) and concluded that it demonstrated what it supposed to be an unlawful intention not to "share the market" with petitioner. (App. 62.) The court specifically noted that petitioner would have "followed" respondent's prices at profitable levels, had the prices been published. (App. 64-65.)

And the court explained that, in its view, "there were three possible outcomes of the market conditions" affecting the A/P industry during the years 1966-70:

---

[9] The district court mentioned three additional circumstances it thought symbolic of what it termed respondent's "predatory intent": (1) respondent's "extensive surveillance" of petitioner, whose plant was located virtually within sight of respondent's in Henderson, Nevada; (2) respondent's filing of meritorious administrative protests challenging petitioner's acquisition of "small business" status that would have conferred on petitioner a preference in receiving procurements; and (3) an incident, disavowed by respondent and thus never resulting in a sale, in which one of respondent's employees had suggested to a major purchaser that A/P might be available at a price of 9-10 cents per pound. (App. 61-62.)

"1. Defendants could decide that they would recoup the losses of a price war by monopoly pricing and could actively pursue the acquisition of a monopoly.

2. Price leadership oligopoly could be attempted and fail, resulting in a price war with eventual acquisition of a monopoly by defendants because of defendants' superior financial resources.

3. Price leadership oligopoly could be attempted and succeed with a relatively stable price and a division of the market." (App. 99.)

The district court therefore supposed that respondent was legally obliged to refrain from a "price war"—which by definition was the unlawful means to achieving monopoly—and was instead bound to attempt the creation of a "price leadership oligopoly" under which each producer would enjoy "a relatively stable price and a division of the market." (*Id.*)

2. Monopolization

The district court built its conclusion that respondent monopolized A/P production upon its determination that respondent had attempted to monopolize the industry. Because respondent had been found to have attempted to monopolize, the district court observed that "if monopoly power did exist, it was willfully acquired and maintained." (App. 63.) Turning, then, to whether respondent possessed monopoly power, the court concluded that decisions of this Court warranted holding that, during the five years 1966-70, respondent's bare percentage market share of A/P sales required the inference that it possessed monopoly power during three years, and strongly suggested the same

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1977

No. 77-118

PACIFIC ENGINEERING & PRODUCTION CO. OF NEVADA,
Petitioner,

v.

KERR-McGEE CORPORATION AND KERR-McGEE CHEMICAL CORPORATION, *Respondents.*

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENTS IN OPPOSITION

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (App. 1) [1] is reported at 551 F.2d 790. The order of the court of appeals denying petitioner's request for rehearing en banc is not reported and is not included in petitioner's Appendix. The opinions of the United States District Court for the District of Utah (Hon. Walter E. Hoffman sitting by special designation) (1) holding that

[1] All references to the Appendix, "(App. ——)," are to the Appendix to the Petition. References to "(J.A. ——)," are to the Joint Appendix in the court below.

respondents committed violations of the antitrust laws (App. 19) and (2) awarding petitioner damages for such violations (App. 93) are not officially reported.

QUESTION PRESENTED

Petitioner and respondent[2] own and operate the only two plants in the United States manufacturing ammonium perchlorate ("A/P"), a chemical compound whose only significant use is as an oxidizer in solid fuel propellants powering rockets and missiles. Beginning in the mid-1960's, demand for solid fuel propellants declined so sharply that petitioner and respondent each possessed sufficient productive capacity to satisfy substantially all demand for A/P. In consequence, the price of A/P, which was established by blind competitive bidding procedures governed by procurement regulations of the Department of Defense, declined sharply. In the following years, petitioner and respondent bid at prices they hoped would win each procurement contract; each knew that, if its bid were the low bid, the business would almost surely be denied its competitor.

Respondent also knew that petitioner was on the verge of bankruptcy. But respondent's bids always exceeded its direct production costs, contributing to the fixed costs of its "sunk" capital investment and generating cash flow, so that respondent would be bet-

---

[2] The courts below referred to respondents Kerr-McGee Corp. and Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp. collectively as "AMPOT," an abbreviation for American Potash and Chemical Corp., which was acquired by Kerr-McGee Corp. on December 31, 1967, and consolidated with Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp. in October 1970. Like petitioner, we refer to both respondents as "respondent."

ter off by winning each bid at its bid price than by foregoing the business.

The single question presented is whether Section 2 of the Sherman Act requires that, in the circumstances affecting the A/P industry, the "larger" or "stronger" competitor must bid for procurements at price levels exceeding its full fixed and variable production costs in order to institute a "price leadership oligopoly" (App. 99) under which the smaller competitor would "follow" the leader's higher prices, and each competitor would receive a relatively stable market share at remunerative prices.

STATEMENT

A. Factual Background

In the late 1950's and early 1960's, the projected demand for A/P as a propellant for military missiles and rockets, and for similar applications in the NASA space program, encouraged rapid and substantial expansion in the nation's A/P manufacturing capacity. While only one firm, respondent's predecessor, had manufactured A/P prior to 1958, three more firms had entered the market by 1961. One was petitioner and the other two entrants were large chemical manufacturers, Hooker Chemical Company and Pennwalt Chemical Corp.

Three years later, by late 1963, the industry's prospects were as gloomy as they once had been bright. A combination of factors—including the diversion of defense appropriations to the nation's growing commitment in Vietnam and NASA's decision not to use solid fuel propellants in the civilian space program—curtailed demand for A/P, for which there was virtually

The decision of the court of appeals focused on the district court's fundamental error. It rejected the trial court's holding that Section 2 of the Sherman Act obliged respondent to refrain from price competition and required instead that it bid at prices designed to institute "price leadership oligopoly" under which both competitors would receive a stable share of A/P sales at remunerative prices. The court of appeals therefore had no occasion to resolve the questions petitioner raises, much less did it resolve those questions in the manner petitioner contends it did.

The court of appeals correctly rejected petitioner's "price leadership" theory and properly reversed the district court's judgment, which was built on that theory. Petitioner does not challenge that decisive aspect of the court of appeals' decision. The decision does not conflict with the decision of any other court of appeals and faithfully follows the principles stated by this Court in analogous cases.

The decision is the product of the unique and extraordinary circumstances of the A/P industry during 1966-70 and presents no issues of general importance calling for resolution by this Court.

Following the same order of analysis as the district court, we first address petitioner's erroneous contention that the court of appeals held that antitrust plaintiffs must prove "predatory conduct" in addition to a specific intent to monopolize (Pet., pp. 22-32); second, we refute the assertion that the court of appeals held that but for a showing of specific intent to monopolize it would have held that respondent monopolized the A/P industry (Pet., pp. 14-22); and third, we disprove petitioner's contention that the court of appeals

"conclusively presumed" the lawfulness of prices exceeding marginal or variable costs (Pet., pp. 32-39).

I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT REQUIRE THAT PLAINTIFF PROVE PREDATORY CONDUCT IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH A SPECIFIC INTENT TO MONOPOLIZE.

Because it rejected the district court's conclusion that Section 2 of the Sherman Act obliged respondent to attempt to create a "price leadership" industry structure, the court of appeals never had occasion to reach the question whether an antitrust plaintiff must show "something in addition to specific intent . . . such as predatory or sinister conduct." (Pet., p. 22.)

A.

The Court of Appeals Properly Rejected the District Court's Erroneous View of Section 2 of the Sherman Act.

Petitioner does not so much as allude to the theory of "price leadership" it successfully urged on the district court.[12] That theory postulates that, in a distressed market with two beleaguered sellers, the "larger" or "stronger" seller is presumed to have "specific intent to monopolize" if it seeks for itself the limited business available. That presumption attaches because the larger competitor cannot help but know that its own success would spell the failure of the smaller producer. To avoid the prospect of monopoly, the theory holds, the larger competitor must seek to implement an industry

---

[12] For example, petitioner's reply brief to the district court on the damages phase of the case says (p. 24): "[I]f [respondent] had operated in the A/P market like a responsible, non-predatory seller, it would have set its price and held it with determination, with [petitioner] following [respondent's] price and both sellers making a reasonable profit."

structure of "price leadership oligopoly" under which, to use the district court's words, each producer would enjoy "a relatively stable price and a division of the market." (App. 99.)

The court of appeals expressly rejected the "trial court's holding [that] the only way [respondent] could have avoided violating the anti-trust laws was to raise prices to a noncompetitive level in order to save its smaller, undercapitalized rival." (App. 10.) The court discussed three independent reasons why the district court erred in equating specific intent to monopolize with refusal to engage in "price leadership."

First, it held that the district court improperly concluded that, in the A/P market during 1966-70, bids below fully-allocated cost constitute "convincing evidence" (App. 60) of monopolistic intent and that "it does not take a great deal of evidence to prove this intent when a company has sold below cost." (*Id.*) The court reviewed the district court's key findings that overcapacity, exertion of market power by major purchasers, and desire by each producer to lower its unit costs by expanding output depressed prices and intensified competitive bidding (App. 4-5, 12). It noted that respondent's bids "were always at prices above average variable cost and 'contributed to the company's cash flow.' " (App. 15.) It *rejected* the trial court's finding —if it can be called a finding—that respondent "must have known" it could have raised the price for A/P because "[t]he prices the [district] court found could have been charged . . . were on the average higher than the forward prices which had provoked strenuous objections from the powerful A/P buyers." (App. 9-10.) It reviewed economic authorities confirming the

rationality—indeed, the probability—of variable or marginal cost pricing in circumstances such as those affecting the A/P market. (App. 12-15.) All these factors demonstrated that "[i]n some instances there is no inference to be taken from selling below total cost." (App. 12.) The court of appeals determined that in this case, such pricing reflected "rational, competitive behavior." (App. 15.)

Second, the court rejected the view that respondent's intention to compete vigorously for all possible business, with knowledge of petitioner's financial weakness, was synonymous with specific intent to monopolize the A/P industry.[13] In holding that the Sherman Act does not require price competition to give way to "price leadership" in markets such as the A/P market, the court of appeals embraced Judge Wyzanski's statement of the proposition:

> " '[A] person does not necessarily have an exclusionary intent merely because he foresees that a market is only large enough to permit one successful enterprise, and intends that his enterprise shall be that one and all other enterprises shall fail . . . there must be evidence that the person who foresees a fight to the death intends to use or actually does use unfair weapons.' " (App. 11.)

Third, the court of appeals rejected the district court's "price leadership" test of intent to monopolize as contrary to both the letter and spirit of the antitrust laws; it said that "[p]rice leadership is not de-

---

[13] The court of appeals (App. 6) and the district court (App. 36) each noted that respondent did not expect to achieve a monopoly if petitioner were forced from the market, because petitioner's production facilities would likely be purchased and operated by one of the major A/P consumers.

sirable competitive conduct." (App. 13.) The court cited cases in which evidence of "[c]onscious parallel pricing" has been held sufficient to establish price fixing, a *per se* violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1. (*Id.*) [14] And it recognized that price leadership would amount to little more than a shared monopoly that would ensure high A/P prices and the preservation of costly idle capacity. (*Id.*)

B.

The Court of Appeals' Decision Does Not Conflict With Decisions Of This Court or Other Courts of Appeal.

Petitioner cites no case or other authority supporting the district court's equating specific intent to monopolize with respondent's failure to attempt institution of "price leadership." We know of no such authority.

---

[14] As the court of appeals recognized (App. 13), other authorities underscore that "price leadership oligopoly" would undermine, rather than foster, the goals of the Sherman Act. The effort of competitors to shield themselves from excesses of supply over demand, and thus to avoid "ruinous" competition by "stabilizing" prices, is flatly inconsistent with the Sherman Act's protection of price competition and "the free play of market forces." United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221 (1940); *see also*, United States v. Container Corporation of America, 393 U.S. 333, 337 (1969).

Furthermore, the Armed Services Procurement Regulations ("ASPR"), 32 C.F.R. §§ 1-100, *et seq.* (1975), governed procurement of A/P by the "Big Three" and other government contractors. The regulations require that evidence that bids or proposals are not "genuinely competitive" must be reported to the Attorney General, and that practices affording an inference of illegal conduct include "collusive bidding, follow-the-leader pricing, rotated low bids, uniform estimating systems, sharing of the business, identical bids, etc." 32 C.F.R. § 1-111.2(a) (1975).

None of the authority that petitioner does cite in support of its second issue presented conflicts with the decision of the court of appeals. Cases endorsing the principle that the trier of fact is in the best position to judge the *mens rea* of witnesses, such as *United States* v. *Yellow Cab Co.*, 338 U.S. 338, 341-42 (1949), and *United States* v. *Aluminum Co. of America*, 148 F.2d 416, 433 (2d Cir. 1945), are irrelevant to the reasons why the court of appeals rejected the district court's belief that the Sherman Act obliged respondent to engage in "price leadership." (*See* Pet., p. 30.) Nor can we perceive among the lower federal courts some simmering "confusion and inconsistency concerning whether predatory conduct is a required element for a finding of an attempt to monopolize" (Pet., p. 30, n.13),[15] or the relevance of any supposed confusion to the court of appeals' decision. So too, the principle that "plaintiffs should be given the full benefit of their proof without tightly compartmentalizing the various factual components and wiping the slate clean after scrutiny of each,"[16] which petitioner quotes twice

---

[15] Any "confusion and inconsistency" among the nine recent cases petitioner cites arises from its attempt to lift phrases out of context from the cases and to equate variations in language with conflicts of principle. Each case simply applies, to differing circumstances and contexts, the well-settled rule that a plaintiff alleging an attempt to monopolize must show that the acts of which he complains are accompanied by a specific intent to monopolize and a dangerous probability that the attempt will succeed. *See, e.g.*, United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 105-06 (1948); Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 396 (1905). The cases reflect differing approaches to the question whether "specific intent to monopolize" may itself be the evidence of "dangerous probability," but that is an issue presented by neither this case nor the petition.

[16] Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 698 (1962); Sanitary Milk Producers v. Bergjans Farm Dairy, Inc., 368 F.2d 679, 691 (8th Cir. 1966).

(Pet., pp. 27, n.11 and 29), does not endorse the district court's belief that the Sherman Act obliged respondent to engage in "price leadership."

Finally, there is no merit to petitioner's assertion that *Utah Pie Co.* v. *Continental Baking Co.*, 386 U.S. 685 (1967), forecloses the court of appeals' decision. (Pet., pp. 26-27.) *Utah Pie* neither supports the district court's "price leadership" test of monopolistic intent nor establishes any presumption of universal applicability holding that sales below fully allocated cost announce an intent to monopolize. This Court observed in *Utah Pie* that a jury was entitled to infer from "persistent unprofitable sales below cost and drastic price cuts themselves discriminatory," 386 U.S. at 696, n.12, the "competitive injury" element of primary-line price discrimination forbidden by the Robinson-Patman Act. It said so with respect to a healthy market suffering none of the structural problems affecting the A/P industry, and whose "drastically declining price structure" could be "attribute[d] to continued or sporadic price discrimination." *Id.* at 703.

By contrast, the district court in this case found that the decline of A/P prices below fully-allocated cost occurred well before the period during which it held respondent should have engaged in "price leadership" (App. 36-37, 108-09), and that the price declines derived from the factors that made the A/P industry a "buyers' market." (App. 107.) That is poles apart from *Utah Pie,* in which price declines originated in price discriminations bearing no relation to supply and demand. The court of appeals was clearly correct in determining that *Utah Pie* does not "establis[h] a definitive standard" (App. 11) under which sales be-

low fully allocated costs establish a specific intent to monopolize in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, regardless of the surrounding circumstances.

II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT "IMPLICITLY APPROVE" THE DISTRICT COURT'S CONCLUSION THAT RESPONDENT MONOPOLIZED A/P PRODUCTION.

Petitioner is simply wrong to claim that, "[r]ead in its entirety, the Court of Appeals' opinion implicitly approves the District Court's additional specific findings that Respondent possessed monopoly power to control prices and to exclude competition." (Pet., p. 14.) Rather, the court of appeals held that its rejection of the district court's conclusion that respondent had attempted to monopolize the A/P market also disposed of petitioner's monopolization allegations. Thus the court said that "[t]he distinctions between the two offenses are not relevant to our decision, because the same conduct was relied upon to establish both the attempt and willful maintenance of monopoly" and that the "fundamental issue is whether [respondent] engaged in predatory price cutting." (App. 2-3.) Accordingly, there is no foundation for petitioner's assertion that the court of appeals held that respondent possessed monopoly power but did not violate Section 2 of the Sherman Act because it had no specific intent to monopolize. (Pet., pp. 14-22.)

The reasons why the court of appeals' rejection of petitioner's—and the district court's—"price leadership" test of monopolistic intent disposed also of the monopolization claims appear clearly from the district court's analysis of what it supposed to be respondent's "monopoly power." Although the district court prop-

erly recognized that "[m]onopoly power is the power to control prices or exclude competition" (App. 63, *citing, American Tobacco Co.* v. *United States,* 328 U.S. 781 (1946); *United States* v. *Grinnell Corp.,* 384 U.S. 563 (1966)), it based its findings that respondent possessed monopoly power on the identical "price leadership" theory it had embraced in concluding that respondent had attempted to monopolize the A/P industry. Thus, the district court held that respondent's "below cost" competitive bids had demonstrated that it was "responsible for maintaining the depressed prices."[17] (App. 64.) And the district court held that respondent had the power to raise prices in the industry solely on the strength of petitioner's testimony that, if respondent "had published a price for A/P, [petitioner] would have followed that price as long as it would have allowed [it] a profit." (App. 64-65.) Furthermore, the court of appeals rejected the district court's suggestion that respondent "must have known

---

[17] The district court also said, "We *feel* the [respondent] used its vast financial resources to subsidize its below cost pricing." (App. 64, emphasis supplied.) The only possible basis for the district court's "feeling" is the assumption that the larger financial resources of respondent would enable it to sustain losses for a longer period of time than could petitioner. But the fact is that there were no cash losses, only bookkeeping losses, since all respondent's costs except a portion of its depreciation were covered. (P. 28, *infra.*) The district court specifically rejected petitioner's contention that Kerr-McGee Corp. conspired with AMPOT or Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp. to finance losses during a "price war." (App. 65-68.)

In recognition of the weaknesses of this aspect of its theory, petitioner no fewer than three times resorts to citations of trial evidence—including irrelevant "renegotiation reports" and casual observations of the district court at trial—in an attempt to suggest that respondent implemented a scheme to cross-subsidize its losses. (Pet., pp. 8, 32, 38-39.)

it could raise prices without affecting its market share" because the powerful A/P buyers themselves forbade the price increases the district court hypothesized. (App. 9-10.)

There are, moreover, other critical obstacles, briefed in the court of appeals but which it did not need to reach, that petitioner would have to overcome to prove its monopolization charge. First, petitioner would have to defend the district court's definition of the relevant market. The court of appeals observed that, "for our purposes, we need not question" the district court's finding as to the relevant market "[h]owever, the fact that [petitioner] was not qualified for certain projects . . . did give [respondent] a significant head start in its market share." (App. 6, n.5.)[18] Second, because the district court drew its inferences concerning monopoly power largely from respondent's market share during some years of the 1966-70 period (App. 63-64), petitioner would have to demonstrate that market share is a meaningful measure of market power in an industry in which one or two competitive bids can account for as much as a third of all annual A/P sales. On the strength of a single bid in 1970, for example, petitioner

---

[18] The definition of the relevant product market was one of the most hotly contested issues before both courts below. Because petitioner's A/P was not approved, through qualification testing, for a number of missile and rocket programs, respondent contended that the business for which petitioner was not qualified to compete should be excluded from the "relevant market" because it was outside the "area of effective competition." *See, e.g.*, Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 299, n.5 (1949). The district court ruled against respondent, but recognized that its ruling on the point bore major consequences for the computation of respondent's market share. (App. 52-57.) The district court expressly acknowledged that "this is a close question and our conclusion may be in error." (App. 57.)

Finally, petitioner asserts that "the record contains no evidence whatsoever that Respondent set its prices based upon its marginal costs." (Pet., pp. 37-38.) The assertion is false. In 1966, respondent's financial analyst recommended to management personnel that respondent would be better off producing A/P at 15 cents per pound than by discontinuing production:

> "A review of standard costs for the year 1966 indicates that a price of $300 per ton for ammonium perchlorate (15¢ per pound) reimburses us for all of the direct out-of-pocket costs, all of the costs of sodium perchlorate consumed in the process, and leaves some $87.70 a ton to absorb indirect burdens and fixed charges, totalling $137.61; or, it might be said that the $300 per ton price absorbs all costs direct and indirect except for depreciation and absorbs approximately one-half of the depreciation costs. On an incremental pricing basis, it is more profitable to produce ammonium perchlorate for sale at $300/ton than to discontinue production." (J.A. 4181-83.)

CONCLUSION

The writ should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

Of Counsel:

WILLARD P. SCOTT
THOMAS R. COCHRAN
WILLIAM HEIMANN

Kerr-McGee
Corporation
P.O. Box 25861
Oklahoma City
Oklahoma 73125

PETER J. NICKLES
EUGENE D. GULLAND

COVINGTON & BURLING
888 Sixteenth Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006

PETER W. BILLINGS
ALBERT J. COLTON
STANFORD B. OWEN
PETER W. BILLINGS, JR.

FABIAN & CLENDENIN
800 Continental Bank Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

Attorneys for Respondents

August 1977

reply brief

Supreme Court, U. S.
FILED
AUG 30 1977
MICHAEL RODAK, JR., CLERK

In the Supreme Court of the United States

No. 77-118

PACIFIC ENGINEERING & PRODUCTION CO. OF NEVADA,
Petitioner,

vs.

KERR-McGEE CORPORATION AND
KERR-McGEE CHEMICAL CORPORATION,
Respondents.

Reply Brief for Petitioner

C. KEITH ROOKER
1800 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

RICHARD W. GIAUQUE
Suite 500
Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Petitioner

Of Counsel:

REX E. LEE
2840 Iroquois Drive
Provo, Utah 84601

WILLIAM D. HALL
P.O. Box 34436
Washington, D.C. 20034

SORG PRINTING COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA, 346 FIRST STREET, SAN FRANCISCO 94105

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases Cited	Page
Greyhound Computer Corporation, Inc. v. International Business Machines Corporation, Slip Opinion (9th Cir. August 17, 1977)	8
Telex Corp. v. International Business Mach. Corp., 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir. 1975), *cert. dismissed* (petition withdrawn), 423 U.S. 802	9

In the Supreme Court of the United States

No. 77-118

PACIFIC ENGINEERING & PRODUCTION CO. OF NEVADA,
Petitioner,

vs.

KERR-MCGEE CORPORATION AND
KERR-MCGEE CHEMICAL CORPORATION,
Respondents.

Reply Brief for Petitioner

In its Petition, Petitioner urged that the Court of Appeals had committed three fatal errors in reversing the judgment of the trial court. First, the Court of Appeals in this monopolization case imposed the same standard of specific, "predatory," "sinister" intent as it imposed in connection with Petitioner's attempted monopoly claim. Second, the Court of Appeals converted the requirement of specific intent in attempted monopoly cases into a requirement that Petitioner prove an intent beyond what the trial judge, Hon. Walter E. Hoffman, by designation, found and what the cases have universally held to be sufficient: an "intent

duopoly *to avoid antitrust liability*. Rather, he found factually that Respondent had engaged in a whole series of acts—none of them involving a failure to engage in price leadership—that evidenced monopoly power and specific intent to monopolize. He found that those were overt acts, and that a dangerous probability of monopoly existed. He found that Respondent in fact had the specific intent to monopolize. He found that Respondent controlled monopoly market shares ranging up to 88 percent. He found that Respondent possessed monopoly power to control price and to exclude competition. He found that this power, and those market shares, were obtained and maintained willfully, and not "by growth or development which was a consequence of a superior product, business accumen or historical accident . . . ." (App. B 62.)

None of these liability findings were related in any way to price leadership, except the finding of monopoly power over price, as indicated.

Only two years after these findings were made, and after a separate damage trial, did the trial court utilize the concept of price leadership. He did so solely for the purpose of assessing damages. Judge Hoffman did not hold or even imply that Respondent was obligated to engage in price leadership. He found that a price leadership duopoly was the *most probable result in a market not skewed by Respondent's monopoly power and intent to destroy Petitioner*, and that this fact provided the necessary basis for measuring Petitioner's damages.[3]

Respondent's Brief in Opposition leaves the case in this posture: There was ample evidence to sustain all of the trial court's findings as outlined above, and as set forth in its liability opinion. The Court of Appeals simply did not hold to the contrary. Respondent does not even argue to the contrary. The failure

---

3. The trial judge found that Respondent had the power to raise the A/P price. (App. B 64-65.) The Court of Appeals commented on this finding, but did not reject it. (App. A 9-10.)

of the Court of Appeals to disagree with the critical factual findings made by Judge Hoffman leaves Respondent in a most difficult position. Respondent must take one of three courses. First, it could argue that Judge Hoffman's findings, not rejected by the Court of Appeals, were unsupported by the evidence. This Respondent does not even attempt.

Second, Respondent could acknowledge the findings of the trial court, and the fact that they were not rejected by the Court of Appeals. This would place Respondent in a dilemma: Since the findings of (1) actual monopoly power and (2) specific intent to monopolize were not rejected by the Court of Appeals, that Court necesarily held that (1) even where actual monopoly power exists, the same intent required in attempted monopoly cases must be proven and (2) in attempted monopoly cases, something more than specific intent to create a monopoly or exclude competition must be shown. Either of these holdings obviously warrants full consideration on the merits by this Court. Respondent's refusal to take this second course is therefore understandable.

Finally, Respondent could attempt to persuade this Court that the Court of Appeals did something different than it did. This, in turn, requires Respondent to attempt to persuade the Court that Judge Hoffman did something different than he did.

The third course is the one Respondent has elected. It makes careful examination of Judge Hoffman's liability opinion the focus of the question whether the Petition should be granted. Such analysis will reveal that Judge Hoffman acted as described in this Reply Brief.

Even the most cursory analysis of Judge Hoffman's liability opinion reveals that he held Respondent in violation of the Sherman Act not because Respondent declined to engage in price leadership, but because he found that Respondent was a monopolist, that it possessed monopoly power, and that its conduct satisfied all of the elements of attempted monopolization.

Respondent not only does not engage, it does not even acknowledge, the controlling findings—unrejected by the Court of Appeals—that Respondent had actual monopoly power and also had the specific intent to monopolize. Respondent's avoidance of these dispositive findings neither results in their disintegration nor diminishes the fact that they control the case.

A week-old decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals is in frontal conflict with the decision of the Tenth Circuit in this case. Petitioner is obliged to call that decision to the attention of the Court.

In *Greyhound Computer Corporation, Inc. v. International Business Machines Corporation,* No. 72-253 (9th Cir., August 17, 1977),[4] the Ninth Circuit, in a case involving both monopolization and attempted monopoly claims, reversed a directed verdict in favor of the defendant. The Ninth Circuit adopted the very position on willful acquisition or maintenance of monopoly power urged by Petitioner but flatly rejected by the Tenth Circuit in this case. The Ninth Circuit described practices far less predatory than those involved in this case:

> These practices were (1) inaugurating the "fixed term plan," (2) eliminating the technological discount, (3) increasing the "multiplier" (a ratio describing the relationship of IBM purchase price to IBM rental price), and (4) "unbundling" (*i.e.*, pricing services separately from the equipment purchase price). (Slip Opinion 11.)

The Ninth Circuit then adopts the following rule of law:

> It is no answer to the charge to say that these practices are not "predatory" but "honestly industrial"—that is, of a kind an ordinary enterprise might utilize with impunity. If the

---

4. Because the opinion is not yet published in either the official or the unofficial reporter, Petitioner will notify the Court by letter to the Clerk when the opinion appears in the reporters. Petitioner is prepared to supply any number of copies of the *Greyhound* slip opinion should the Court desire such copies.

> jury concluded IBM possessed monopoly power in the leasing of general purpose computers, IBM would be precluded from employing otherwise lawful practices that unnecessarily excluded competition from the submarket. The question is whether the jury could have found that the alleged practices were in fact adopted, and, if so, whether they had the prohibited effect. (Slip Opinion 11.)

Moreover, the Ninth Circuit expressly rejects the argument made by Respondent and adopted by the Court of Appeals that Judge Hoffman was concerned with competitors rather than with competition:

> Failure to establish that IBM had monopoly power in the sales market is not a legal bar to holding that IBM violated the Act by using exclusionary sales tactics to maintain its monopoly power in the lease market. The Sherman Act would be violated if IBM had monopoly power in the sales market and used that power to foreclose competition, gain a competitive advantage, or destroy a competitor in the lease market. (Slip Opinion 18.)

The *Greyhound* opinion harmonizes with the prior decisions of this Court and other courts of appeals, as much as the decisions of the Tenth Circuit in this case and in *Telex Corp. v. International Business Mach. Corp.*, 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir. 1975), *cert. dismissed*, 423 U.S. 802, are inconsistent with the prior authorities. The *Greyhound* decision underscores the astounding departures of the Tenth Circuit, both in this case and in *Telex*, from the precedents. It emphasizes the conflict among the circuits produced by the decisions of the Tenth Circuit in this case and in *Telex*, as well as the fundamental injustice wrought by its decision in this case.

If the *Greyhound* decision is good law, and it is, and if Judge Hoffman did what he simply said he did, the Petition should be granted and the judgment of the trial court reinstated.

Respectfully submitted this 30th day of August, 1977.

C. KEITH ROOKER
1800 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

RICHARD W. GIAUQUE
Suite 500
Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Petitioner

Of Counsel:

REX E. LEE
2840 Iroquois Drive
Provo, Utah 84601

WILLIAM D. HALL
P.O. Box 34436
Washington, D.C. 20034

Supreme Court, U. S.
FILED
OCT 28 1977
MICHAEL RODAK, JR., CL

In the Supreme Court of the United States

No. 77-118

PACIFIC ENGINEERING & PRODUCTION CO. OF NEVADA,
Petitioner,

vs.

KERR-McGEE CORPORATION AND
KERR-McGEE CHEMICAL CORPORATION,
Respondents.

Petition for Rehearing

C. KEITH ROOKER
1800 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

RICHARD W. GIAUQUE
Suite 500
Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Petitioner

Of Counsel:

REX E. LEE
2840 Iroquois Drive
Provo, Utah 84601

WILLIAM D. HALL
P.O. Box 34436
Washington, D.C. 20034

SORG PRINTING COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA, 346 FIRST STREET, SAN FRANCISCO 94105

In the Supreme Court of the United States

No. 77-118

PACIFIC ENGINEERING & PRODUCTION CO. OF NEVADA,
Petitioner,

vs.

KERR-McGEE CORPORATION AND
KERR-McGEE CHEMICAL CORPORATION,
Respondents.

Petition for Rehearing

On October 3, 1977, this Court denied certiorari in a case in which the Court of Appeals sanctioned a seven-year period of continuous below-cost pricing by a gigantic firm having undisputed monopoly power and monopoly market shares, for the express purpose of excluding Petitioner from the relevant market, and in which, as the trial court found, Respondent's below-cost pricing was accompanied by numerous anti-competitive acts and practices. Based upon all the evidence, the trial court found that Respondent was motivated by a specific intent to monopolize and that Respondent had willfully acquired and maintained its mo-

nopoly power and monopoly market shares. The Court of Appeals in sanctioning Respondent's monopolistic power and abuse of that power committed numerous errors, three of which were presented in the Petition for Certiorari. In this Petition for Rehearing, Petitioner advances three grounds for further consideration by this Court that were available to it previously but were not presented because Petitioner believed the issues presented in the Petition so clearly warranted this Court's attention on the merits. One of the three issues now presented, although previously available, is prompted by intervening circumstances having a major impact on the nation economically.

The grounds upon which Petitioner seeks reconsideration of the Court's denial of Certiorari are as follows:

I. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in This Case Evidences a Growing Hostility Toward Private Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws—A Trend That Must Be Reviewed and Reversed.

II. The Court of Appeals' Adoption of Conclusively Legal Marginal Cost Pricing Conflicts with Congressional Declaration of Fair Pricing.

III. The Court of Appeals Flagrantly Violated the "Clearly Erroneous" Standard of Rule 52(a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

ARGUMENT

I. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in This Case Evidences a Growing Hostility Toward Private Enforcement of the Anti-Trust Laws—a Trend That Must Be Reviewed and Reversed.

By its denial of certiorari in this case, the Court struck a debilitating blow to private antitrust enforcement. Among the matters of seeming great moment that came before the Court for review this session, this private antitrust action was apparently not thought significant enough to warrant the Court's attention.

The Court's denial left standing a decision that surely will become an open invitation for large, dominant firms in this country to destroy smaller rivals through vicious, predatory pricing activities. Today, with a national energy crisis at hand, the behavior of dominant firms in energy-related industries touches every citizen. The elimination of competition by dominant companies such as Respondent Kerr-McGee Corporation will cost the general public billions of dollars in higher, monopolistic product prices, and thousands of jobs in small businesses unable to withstand the vicious pricing activities present in this case.

In the two decades from 1948 to 1968, decisions of this Court in the antitrust field provided considerable illumination and guidance, to litigants and the lower courts alike, in interpreting and applying the antitrust laws so as to ensure preservation of competition and the protection of small business against monopolistic practices. In the line of authority cited by Petitioner in its Petition to this Court, including *United States v. Griffith*, 334 U.S. 100 (1948); *United States v. Yellow Cab Co.*, 338 U.S. 338 (1949); *Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co.*, 348 U.S. 115 (1954); *Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co.*, 386 U.S. 685 (1967); and *Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. Int'l Parts Corp.*, 392 U.S. 134 (1968), this Court stood firmly behind the notion that the protection of competition required vigorous enforcement of the antitrust laws. That line of authority, however, has been so eroded in the last several years by decisions of the courts of appeals that one wonders, particularly after the decision of the Court of Appeals in this case, whether any protections are still available under the antitrust laws for a small business in this country.

Recent decisions, reported on an almost monthly bases, ignore prior antitrust authority, routinely overturn jury verdicts in antitrust cases, and set legal standards difficult, if not impossible, for antitrust plaintiffs to satisfy. This developing body of law

provides large, dominant firms such as Respondent with a hunting license against American small businesses.[1]

---

1. *See for instance, Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp.*, 1977-2 Trade Cases Par. 61,641 (2d Cir. September 20, 1977) (overturning a jury verdict for $2.25 million and completely disregarding this Court's teaching regarding per se restraints in *United States v. General Motors*, 384 U.S. 127 (1966)); *Telex Corp. v. International Business Mach. Corp.*, 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir. 1975) (overturning a substantial plaintiff's verdict, requiring plaintiff to show "sinister" conduct—beyond "mere" intent to monopolize, and disregarding previously clear Section 2 standards announced in *United States v. Aluminum Co. of America*, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945); *Hanson v. Shell Oil Co.*, 1976-2 Trade Cases Par. 61,052 (9th Cir. 1976) (overturning a jury verdict exceeding $1 million, embracing the questionable doctrine that sales at or above "marginal" cost are presumptively lawful, and characterizing the plaintiff thusly, "Like many another loser in a competitive endeavor, he decided to try the antitrust laws as a means of shifting his losses to someone else," a remark hardly generous to antitrust enforcement); *International Air Indus. Inc. v. American Excelsior Co.*, 517 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1975) (upholding a verdict in favor of the defendants, also giving favorable reception to the "marginal" cost theory of pricing, upholding the exclusion of evidence from the defendant's files that a course of action chosen by the defendant would "deprive [the plaintiffs] of their present source of wood and possibly make it rather difficult for them to continue their operation," with the comment that such memoranda are of "little probative value"); *Yoder Bros. Inc. v. California-Florida Plant Corp.*, 537 F.2d 1347 (5th Cir. 1976) (affirming a directed verdict against an antitrust plaintiff and invoking various highly technical standards for a plaintiff to satisfy in establishing the requisite "dangerous probability of monopoly" and for sufficient evidence of "the relevant product market" to reach the jury); *Morning Pioneer Inc. v. Bismarck Tribune Co.*, 1974-1 Trade Cases Par. 74,956 (8th Cir. 1974) (affirming a trial court's holding that to establish an attempt to monopolize a plaintiff must show specific intent, overt anticompetitive acts and a dangerous probability of success by the defendant, and affirming an award of $1.00 (trebled) to the plaintiff); and *Chisholm Bros. Farm Equipment Co. v. International Harvester*, 498 F.2d 1137 (9th Cir. 1974) (affirming a directed verdict against an antitrust plaintiff, holding that specific intent "must be accompanied by predatory conduct directed to accomplishing the unlawful purpose," and reversing the usual burden of proof rule by stating the "evidence did not disclose that [defendant's] actions were not predominantly motivated by legitimate business objectives," Id. at 1144-45). *Cf., Ungar v. Dunkin' Donuts of America, Inc.*, 531 F.2d 1211 (3d Cir. 1976) (reversing an order certifying a class of antitrust claimants, holding that "individual coercion" by a franchisor is a necessary element to be proved by *each* plaintiff).

While the foregoing authorities demonstrate a growing hostility among the courts of appeals toward enforcement of the antitrust laws, none of the recent decisions presents such a classic abuse of monopoly power as the instant case. With its denial of certiorari, the Court leaves standing in this case a court of appeals decision summarily reversing a plaintiff's verdict for some $5 million, which was based upon unrefuted findings, among others, that:

(1) Respondent Kerr-McGee possessed *actual monopoly power* —annual shares of the market ranging between 67% and 88%, plus power to control price and exclude competition.

(2) Kerr-McGee had the *specific intent to destroy competition or create a monopoly.*

(3) Kerr-McGee's sales were far below cost over a seven-year period, and were fixed *with the specific intent of driving Petitioner out of existence.*

(4) Kerr-McGee violated the Robinson-Patman Act by widespread contemporaneous sales of ammonium perchlorate at discriminatory prices.

(5) Kerr-McGee was able to subsidize its enormous ammonium perchlorate losses from its other profitable government business, and from the profitable sale of other products.

(6) Kerr-McGee management officials acknowledged that the company was pricing ammonium perchlorate on "the expectation of forcing [Petitioner] to shut down."

(7) Kerr-McGee maintained a pricing policy of raising prices when it appeared Petitioner was about to go out of business and leave Kerr-McGee with a monopoly, and lowering prices when Petitioner stayed alive.

(8) Kerr-McGee was guilty of a variety of other anticompetitive, "buccaneering" practices against Petitioner, including overt and covert intelligence activities, attempts to steal business already under contract to Petitioner, and attempts to destroy Petitioner's small business status.

Respondent Kerr-McGee is a firm with enormous economic power. The record shows that it has used that power in a malevolent manner to destroy a smaller rival, maintain its market control, and otherwise enhance its economic self-interest, against the general welfare.

Even the Court of Appeals agreed that Kerr-McGee selected and priced the product involved at levels far below full cost, with the knowledge and intent that Petitioner, a small, one-product company could not survive at those prices. Indeed, nowhere is the Court of Appeals' hostility toward private antitrust enforcement and the plight of Petitioner more evident than in its statement that "the other practices employed by [Kerr-McGee] inflicted no independent harm" and *"indicate nothing more than an intent that [Kerr-McGee's] pricing succeed in excluding [Petitioner] from the market."* (App. A., p. 11; emphasis added.) Such a cavalier approval of predatory pricing ought to be reviewed by this Court and summarily reversed. The courts of appeals and large corporations in this country ought to be notified once and for all time that pricing with the intent of driving out one's competitors will not be tolerated under the antitrust laws of the United States, particularly by a firm that has undisputed monopoly power.

As can be seen, the courts of appeals are manifesting increasing stinginess in permitting the Sherman Act—particularly Section 2—to work its beneficial effects on competition. Those courts have expressed a confusion, an uncertainty, and a failure to recognize the symptoms of monopoly power, symptoms that were already identified in such decisions as *Alcoa* and *Griffith*. This confusion and uncertainty stem from the lower courts' attempts in recent years to separate "good" monopolies from "bad" monopolies. Monopolization must be condemned, however, because its mere status is anticompetitive, and because the power of monopoly carries with it the grave potential of abuse. We had

always assumed that this principle is the mainstay of Section 2 doctrine. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has declared otherwise.

Because these rulings by the courts of appeals "threaten the effectiveness of the private action as a vital means for enforcing the antitrust policy of the United States," certiorari is clearly warranted. *Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. Int'l Parts Corp., 392 U.S. at 136.*

The Court is rarely confronted with an opportunity such as this case presents—to condemn the status of monopoly as being illegal, in order that the power of the monopolist be constrained. And rarely will the Court have before it such clear proof as here that certain monolithic American firms are indeed engaged in purposeful, anticompetitive conduct designed to thwart, destroy, suppress and eliminate smaller competitors.

The increasing judicial emasculation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act must end. This Court must declare a renewed commitment to the free marketplace and, more importantly, to the rights of those victimized by power and size. This case presents the Court with an opportunity to light the first candle in the process of reaffirming the values of antitrust enforcement in our free enterprise system.

II. The Court of Appeals' Adoption of Conclusively Legal Marginal Cost Pricing Conflicts with Congressional Declaration of Fair Pricing.

Sales of imported steel products at prices ruinous to the domestic steel industry have received great attention in recent weeks.[2]

---

2. E.g., *The Wall Street Journal,* Western Edition, September 20, 1977, p. 2, reporting cut-back of 5000 jobs in Youngstown, Ohio attributed to "low-price imported steel";

The Wall Street Journal, Western Edition, September 29, 1977, p. 4, reporting additional layoffs;

The Wall Street Journal, Western Edition, October 7, 1977, p. 8, reporting additional layoffs at two Detroit plants of National Steel Corporation attributed to "the heavy influx of foreign steel into Detroit ports. . . ."

The Secretary of the Treasury, acting under the Antidumping Act, 19 U.S.C. §§ 160, et seq., has preliminarily determined that certain major imported steel products have been sold below their fair value in violation of the Act. 42 Fed. Reg. 54489, et seq., October 6, 1977. "Fair Value" as the term is used in the Antidumping Act is defined by Congress as the prevailing price in the nation of origin or, if that price is below cost, a "constructed value." 19 U.S.C. Section 165 defines the "constructed value" as fully-allocated cost plus profit.

The purposes of the Sherman Act and the Antidumping Act are similar. The latter is intended to protect domestic industry from unfair competition injurious to industry and the national economy. Similarly, the Sherman Act, and especially Section 2, is designed to proscribe economic power and unfair tactics injurious to competition and the national economy. Although one is aimed at excessive concentrations of economic power and the use and abuse of that power, and the other at protection of domestic industry from predatory foreign competition, both are centrally concerned with the means of competition—whether competitive tactics are fair.

In the Antidumping Act, Congress has declared that sales below fully-allocated cost are unfair. The Court of Appeals in this case held sales below fully-allocated cost, over a long-run seven-year period, with intent to exclude a competitor, to be fair. The views of Congress and the Court of Appeals cannot be reconciled. Nor should they be, because the Court of Appeals is flatly wrong.

The destructive effects of sales below cost by big businesses to eliminate their smaller competitors, as in this case, are not all different from the destructive effects of below-cost imports. Thousands of steel-workers have been added to the ranks of the unemployed because of the unfair prices of imported steel products. In like manner extensive unemployment will result from concentrations of economic power following the collapse of small businesses unable to subsidize the below-cost pricing available to the industrial giants like Respondent Kerr-McGee Corporation.

Why should the courts allow the very forms of insidious and destructive competitive conduct by domestic firms that are foreclosed by Congress when attempted by foreign firms? The Court of Appeals has sanctioned purposeful exclusion of small businesses by their wealthier competitors. Judges and lawyers may understand that this Court's denial of certiorari represents no endorsement of the Court of Appeals' position. Businessmen may be expected to view the matter otherwise, however, and to act on the promise of the erroneous decision of the Court of Appeals. That decision is bad law. It should be plainly rejected by this Court.

III. The Court of Appeals Flagrantly Violated the "Clearly Erroneous" Standard of Rule 52(a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

The trial court, in its liability opinion, found:

> [T]he plaintiff must prove that the defendant had the specific intent to destroy competition or create a monopoly, that the defendant took overt acts pursuant to this intent, and that a dangerous probability of monopoly existed. . . .
>
> In the case at bar, the primary question is whether AMPOT possessed the requisite specific intent. . . .
>
> As is claimed by PE there is ample evidence of predatory intent. The most convincing evidence is the fact that all of Kerr-McGee Chemical Corporation's and its predecessor's major sales during and for some years prior to the four year and nine month damage period were below cost. . . .
>
> Historically, it does not take a great deal of evidence to prove this intent when a company has sold below cost. AMPOT's extended below cost selling combined with its other acts provide the specific intent in the case at bar. . . .
>
> It is not just the sales below cost, however, which convince us that AMPOT and its successor possessed the requisite predatory intent. Kerr-McGee's other activities are equally persuasive. (App. B, pp. 59-61.)

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Pursuant to Rule 33, subdivision 3(b), of the Supreme Court Rules, the undersigned, a member of the Bar of the Supreme Court of the United States, having duly entered his appearance in the foregoing cause as counsel of record, hereby certifies that, in conformity with Rule 33, subdivision 1, the foregoing Petition was served upon Respondents Kerr-McGee Corporation and Kerr-McGee Chemical Corporation by depositing three copies thereof in the United States Mails, with air mail postage prepaid, addressed to Respondents' counsel of record as follows, this 28th day of October, 1977:

FABIAN & CLENDENIN
PETER W. BILLINGS, ESQ.
ALBERT J. COLTON, ESQ.
STANFORD B. OWEN, ESQ.
PETER W. BILLINGS, JR., ESQ.
800 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

s/ C. KEITH ROOKER
C. Keith Rooker